This article applies the concept of hybrid regimes to evaluate the state of political transition in Indonesia and Thailand. It aims to answer why the transition to democracy in Indonesia during 1999–2004 was successful, while the transition in Thailand during 1997–2006 culminated in a reversion to authoritarianism by examining the social profiles and formation of cabinet and parliament members as well as the design of constitutions. The study suggests that the lack of inclusiveness helps explain why democratization in Thailand was in failure. During the transition period, inclusiveness has not markedly increased because of the leadership strongman style, the flaws in the recruitment process, and the problem with the party system. This was unlike Indonesia, where cabinet, parliament, and multiparty system were able to include a variety groups and broad societal segments that played a significant role in deliberating political rules of the game. Indonesia's institutional rearrangements appear to sustain popular participation and engender momentum for fostering democracy, while Thailand's constitutional re-engineering contains many provisions to disempower the elected bodies. The perpetuation of the hybrid regime in Thailand is foreseeable as the hybridity satisfies the needs and concerns of the traditional elites and the urban middle class.

Empowering the rank and file members in choosing a party leader has become an increasing trend in parliamentary democracies. This study examines the process of adopting more inclusive methods to choose a party leader in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan. The LDP introduced a national primary to elect a leader in 1978. However, this first attempt to open up the party leadership selection was soon replaced by traditional coalition-making politics. In this regard, the LDP is different from most of the Westminster parties that followed a smooth linear process of transferring more power to the rank and file members. This article identifies a ‘swing-back’ effect between 1980 and 1990 in the democratization process of party leadership selection. Working like a pendulum, the LDP did not resume a primary until 1991. It was in 2003 that a nationwide primary became a regular way. This article argues that the discontinuity of reformist actors caused this uncommon swing-back effect. The reformist split in 1976, the sudden death of Masayoshi Ohira, and Kanemaru mediation in 1984 stalled the reforms. Although one finds a similar trend in democratizing party leadership selection outside Europe, the LDP presented an abnormal inactivity and time-lag differences.

This article proposes an analysis of changes implemented during Malaysia's Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's administration (2003–09), using the theoretical framework commonplace in studies on conservatism. Based on the premise that transformations in conservative polities are prone to producing conflict, the dynamics of conflict situations during Abdullah's checkered Premiership is foregrounded. As we apply the main criteria defining conservatism to regime behaviour in Malaysia, it becomes clear that such criteria are stoutly held by the regime's elites in their quest for social harmony and political stability. Regime maintenance then finds justifications in such seemingly sublime ends, thereby self-perpetuating Malaysian conservatism. Such despondency prevailed during Mahathir Mohamad's administration (1981–2003), which displayed bias against changes and introduced schemes to justify the systems it upheld. Transmutations wrought during Abdullah's tenure may have been neither substantial nor totalizing, but within the conservative paradigm which had long gripped national politics, Abdullah's deviations were significant nevertheless.

Elections to Japan's upper house, the House of Councillors, are ‘secondary’ elections, that is, elections that do not choose the government. Among the implications of this secondary status is that the party system is primarily determined elsewhere, by the system used in the general elections that do choose the government. From 1947 through 1993 the system used in general elections fostered a multiparty system that did not sit easily with the many single-member districts of the House of Councillors. Since 1996 general elections use a system based primarily on single-member districts, which is fostering a two-party system. As a two-party system emerges, we should expect the single-member districts of the upper house to become more and the multi-member districts to become less congruent with the party system. The 2004 House of Councillors election presented us with our first example of what two-party elections might look like in future upper house elections. The overall results do indeed indicate the advent of the two-party system with the major parties winning 96% of the seats in the district tier and 71% in the PR tier.

Documenting how the Japanese state responded to increasing social discontent during initiation of unpopular welfare reforms, this study examines the factors that hindered the political empowerment of civil society despite the timely introduction of participatory policymaking institutions. The Japanese government opted in the early 2000s to introduce a participatory method to initiate the unpopular pension reform. Deliberation councils were established to encourage open discussions among government policymakers and committee members, including citizen representatives. The final outcomes of the deliberations, however, were mostly about parametric adjustments and did not adequately consider the urgent demand of the general public. The participatory measure did not significantly improve the public's trust in the pension programs, but it did justify the government's reform initiatives. The welfare bureaucracy that set the goal, defined the scope of the agenda, and steered the discussions toward technical issues structurally restricted the voices of the citizen members in the deliberation councils. The lack of citizen advocacy groups, which could otherwise have effectively supported the citizen members on the committee, contributed to the limited roles and influences of the citizens. It is argued that the traditional conservative corporatism of Japan was reinforced during this time period, despite the introduction of the idea of participatory governance.

The aim of this short essay is to further reflect on sociology in Japan by supplementing discussions on the three sociological papers compiled in this volume and adding critical perspectives. Discussions, and arguments, will be provided on the three thematic categories, namely, ‘international sociology’, sociology of culture as well as language use, and the global academic market, the latter addressing not merely sociology but also other social sciences.

After the end of World War II, East Asia gradually formed what can be referred to as a quasi-anarchical regional order. The quasi-anarchy system is defined by the anarchy system associated with a sub-hierarchical system, so this system possesses the characteristics of both anarchy and hierarchy in terms of security relations among states. The states in a quasi-anarchical order can be differentiated into three types according to the method through which they seek security. They comprise that of self-help states, the state that provides security guarantees to client states (security guarantor), and states that receive security protection from the security guarantor (client states) within the quasi-anarchy. The standard security relationship between states consists of two types: the first is a competitive security relationship; the second is a security-dependent relationship. The quasi-anarchical order in East Asia has restricted the continuance and positive effect of a rising China's reassurance policy through three mechanisms: dependence, reliance on support, and imitation.

What determines whether interest groups choose to contact politicians or bureaucrats? Despite the importance of this question for policymaking, democracy, and some prominent principal-agent understandings of politics, it is relatively unexplored in the literature. We argue that government stability plays a major part in interest groups’ decisions. That is, central to interest groups’ decisions is their assessment of the likelihood that politicians currently in power will continue to be in the future. We deduce logical, but totally contrasting hypotheses, about how interest groups lobby under such conditions of uncertainty and then test these using a heteroskedastic probit model that we apply to a unique longitudinal survey of interest groups in Japan. We find that when it is unclear if the party controlling the government will maintain power in the future, interest groups are more likely to contact the bureaucracy. When it is believed that the party in power will retain control for a considerable period, interest groups are more inclined to contact politicians. In addition, during times of government uncertainty, interest groups that are supportive of the governing party (or parties) are more likely to contact politicians and those that are less supportive will be more likely to contact bureaucrats.