Does institutional variation have implications for questions of
conflict and peace? Theory indicates that it does, but extant studies that
address this question treat such institutions as homogenous. Building on
recent theoretical advances, I argue that cooperation on a wide array of
economic issues and regular meetings of high-level officials provide
member-states with valuable information regarding the interests and
resolve of their counterparts. This, in turn, reduces uncertainty and
improves the prospects of a peaceful resolution of interstate disputes. To
test the effect of these two institutional features on the level of
militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), I present an original data set
that measures variation in institutional design and implementation across
a large number of regional integration arrangements (RIAs) in the 1980s
and 1990s. Employing multivariate regression techniques and the regional
unit of analysis, I find that a wider scope of economic activity and
regular meetings among high-level officials mitigate violent conflict.
These results remain intact after controlling for alternative explanations
and addressing concerns of endogeneity.Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the 45th Anual
Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March
16–20, 2004 and at the 100th Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2–5, 2004. For
helpful comments and suggestions I thank the editor and two anonymous
referees of this journal, as well as Paul Fritz, Yoav Gortzak, Edward
Mansfield, Timothy McKeown, Brian Pollins, Peter Rosendorff, Donald
Sylvan, Alex Thompson, and Peter Trumbore.