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Attack versus defense: A strategic rationale for role differentiation in conflict
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 August 2019
Abstract
Is there a strategic mechanism that explains role-contingent differences in conflict behavior? I sketch a theory in which differences in optimal behavior for attackers and defenders arise under initially symmetric conditions through the dynamic accumulation of differences in the distributions of traits in the subpopulations of potential opponents.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019
References
Bishop, D. T., Cannings, C. & Maynard Smith, J. (1978) The war of attrition with random rewards. Journal of Theoretical Biology 3:377–88.Google Scholar
Hafer, C. (2006) On the origins of property rights: Conflict and production in the state of nature. The Review of Economic Studies 73:119–43.Google Scholar
Target article
Revisiting the form and function of conflict: Neurobiological, psychological, and cultural mechanisms for attack and defense within and between groups
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Author response
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