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The attack and defense mechanisms: Perspectives from behavioral economics and game theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 August 2019

Subhasish M. Chowdhury
Subhasish M. Chowdhury*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, United Kingdom. s.m.chowdhury@bath.ac.uk https://sites.google.com/site/subhasishmc/
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Abstract

This commentary complements the article by De Dreu and Gross (2019) from the perspectives of behavioral economics and game theory. It aims to provide a bridge between psychology/neuroscience research and economics research in attack-and-defense by stipulating relevant literature, clarifying theoretical structures, and suggesting improvements in experimental designs and possible further investigations.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e121
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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