Mark Mazower's latest book, No Enchanted Palace: the End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations intelligently weaves in the League of Nations as the primary informant of the United Nations to deconstruct any claims of discontinuities between the two institutions. In doing so, Mazower offers an eloquent polemic against the literature's tendency to idolize the United Nations' founding as a symbolic and material break from empire. Exploring the dark sides of its intellectual origins and early years, however, Mazower points to the decolonization movement to argue for the potential of the United Nations as a site of emancipatory struggle — his book concludes with a reinvestment in its promise of a more inclusive and just world order. The issue left to the reader, and which I hope to address in this review essay, is the legitimacy of Mazower's claim that the United Nations has indeed escaped its imperial heritage.

“The right of privacy … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”

Recent theories of societal development carry a heavy load; they are weighed down by their inheritance from the philosophy of history. Only at the price of a paradoxical forgetfulness can they ignore the fact that there have been predecessors, whose origin and decline, as well as the particular circumstances of their revival, must also be of interest. However, there appears to be a quest for the meaning of life, coupled with an aesthetic requirement to do a kind of elegant violence to historical complexity, which gives rise to such forgetfulness about one's own history. If one has discerned the difficulties with philosophy of history, it is only with considerable irony that one could erect a handsome structure in the form of a theory of development. There are, nevertheless, some lessons from the development of theories of development, which may permit a cautious advance. In what follows I want to attempt such a cautious advance towards a theory of legal development.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has proven a particularly active defender of human rights in Latin America. The Court has developed an innovative and creative jurisprudence with respect to all kinds of human rights violations, including forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, violations of indigenous peoples' rights or those of undocumented migrants. Legal scholars have praised the Inter-American Court for its effective protection of human rights and even the International Court of Justice has drawn on the judgments of the Inter-American Court. The Inter-American Court has, however, also been criticized for adopting an overly broad standard of review, exceeding the competences conferred on it in the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR, Convention) and for its detailed reparation orders which encroached on the states' internal domestic affairs. Put differently, the Court was blamed for being a too active judicial lawmaker. It has therefore been suggested that the Inter-American Court would be well advised to pay more attention to national sovereignty and the consent of the regional community of states when exercising its adjudicative function.

David Strauss' The Living Constitution addresses the issues of constitutional interpretation and judicial activism in the United States. The book supports the practice of Living Constitutionalism and attempts to demonstrate its advantages over Originalism. It presents general arguments as well as accounts of landmark decisions in order to demonstrate the superiority of Living Constitutionalism. The Living Constitution also argues for common law as the all-but-exclusive method for constitutional change in the modern United States. Overall, the book presents a well-organized and concise case for Living Constitutionalism.

It is a pleasure to be back in Dublin and to have this opportunity to speak to you about the Court and its future. Reading the outpourings of denigration in the newspapers recently you can be forgiven for believing that the Court is about to be towed into the middle of the Rhine and scuppered by a coalition of unhappy State Parties. So where does the future of the Court lie and how should one respond to such media buffetings?

What should we make of Susan Silbey's call for socio-legal scholarship that is both critical and empirical? Do we think the law and society movement can and should develop a critique of the legal order? Can empirical research contribute to such a critique? Does the idea of a “critical sociology of law” make any sense at all?

The institutional design of the Strasbourg system that has evolved over the last decades is an expression of contemporary debates surrounding the system's very nature and purpose. The current debate primarily bears on the range of choices that the Council of Europe faces in adapting to the changes in Europe, which largely have been caused by its expansion to cover nearly all post-Communist States of Central and Eastern Europe since the 1990s. This expansion, and with it the extension of the scope of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) to now more than 800 million people in forty seven countries, has confronted the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) with a far broader range of human rights problems than had previously existed. By 2010, the number of pending cases had risen to 139,650 but the Court's adjudicative capacity remains limited.

The Max Planck Institute's research on international judicial institutions as lawmakers, which was published in May as a special issue of the German Law Journal, is an important contribution to the analysis of one of the most complex and controversial legal issues in our epoch. In the last two decades, international adjudication has become a recurrent source of legal concern, and sometimes even a source of public concern.

In its Aid Measures for Greece and Euro Rescue Package case, the German Federal Constitutional Court affirmed the Parliament's budget authority to provide financial aid measures to the European Monetary Union. The judgment conforms to the German Federal Constitutional Court's case law concerning the transfer of sovereign power to international organizations and reaffirms that German participation in international organizations is linked to constitutive pillars of the German Basic Law. One of these pillars is the Principle of Parliamentary Budget. This principle provides that any financial aid package has to be approved by the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundestag) before guarantees can be given to other states by the Federal Government. In its holding, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the aid measures for Greece and the euro rescue package were consistent with the Principle of Parliamentary Budget and German Basic Law.

Empirical research had already lost the possibility of a naive claim to objectivity when empirical legal sociology began work in post-war Germany. From the mid-1960s general sociology was involved in the “Positivismusstreit” and was discussing the influence of preconceived interests of perception, commonplace theories and social interaction on empirical observation. Social scientists widely accepted the view that social reality does not exist objectively, but emerges intersubjectively. Science also shapes social reality. For sociology there is nothing which can simply be counted and measured.

Without presenting a full definition, it can be said that the notion of judicial lawmaking implies the idea that courts create normative expectations beyond the individual case. That is, our question is whether courts' normative declarations have an effect which is abstract and general. Our purpose here is to ask about judicial lawmaking in this sense with respect to international criminal courts and tribunals. In particular, we will focus on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). No other international criminal court or tribunal has issued so many judgments as the ICTY, so it seems a particularly useful focus for examining the creation of normative expectations.

In international law, jurisdiction serves the same principal aim as in national law, namely the settlement of disputes in order to maintain (legal) peace and security. In international law, as in national law, judicial procedures take time, sometimes a lot of time, during which the rights at stake may be negatively affected by acts of one of the parties potentially resulting in an ineffective judgment. A remedy against such an occurrence has been developed through an instrument of interim protection by which the court directs the parties to leave the rights as they stand and not to interfere with the situation. Such an instrument appears indispensable in order to ensure that a court or tribunal is able to effectively exercise its function. At the national level, interim protection is usually unproblematic since the competence of the tribunals is mostly comprehensive. In international law, in contrast, the competence of judicial organs is one of the most discussed problems because it depends on the consent of states. Any expansion of competence without an explicit agreement of the states concerned is therefore of utmost significance for the role and the acceptance of international courts and reflects the organizational status of international society. Thus, in the context of the project “Beyond Dispute: Lawmaking by International Judicial Institutions,” the subject-matter of this contribution mostly relates to the role and self-understanding of international judicial organs; it is less concerned with the creation of substantive normative expectations between international subjects. Yet, the expansion of judicial competences fits into the conceptual apparatus of this research as it innovates the legal order and reaches beyond the case at hand. The case of provisional measures provides a particularly fine example of incremental judicial law making through progressive interpretation, supported by a holistic vision of the international judiciary, reciprocal strengthening and later state practice, as well as its functional legitimation and its limits.

On 8 March 2011, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice issued a significant ruling regarding the interpretation and scope of the concept of European Union citizenship. In an eagerly anticipated judgment, the Court held that Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) confers a right of residence and a right to obtain a work permit upon the parents of a minor dependent European Union citizen who has never left the Member State of his or her nationality. The ruling is notable for having redefined the “internal situation” rule and extended the reach of the primary law provisions on Union citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC. Yet, some of the potential implications of Zambrano have been qualified by the Court's subsequent rulings in McCarthy and Dereci. In those cases, the Court restricted the scope for EU citizens who have never exercised their free movement rights to rely on EU law in order to derive rights of residence for their third-country-national family members in their country of nationality. Moreover, the brevity of the Zambrano judgment indicates substantial disagreement amongst the judges and has the effect of leaving a number of issues unclear. What are the precise limitations to relying on Article 20 TFEU in a situation that falls outside the scope of Article 2004/38/EC? How does the ruling impact the ongoing discussions on reverse discrimination and the protection of fundamental rights in the E.U.? After briefly describing the factual and legal background of the case, the opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, and the Court's judgment, we will discuss the questions raised above before considering the potential implications of the ruling for Member States' migration and nationality laws.

This paper describes a topology of legal thought and the social conditions (the larger social construction of reality) of which that topology, that thought, is a component. Part I is a description of the structure of legal thought; Part II of the social conditions (a theory of the state, or political economy). The Conclusion considers the place of traditional legal practice on a new landscape.