This article analyzes rural-urban migration in Great Britain in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Using a new dataset of 28,000 individuals matched between the 1851 and 1881 population censuses, I examine the selection process and treatment effect of migration, controlling for the endogeneity of the migration decision. I find that urban migrants were positively selected—the best of the rural labor pool—and that the economic benefits of migration were substantial. Migrants responded to market signals, and labor markets were largely efficient; however, not all gains from migration were exploited, potentially indicating some degree of inefficiency.

Using data on New Deal grants to each U.S. county from 1933 to 1939, we estimate how relief and public works spending and payments to farmers through the Agricultural Adjustment Administration influenced retail consumption. On a per capita basis, we find that an additional dollar of public works and relief spending was associated with a 44 cent increase in 1939 retail sales. In contrast, the AAA seems to have had a negative effect on retail sales, suggesting that nonlandowners in the farm sector suffered disproportionate declines in income as a result of the AAA.

Railroad development had a profound impact in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Brazil. Direct benefits were small for passengers, but large for freight services, and contributed heavily to the transition from stagnation to growth. Domestic-use activities received a differentially large stimulus. Estimates of the social rate of return reveal that Brazil did not overinvest in railroads. A different allocation of subsidies to railroad capital could have generated additional gains. Backward linkages did little for industry, but the “leakage” attributable to imported inputs was modest. Institutional externalities were mixed. By 1913 railroads had paved the way for dramatically improved economic growth.

This article aims to cover an important aspect of the economic history of Porfirian Mexico: the integration of agricultural domestic markets. Because corn was the staple crop of the commercial agricultural sector, it becomes the protagonist of this story. Panel techniques are applied to a price-convergence model. Although still unfinished on the eve of the Mexican Revolution, corn market integration substantially accelerated during the Porfiriato and ended up further integrated than estimated by Kuntz. Railroads were not only indispensable to the economic growth of Mexico, but also played a key role in the process of corn market integration.

This article studies the effects of branch banking restrictions on American firm investment and growth. Authors have suggested that the lack of widespread branching bank networks hindered the development of large-scale industrial firms. This article presents a model that implies that restrictions on branch banking cause the severity of external finance constraints to increase with firm size. This hypothesis is tested using a panel data set of over 250 firms for 1911–1922. Investment and growth sensitivities are significantly higher for large firms than for smaller firms, suggesting that branch banking restrictions hindered the expansion of large-scale firms.

Even after controlling for local economic conditions, differences in supervision and regulation help explain the large variation in state bank suspension rates across U.S. counties during the Great Depression. More stringent capital requirements lowered suspension rates whereas laws prohibiting branch banking and imposing high reserve requirements raised them. States whose bank supervisors could liquidate banks minimized contagion and credit-channel dislocations and experienced lower suspension rates. Those that gave their supervisors sole authority to issue bank charters and granted their supervisors long terms strengthened the incentives for bank lobbyists to influence supervisory decisions and consequently experienced higher rates of suspension.

Colonial societies exhibit peculiar institutions frequently attributed to the unequal and exploitative nature of the relations between colonizer and colonized. Repartimiento has been depicted as a coercive system of production and consumption designed by Spaniards to draw reluctant Amerindians into the market. An examination of repartimiento through the lens of New Institutional Economics provides an alternative understanding of this credit system. Characteristics of the repartimiento most often identified as exploitative are better explained as institutional adaptations designed to facilitate contract enforcement and economize on transaction costs in this cross-cultural trade. Consequently, this peculiar colonial institution served to expand trade.

Between 1842 and 1852, eleven states adopted new constitutions, simultaneously creating procedures for issuing government debt and for chartering corporations through general incorporation acts. Why simultaneously? Voters wanted geographically specific infrastructure investments but opposed geographically widespread taxation. States resolved the dilemma by developing several innovative public finance schemes. One, “taxless finance,” used borrowed funds and special corporate privileges without raising current taxes. Another scheme, “benefit taxation,” coordinated the incidence of taxes with the geographic benefits of investments through the property tax. After the fiscal crisis of the early 1840s, states changed their constitutions to eliminate taxless finance in the future.