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Symmetric conflicts also allow for the investigation of attack and defense

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 August 2019

Joachim Hüffmeier Open the ORCID record for Joachim Hüffmeier [Opens in a new window]  and
Jens Mazei
Joachim Hüffmeier
Affiliation:
Institute of Psychology, TU Dortmund University, 44227 Dortmund, Germany. joachim.hueffmeier@tu-dortmund.dejens.mazei@tu-dortmund.dehttps://www.fk12.tu-dortmund.de/cms/psych/de/Home/Mitarbeiter/psychologie_ifp/Hueffmeier_Joachim.htmlhttp://www.psych.tu-dortmund.de/cms/psych/de/Home/Mitarbeiter/psychologie_ifp/Mazei_Jens.html
Jens Mazei
Affiliation:
Institute of Psychology, TU Dortmund University, 44227 Dortmund, Germany. joachim.hueffmeier@tu-dortmund.dejens.mazei@tu-dortmund.dehttps://www.fk12.tu-dortmund.de/cms/psych/de/Home/Mitarbeiter/psychologie_ifp/Hueffmeier_Joachim.htmlhttp://www.psych.tu-dortmund.de/cms/psych/de/Home/Mitarbeiter/psychologie_ifp/Mazei_Jens.html
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Abstract

De Dreu and Gross argue that only asymmetric games allow the motives underlying defense and attack to be disentangled. However, the Prisoner's Dilemma Game Alt matrix (PDG-Alt matrix), a modified symmetric PDG, also allows these motives to be disentangled. Studies using the PDG-Alt matrix produced findings contradicting a central claim of De Dreu and Gross.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e125
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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