Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-p9bg8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T23:28:45.740Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

What realism about agents requires

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 September 2022

Mark Sprevak
Mark Sprevak*
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK mark.sprevak@ed.ac.ukhttps://marksprevak.com/
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Bruineberg et al. argue that the formal notion of a Markov blanket fails to provide a single principled boundary between an agent and its environment. I argue that one should not expect a general theory of agenthood to provide a single boundary; and the reliance on auxiliary assumptions is neither arbitrary nor reason to suspect instrumentalism.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e211
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Craver, C. F. (2009). Mechanisms and natural kinds. Philosophical Psychology, 22, 575–594.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dennett, D. C. (2017). From bacteria to Bach and back: The evolution of minds. W. W. Norton.Google Scholar
Huebner, B. (2014). Macrocognition. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Kingma, E. (2019). Were you a part of your mother? Mind; A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy, 128, 609–646.CrossRefGoogle Scholar