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The political complexity of attack and defense
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 August 2019
Abstract
De Dreu and Gross's distinction between attack and defense is complicated in real-world conflicts because competing leaders construe their position as one of defense, and power imbalances place status quo challengers in a defensive position. Their account of defense as vigilant avoidance is incomplete because it avoids a reference to anger which transforms anxious avoidance into collective and unified action.
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Target article
Revisiting the form and function of conflict: Neurobiological, psychological, and cultural mechanisms for attack and defense within and between groups
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Author response
Asymmetric conflict: Structures, strategies, and settlement