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Attack versus defense: A strategic rationale for role differentiation in conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 August 2019

Catherine Hafer Open the ORCID record for Catherine Hafer [Opens in a new window]
Catherine Hafer*
Affiliation:
Department of Politics, New York University, New York, NY 10012. catherine.hafer@nyu.eduhttp://as.nyu.edu/politics/directory.catherine-hafer.html
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Abstract

Is there a strategic mechanism that explains role-contingent differences in conflict behavior? I sketch a theory in which differences in optimal behavior for attackers and defenders arise under initially symmetric conditions through the dynamic accumulation of differences in the distributions of traits in the subpopulations of potential opponents.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e123
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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References

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