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Bayesian realism and structural representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 September 2022

Alex Kiefer Open the ORCID record for Alex Kiefer [Opens in a new window]  and
Jakob Hohwy Open the ORCID record for Jakob Hohwy [Opens in a new window]
Alex Kiefer
Affiliation:
Cognition & Philosophy Lab, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC 3800, AustraliaAlex.Kiefer@monash.edualexbkiefer.net
Jakob Hohwy
Affiliation:
Monash Center for Consciousness & Contemplative Studies, Cognition & Philosophy Lab, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC 3800, AustraliaJakob.Hohwy@monash.eduhttps://research.monash.edu/en/persons/jakob-hohwy
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Abstract

We challenge the authors' view that Markov blankets are illicitly reified when used to describe organismic boundaries. We do this both on general methodological grounds, where we appeal to a form of structural realism derived from Bayesian cognitive science to dissolve the problem, and by rebutting specific arguments in the target article.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e199
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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