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Why quantum probability does not explain the conjunction fallacy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 May 2013

Katya Tentori  and
Vincenzo Crupi
Katya Tentori
Affiliation:
Center for Mind/Brain Sciences (CIMeC), Department of Psychology and Cognitive Sciences (PSC), University of Trento, Palazzo Fedrigotti, Corso Bettini, n. 31, 38068 Rovereto, Italykatya.tentori@unitn.ithttp://www.unitn.it/en/cimec/11750/katya-tentori
Vincenzo Crupi
Affiliation:
Dipartimento di Filosofia e Scienze, dell'Educazione, Via S. Ottavio 20, 10124 Torino, Italy. vincenzo.crupi@unito.it
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Abstract

We agree with Pothos & Busemeyer (P&B) that formal tools can be fruitfully employed to model human judgment under uncertainty, including well-known departures from principles of classical probability. However, existing findings either contradict P&B's quantum probability approach or support it to a limited extent. The conjunction fallacy serves as a key illustration of both kinds of problems.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , June 2013 , pp. 308 - 310
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

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