In March 2024, Daniel Kahneman – the man who did perhaps more than anyone else to shape the field of behavioural public policy – died. He is among a small handful of scholars who have had a huge effect on my own career, and in this essay – the first in a series of essays in a special section of the Journal that honour him – I reflect on how his work inspired much of my own.

Paternalistic nudging and framing aim to correct flaws in deliberation by relying on the same cognitive mechanisms that create those flaws. Regarding some choices as flawed and in need of correction requires some standard of correctness. In their well-known book, Nudge, Thaler and Sunstein take the individual's own “purified” preferences to be that standard, which is inconsistent with the finding of behavioral economics that individuals do not have a stable preference ranking of alternatives, but instead construct their preferences when faced with a choice. This essay defends an alternative, readily usable standard to judge whether individuals are choosing badly and whether nudges can help them to choose better.

The heart of prospect theory is the value function, proposing that the carriers of value are positive or negative changes from a reference point. Daniel Kahneman observed that if prospect theory had a flag, the value function would be drawn on it. The function is nonlinear, reflecting diminishing sensitivity to magnitude. When describing how human lives are valued, the function exposes profound incoherence. An individual life is highly valued and thus vigorously protected if it is the only life at risk. But that life loses its value when it is one of many endangered by a larger tragedy. Beyond this insensitivity, the function may actually decline when many lives at risk become mere numbers. The more who die, the less we care. Implications of this deadly ‘arithmetic of compassion’ for understanding and managing the risk from nuclear weapons are briefly discussed.

With the increasing availability of life-saving vaccines against the SARS-CoV-2 virus, government agencies face the challenge of promoting vaccine uptake. Thus, encouraging vaccine uptake marks an urgent policy challenge in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. This study builds on the theory of psychological ownership to design a behaviorally inspired local government vaccination campaign. We conducted a large-scale, cluster-randomized field experiment (N = 27,298 residents nested in 6,442 addresses) delivered to all registered residents of a German municipality via an official mailing campaign. The campaign included a psychological ownership intervention designed to boost residents’ intentions to get vaccinated – measured through unique link clicks on a municipal website where people can schedule a COVID-19 vaccination appointment. Findings suggest that adding possessive pronouns (i.e., ‘YOUR vaccination’) increases vaccination intentions by 39%, or 2.5 percentage points (p < 0.0001 [95% CI = 1.8%, 3.3%], control letter: 6.4%, treatment letter: 8.9%). The discussion outlines the value of using psychological ownership-based nudge interventions to increase vaccine uptake and other desirable behaviors.

Kahneman and Tversky’s ‘Prospect Theory’ paper famously demolishes expected utility theory as a predictive device. However, it presents deviations from that theory as ‘normatively unacceptable’ and argues that decision-makers would normally correct them when possible. In a later paper, Kahneman rejects a similar argument (the ‘discovered preference’ hypothesis) advanced by Plott. Later still, Kahneman endorses Sunstein and Thaler’s ‘libertarian paternalism’, which aims to help people avoid deviating from their ‘true’ preferences. I report an email correspondence between Kahneman and me in which we debated whether his position on libertarian paternalism was consistent with his critique of Plott’s hypothesis.

Once vaccines against COVID-19 became available in many countries, a new challenge has emerged – how to increase the number of people who vaccinate? Different policies are being considered and implemented, including behaviourally informed interventions (i.e., nudges). In this study, we have experimentally examined two types of nudges on representative samples of two countries – descriptive social norms (Israel) and saliency of either the death experience from COVID-19 or its symptoms (UK). To increase the legitimacy of nudges, we have also examined the effectiveness of transparent nudges, where the goal of the nudge and the reasons of its implementation (expected effectiveness) were disclosed. We did not find evidence that informing people that the vast majority of their country-people intend to vaccinate enhanced vaccination intentions in Israel. We also did not find evidence that making the death experience from COVID-19, or its hard symptoms, salient enhanced vaccination intentions in the UK. Finally, transparent nudges as well did not change the results. We further provide evidence for the reasons why people choose not to vaccinate, and whether different factors such as gender, belief in conspiracy theories, political ideology, and risk perception, play a role in people's intentions to vaccinate or susceptibility to nudges.

Many moral judgments are rooted in the outrage heuristic. In making such judgments about certain personal injury cases, people’s judgments are both predictable and widely shared. With respect to outrage (on a bounded scale of one to six) and punitive intent (also on a bounded scale of one to six), the judgments of one group of six people, or 12 people, nicely predict the judgements of other groups of six people, or 12 people. Moreover, outrage judgments are highly predictive of punitive intentions. Because of their use of the outrage heuristic, people are intuitive retributivists. People care about deterrence, but they do not think in terms of optimal deterrence. Because outrage is category-specific, those who use the outrage heuristic are likely to produce patterns that they would themselves reject, if only they were to see them. Because people are intuitive retributivists, they reject some of the most common and central understandings in economic and utilitarian theory. To the extent that a system of criminal justice depends on the moral psychology of ordinary people, it is likely to operate on the basis of the outrage heuristic and will, from the utilitarian point of view, end up making serious and systematic errors.

Dark patterns – design interfaces or features that subtly manipulate people in making suboptimal decisions – are ubiquitous especially in e-commerce websites. Yet, there is little research on the effectiveness of dark patterns, and even lesser studies on testing interventions that can help mitigate their influence on consumers. To that end, we conducted two experiments. The first experiment tests the effectiveness of different dark patterns within a hypothetical single product online shopping context. Results show that, indeed, dark patterns increase the purchase impulsivity across all dark patterns, relative to the control. The second experiment tests the effectiveness of three behaviorally informed interventions on four different dark patterns also in a hypothetical online shopping scenario, but this time offering multiple products instead of a single product. Between-subject analysis shows that not all interventions are equally effective, with uneven impact across dark patterns. However, within-subject results indicate that all interventions significantly reduce purchase impulsivity pre- versus post-intervention, indicating that any intervention is better than none when it comes to combating dark patterns. We then end by discussing the policy implications of our results.

This paper examines Daniel Kahneman’s concept of experienced utility and its roots in Bentham’s hedonic utilitarianism. It focuses on Kahneman’s call for a ‘separate value judgement’ to determine when experienced utility can be used to evaluate temporally extended outcomes (TEOs). Two potential judgements are proposed: comprehensiveness and personal independence. Comprehensiveness means that the measurement of utility captures all relevant aspects of instant utility. Personal independence means that the TEO is fully independent of other TEOs with which it might be combined (or ‘concatenated’). I argue that identifying TEOs meeting these criteria may be challenging, possibly restricting the applicability of experienced utility. I conclude by considering the implications for behavioural science’s quest for an unambiguous, measurable operationalisation of utility.

Debtors were stimulated to contact their creditors to negotiate a repayment plan. Contacting creditors was important because debtors were unlikely to repay the debt immediately and upon contacting, debtors could agree on a repayment plan to repay the debt in the long run. Using insights from scarcity theory and nudging techniques, a standard debt repayment letter was adapted and both letters were compared. Experimental results (N = 3,330) provide support for the use of nudging techniques as more debtors agreed on a repayment plan and response rates increased. The results underline the importance of stimulating debtors to contact their creditors.

Daniel Kahneman’s legacy is best understood in light of developments in economic theory in the early-mid-20th century, when economists were eager to put utility functions on a firm mathematical foundation. The axiomatic system that provided this foundation was not originally intended to be normative in a prescriptive sense but later came to be seen that way. Kahneman took the axioms seriously, tested them for descriptive accuracy, and found them wanting. He did not view the axioms as necessarily prescriptive. Nevertheless, in the research program he conceived, factual discoveries about real decision-making were stated as deviations from the axioms and thus deemed ‘errors’. This was an unfortunate turn that needs to be corrected for the psychological enrichment of economics to proceed in a productive direction.

While in his early years, Kahneman followed the world of classic utilitarianism in which smart individuals base decisions on how they will truly feel each moment in the future, Kahneman in Mandel (2018) adopted a very different position, namely that what matters is the story people tell of their lives. He thus grappled with evolving stories of both the future and the past, and the presence of different decision-supporting evaluations for the short-run and the long-run.

Important challenges like climate change require transformative policy responses. According to a growing public policy literature, such transformative responses typically require complex policy packages that bundle various individual policy instruments to complement each other, compensate transition losers, and create positive synergies. Nevertheless, while adding new instruments to a package can increase policy effectiveness, it comes at a price: increased policy design complexity. Increased complexity potentially leads to fundamental public misperceptions that undermine policy legitimacy and feasibility. Here, I argue that complex policy packages affect public opinion through a compensation, policy perception, and design complexity mechanism. To test this argument, this study assesses if citizens evaluate proposals for isolated climate policies related to food and mobility behaviors differently to complex policy packages. Employing a novel two-stage conjoint-experimental approach with 9115 respondents from the USA and Germany, the study shows that policy packaging increases citizens’ perceived policy effectiveness to reduce climate pollutants, but also perceived restrictions on citizens’ lifestyles. Moreover, increased design complexity can lead citizens to pay special attention to salient costly parts of policy packages. However, increased design complexity does not fundamentally reverse preferences. Through packaging desired and undesired policy instruments, policymakers can increase public support for transformative climate policies.

Kahneman’s criticism of neoclassical rationality was central to his research programme. He argued that rationality understood as temporal consistency among preferences and beliefs is inapt as a descriptive and prescriptive standard of decision-making. Descriptively, consistency ignores high decision costs and biases, such as framing effects. Prescriptively, it is problematic since it neglects the processual nature of choice and the crucial role of regret. Instead, Kahneman argued in favour of using reasonableness as a standard, though he did not fully develop the concept in his work.

Existing research demonstrates that parents are poorly informed consumers of early childhood education and care (ECEC) services. Choosing such services is a complex process shaped by a combination of logistical limitations (e.g., cost/location), informational barriers and ideas about what the goal of care should be (e.g., education of young children or provision of an environment that feels like home). Experimental studies have also demonstrated that when study participants are informed of the importance of a specific decision, they engage in more complex decision-making. In this article, we test whether providing parents with information about the regulatory stringency of ECEC options available influences their choices regarding ECEC. A conjoint survey designed to capture quasi-behavioural choices for ECEC services was completed by 682 parents. Before engaging with the survey, participants were randomly assigned into either a control group or a treatment group that informed them about the stringency of oversight regarding ECEC options available in the province of Ontario, Canada. Receiving information did not meaningfully change the choices of the entire sample. However, a subgroup analysis revealed an important information effect on parent decisions for lower income/lower-education parents.

Behavioural public policy (BPP) operates within one of four cultural models of public management, an illustration of an influential scheme set out by Christopher Hood. Even though BPP can be fatalist, individualist or egalitarian, so far it has been hierarchicalist. Hallsworth’s manifesto is largely an expression of this hierarchicalist form of public management, with all its limitations and contradictions. As the manifesto pays relatively little attention to decentralist and egalitarian approaches, it misses a radical opportunity. Future work on BPP could incorporate entrepreneurial and egalitarian possibilities while recognising the difficulties of moving away from hierarchalism completely. Even though Hood cautions against a ‘public management for all seasons’, it remains a plausible path for the next generation of researchers and practitioners of BPP.

Times of emergency often serve as triggers for the creation of new policy. Such policies may involve restriction of human rights, and various mechanisms can be used to mitigate the severity of such restrictions. One such mechanism is the temporary measure. A series of three experiments examined the potential of temporary measures for increasing the likelihood of approval of rights-restricting policy and the role of time – both prospectively and retrospectively – in the willingness to restrict human rights. We find that behavioural examination confirms the concerns expressed in the literature regarding temporary legislation. Participants asked to approve a rights-restricting policy were more willing to approve a temporary measure when it was presented as a compromise, and they were more willing to extend a rights-restricting policy when it had previously been implemented. These findings indicate a possible slippery slope effect in temporary legislation: policymakers might be persuaded to approve measures they would not otherwise approve when those measures are temporary or when they have been previously approved by others.

This article serves as a commentary on Michael Hallsworth’s 2023 piece, ‘A manifesto for applying behavioural science,’ featured in Nature Human Behaviour. The manifesto was prompted by methodological, practical and normative critiques directed at behavioural science and its role in public policy. In this commentary, I argue that the manifesto presents numerous insightful and constructive reform proposals regarding the scope, methods and values in behavioural science, which can help advance the field of behavioural public policy. While there is much to agree with, I contend in this commentary that applied behavioural science can and should delve deeper into the study of socially and culturally embedded processes of goal formation. Additionally, it should explore the institutional conditions necessary for individuals to formulate their goals competently and in a self-determined manner.

The aim of this article is to better understand how judgements about nudge acceptability are formed and whether they can be manipulated. We conducted a randomized experiment with N = 171 participants to test whether acceptability judgements could be (1) more favourable when the decision to implement the nudges was made following a consultation with the targeted population and (2) influenced by the joint framing of the nudge's purpose and effectiveness (in terms of an increase in desirable behaviour versus decrease in undesirable behaviour). We tested these hypotheses on various nudge scenarios and obtained mixed results that do not clearly support our hypotheses for all nudge scenarios. A surprising result that calls for further work is that by mentioning that a nudge had been implemented through a consultation with the targeted population its acceptability could be lowered.