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Markov blankets: Realism and our ontological commitments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 September 2022

Danielle J. Williams Open the ORCID record for Danielle J. Williams [Opens in a new window]
Danielle J. Williams*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California at Davis, Davis, CA 95616, USA heywilliams@ucdavis.edudaniellejwilliams.com
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Abstract

The authors argue that their target is orthogonal to the realism and instrumentalist debate. I argue that it is born directly from it. While the distinction is helpful in illuminating how some ontological commitments demand a theory of implementation, it's less clear whether different views cleanly map onto the epistemic and metaphysical uses defined in the paper.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e217
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

Bogacz, R. (2015). A tutorial on the free-energy framework for modelling perception and learning. Journal of Mathematics and Psychology, 76, 198–122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Curtis-Trudel, A. (2021). Implementation as resemblance. Philosophy of Science, 88, 1021–1032.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, D., & Drayson, Z. (forthcoming). The nature of the predictive mind: Realism and instrumentalism in Bayesian cognitive science. In Cheng, T., Sato, R. & Hohwy, J. (eds.) Expected experiences: The predictive mind in an uncertain world. Routledge.Google Scholar