In the United Nations as in other political organizations elective offices are eagerly sought as badges of prestige and levers of influence. Some of the most hotly contested political battles in the United Nations have centred around elections to the prestigious and influential nonpermanent seats on the Security Council. Contests have sometimes run to many ballots before any country emerged with the required two-thirds majority, and deadlock has more than once forced a compromise in which the two-year term was divided between two contenders. Indicative of the feeling sometimes aroused was Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations in 1965 which, although prompted by other motives as well, was timed to serve as a protest against the seating of Malaysia on the Security Council. Contests for other positions are generally less spirited, but there are invariably more office seekers than offices.

The South West Africa Cases presented the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with a choice not only between the parties to the suit but also between rival claims about the nature of international law itself. Perhaps every case presents the Court with a choice of some degree between jurisprudential foundations, but in the South West Africa Cases the choice is striking.

The quality of executive leadership may prove to be the most critical single determinant of the growth in scope and authority of international organization. Now sufficiently long and varied to allow a comparative approach, the history of international organization may provide elements for a theory of leadership. This essay is but a preliminary effort in that direction. It is concerned not only with how the executive head protects and develops his position as top man but also with how, by doing so, he may be the creator of a new (if yet slender) world power base.

The United Nations at its present stage of development is a political system of formally coordinate Members, each able to place before the Organization the demands that flow from its own environment. One can hypothesize that a stable environment will yield a stable pattern of demands on the United Nations political system. Similarly it can be hypothesized that a change in the environment—the major components of which are the Member States—will change the pattern of demands made on the political system of the Organization. It is on just such a change that this article proposes to focus. In the period between 1955 and the end of 1968, 37 African states, largely devoid of experience in the contemporary international arena and struggling with the multitudinous problems of fashioning coherent national entities in the face of both internal and external pressures, joined the United Nations. The admission of these states substantially altered the Organization's environment and the demands being made upon it. It is suggested here that these changes have been so substantial as to alter the nature of the political process of the Organization. Concern will be focused successively upon the nature of the entry of the African states into the United Nations, a determination of the areas in which the African states have made demands upon the system, the constitutional structure of the Organization as it has evolved under the impact of the African states, the impact of the African states on the handling of major issues, and finally on trends and implications of the role of African states in the United Nations.

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) devoted its major efforts from the endof July 1965 until April 1968 to negotiating the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, spending little time on other arms control measures in the sessions throughout this period. In May 1968 the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly presented the draft treaty to the First (Political and Security) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. After lengthy debate and acceptance of several amendments to meet the wishes of nonnuclear states the Treaty reached its final form on May 21, 1968, and was “commended” in General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII) of June 12, 1968.

In recent years considerable concern has been expressed in the United States over the changing composition of the United Nations membership and the failure of the one-state, one-vote formula in the General Assembly to reflect the actual power and significance of the different United Nations Members. “Malapportionment” as such is frequently not the issue here, for whether one looks at population, wealth, or budget assessments the United Nations General Assembly has always been “malapportioned.” And, at least in terms of population, the United Nations is no more malapportioned now than it was in 1945. Rather than a concern with a new situation, the growing emphasis on this issue is often a reflection of the fear that malapportionment will now operate to the disadvantage of the United States; that is, the ”overrepresented” states of today may not be as closely associated with the United States as the ”overrepresented” states of the past.

It was above all to avoid the recurrence after World War II of threats to world peace and order that the United States set out to design and bring into being the United Nations and the congeries of related agencies. “From the very beginning,” says the report of the American delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, “the problems of post-war peace and security were paramount.” This seemingly obvious observation is not as trivial as it may sound, for it is a benchmark by which to measure the transformation that has occurred in the character, emphases, and achievements of the United Nations. It will no longer do to say, as was once possible, that the UN's value can be judged solely by its success in avoiding international conflict. Today, the United Nationsvery likely would command American attention and participation even if it had no utility in the realm of peace and security.

At the present time scientific opinion has shifted to the view that man can, in certain circumstances and at certain places, modify at least local weather conditions in limited ways. Many believe that man can dissipate certain “cold” fogs in limited areas for short periods; that he can increase rainfall or snowfall by perhaps ten to fifteen percent in a local area in narrowly limited circumstances; that he can probably convert hail into less dangerous forms of precipitation, also in narrowly limited circumstances.1 Some experiments are being conducted to learn more about such phenomena as hurricanes and lightning. Man still needs to learn much more and to develop faster computers before he can begin to think of safely undertaking intentional modification on anything more than a local and highly selected basis. Nevertheless, it is clear that even the limited effects thus far produced do not stop at some predetermined boundary; both nationally and internationally attempts to modify weather can be expected to cause dislocations and friction.

In recent years political scientists have given increasing attention to the phenomenon of legitimacy, defined, following Richard Merelman, as the quality of “oughtness” perceived by members of a political system to inhere in the system's authorities and/or regime. The more the regime is regarded as morally proper and elicits generalized favorable attitudes from its constituency—i.e., is perceived to be legitimate—the more the members are predisposed to comply with directives of the authorities even when they are under no serious compulsion to do so or their own immediate self-interest does not so dictate.

Karl Deutsch has argued that since the mid-1950's the structural, or institutional, political integration of Western Europe has come to a halt. What Deutsch means by the halt of political integration in Western Europe is the ending of any trend toward the development or the expansion of the authority of supranational institutions to make major policy decisions. Political decisions will continue to be made by sovereign nationstates and not by any supranational European institutions. Although institutional political integration is the central variable in his analysis, Deutsch reports no attempts to directly measure the decisionmaking capability of any Western European supranational institution. By accepting the validity of his sociocausal paradigm of political integration, which holds that political integration cannot occur until after a process of social assimilation creates a homogeneous transnational population, Deutsch contends that in order to describe the levels of political integration in Western Europe he need only examine data relating to the levels of social homogeneity which characterize that region. To measure the extent of social assimilation in Western Europe Deutsch examines the transaction flow rates of trade, mail, travel, migration, and student exchange data and studies the responses of mass and elite population samples to a complex series of survey questions. Deutsch's analysis of these varied data leads him to conclude that the levels of social assimilation in Western Europe have 1) remained constant for the past decade and 2) are too low to permit institutional political integration to occur.

The decision of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to occupy Czechoslovakia in August 1968, while it represents a fundamental turning point in Soviet foreign policy, most of whose implications are ambiguous yet ominous, should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the Soviet regime remains confronted with a wide array of postponed internal and external problems that demand action and yet defy resolution. The decision to arrest forcibly the processes of liberalization in Czechoslovakia stands out as an uncharacteristic act of will on the part of a regime whose four years in power have been marked by drift, indecisiveness, vacillation, paralysis, and “muddling through.” For five years the government of Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin has postponed action on painful problems, has permitted events and situations to accumulate dangerously, and in general has allowed itself to be dominated by events rather than domesticating them. During its first two years in office the regime's inaction was perhaps inaccurately ascribed to prudence, caution, and calculated restraint. It now appears in retrospect that paralysis was confused with prudence, inertia was mistaken for caution, and factional indecisiveness was accepted as self-restraint.

The decision of the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919 to place the German colonies and Turkish territories under the supervision of the League of Nations raised serious political and legal questions to which no one had satisfactory answers. But, by contrast with the numerous recent studies of World War I and the Peace Conference that deal at least in passing with the origins and establishment of the mandates system, there are very few satisfactory scholarly essays that analyzer the aftermath of the Peace Conference's deliberations on international colonial affairs. The opening of the archives of the government of the United Kingdom after 1919 provides a good opportunity to review the subject and to examine what the unpublished records reveal about international supervision in colonial areas.

For the past two decades the nation-state in Western Europe has been on the defensive as a principle of political organization and the nationalism which sustains it has been held in disrepute. The assailants have been both internal, reacting against the increasing centralization which comes first with nation building and later with modernization, industrialization, and increasing welfare activity, and external in the form of federalist, neo-functionalist, and supranationalist claims against the nation-state. These latter claims challenge the material adequacy of the nation-state to fulfill the security and welfare demands of the modern age and die moral validity of the principle of nationalism at whose door has been laid the responsibility for the bellicosity, aggression, war, and destruction which plagued the European Continent during the first half of this century.

Except for the subfield of comparative regional integration, international organization as an area of study is notorious for its lack of systematic and testable theory. This situation has been created less by a deficiency of techniques for quantitative analysis than by the absence of attention to theoretical conceptualization and its necessary accompaniment, the imaginative use of data to test hypotheses. There is little shortage of case studies, abstract theorizing, or sophisticated quantitative techniques, but systematic testing of important concepts is rare. Much of the literature in the field fails even to ask relevant and important theoretical questions. The “Mount Everest Syndrome”–studying international organizations “because they are there”–has afflicted the field for too long.

This essay is addressed to the issue of the extent to which and the ways in which the United Nations may serve the interest of the United States in the maintenance of world peace during the decade that lies ahead. It rests upon two assumptions, both of which require careful qualification: first, the assumption that the United States has, and recognizes that it has, a fundamental interest in international peace; second, the assumption that the United Nations is in principle an organization dedicated to the promotion of international peace.