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Matching pennies games as asymmetric models of conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 August 2019

Michał Wiktor Krawczyk Open the ORCID record for Michał Wiktor Krawczyk [Opens in a new window]
Michał Wiktor Krawczyk*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, 00-241 Warsaw, Poland. mkrawczyk@wne.uw.edu.pl http://coin.wne.uw.edu.pl/mkrawczyk/
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Abstract

De Dreu and Gross (D&G) seem to have disregarded some relevant experimental literature on games of conflict, most notably variations on “matching pennies” games. While in such games, “attacker” and “defender” are typically not explicitly labelled, players’ differentiated roles yield naturally to such notions. These studies partly validate some of D&G's findings and interpretations.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e128
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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