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Resolving attacker-defender conflicts through intergroup negotiation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 August 2019

Nir Halevy
Nir Halevy*
Affiliation:
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. nhalevy@stanford.eduhttps://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/faculty/nir-halevy
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Abstract

The target article focuses on how attacker-defender conflicts are fought. This commentary complements it by considering how attacker-defender conflicts may be resolved at the bargaining table. I highlight multiple linkages between asymmetric intergroup conflict as modeled with the attacker-defender game and negotiation research and illustrate how the proposed model of attacker-defender conflicts can inspire new research on intergroup negotiation.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e124
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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