This paper addresses both how best to incorporate forecasts of future excess market returns into a market-timing strategy and what additional return to expect as a consequence. In contrast to the work of Jensen [8] and Grant ([4], [5], and [6]), the results specifically consider and measure the attractiveness to a risk-averse investor of the positively skewed distribution of portfolio returns expected from a market-timed portfolio. The usual mean and variance characterization of a risky portfolio is not sufficient in the case of a markettimed portfolio, and a simple utility model is employed to measure the incremental value of a market-timing strategy. The results are given as a function of the relative volatility of the market, the quality of available forecasts, and the risk attitude of the investor.

This paper provides an explanation for the widespread use of traditional securities by well-established firms. Standard moral hazard models predict that equity, debt, and warrants are almost never optimal financing instruments. I show that issuing these securities is, nevertheless, nearly optimal: the issuer would gain very little by using non-traditional securities instead. Combined with equity, one debt issue (without multiple layers of seniority) and one warrant issue (without multiple exercise prices) suffice to achieve near optimality. The near optimality of traditional financing depends crucially on the issuer's ability to use warrants in addition to debt and equity.

We model the employee incentive problem jointly with a firm’s exit decision. Our model predicts that firms in industries where human capital is important are more likely to go public and use high-powered, stock-based compensation. We also show that the higher the management quality, the more likely a firm is to go public than to be acquired. Regarding life cycle, a firm with high capital intensity and/or high management quality will choose to go public at a younger age.

Horizon-matched historical volatility is commonly used to forecast future volatility for option valuation under the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 123R. In this paper, we empirically investigate the performance of using historical volatility to forecast long-term stock return volatility in comparison with a number of alternative forecasting methods. In analyzing forecasting errors and their impact on reported income due to option expensing, we find that historical volatility is a poor forecast for long-term volatility and that shrinkage adjustment toward comparable-firm volatility only slightly improves its performance. Forecasting performance can be improved substantially by incorporating both long memory and comovements with common market factors. We also experiment with a simple mixed-horizon realized volatility model and find its long-term forecasting performance to be more accurate than historical forecasts but less accurate than long-memory forecasts.

This paper analyzed the issue of why large commodity futures traders hold a large percentage of their portfolios in straddle positions where, for the most part, such behavior implies that they are holding assets with negative expected returns. It showed that an earlier paper by Schrock [2], which suggested that such behavior provided a means by which investors could enhance their risk-return tradeoffs, provided only a partial explanation for this behavior which, in a world of positive interest rates, held only under fairly restrictive conditions. Thus, it went on to develop a more general result which strongly suggests that differentially low margin requirements on straddle positions provide a strong incentive in a world of positive interest rates for investors to hold commodity straddle positions. With some modification the model developed in this paper can be used to derive similar conclusions for certain classes of transactions in the stock options market.

The familiar two-parameter model for portfolio decisions, attributed to Markowitz [11], has individuals maximizing an objective function, ϕ [E(Y), V(Y)], of mean and variance of end-of-period wealth, subject to a constraint imposed by initial wealth. In the usual version there is an arbitrary number, n, of risky assets with stochastic end-of-period values (price plus dividend) represented by the vector X with exogenously given mean vector μ and nonsingular variance matrix σ. There is also one riskless asset, whose certain end-of-period value per dollar invested is p. Final wealth, as constrained by initial wealth, W, is given by Y = WP + a' (X – OP), where a and P are vectors of risky asset quantities and prices. Assuming ϕE > 0 (wealth preference), ϕV < 0 (risk aversion), and that the Hessian of $ is negative and semidefinite, portfolio optimum calls for ϕE(μ − OP) + 2ϕVσa = 0, or

A key assumption behind the traditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is the joint normality of security returns. Recently, however, this assumption has been relaxed in at least two directions. First, the emergence of continuous-time models has shifted emphasis from discrete-time random variables to continuous-time diffusion processes, with log-normality (as opposed to normality) for security prices in the stationary case. Second, the recognition that the CAPM is difficult to test empirically has led to the development of an asset pricing theory based on an arbitrage argument in large markets and free of any distributional assumption.

This paper presents a model of equilibrium in a capital market for linear shares of risky firms andin a market for managerial labor in which market participants function as both investors and managers. The model yields interesting and relevant equilibrium conditions that integrate earlier separate treatments of the capital market with human capital and the incentive contracting problem regarding shirking.The theory developed here provides a microeconomic explanation of how the price of risk established in the capital market is relevant to the labor contracting problem. The analysis also provides a logical rationale for the division of responsibilities between a board of directors and the management of the firm.

Recent developments in the literature on bond portfolio management have identified conditions under which uncertainty of the investment return attributable to interest rate changes is eliminated. Such a strategy, called immunization, is achieved when the duration of the bond or portfolio of bonds is equal to the investor's holding period. Duration is defined as a weighted average time to maturity and was originally developed by Macaulay [13]. The condition under which immunization is obtained by setting duration equal to holding period was derived by Redington [14] and Fisher and Weil [10] and further developed by Bierwag and Kaufman [4], Bierwag [2], and Khang [12]. Bierwag [3] has provided a concise summary of the theory of immunization, and Bierwag and Khang [7] show that immunization is equivalent to selecting a strategy in which the worst possible return is maximized, i.e., a minimax strategy. Bierwag [1] examines immunization under multiple shocks to the term structure and Bierwag, Kaufman, and Toevs [6] extend the concept to a general equilibrium, two-state Arrow-Debreu world.

This paper develops a methodology for term structure estimation from a no-arbitrage condition in markets with frictions. The methodology unifies existing estimation procedures, such as the regression and linear programming approaches, and substantially broadens the class of useful estimation techniques. The estimators derived in this way are capable of reflecting actual market conditions, such as the asymmetry in the tax treatment of long and short positions and the higher financial cost of establishing a short position. The methodology is derived by applying the conjugate duality theory of mathematical programming.

This study explores the phenomena associated with conflicts of interest, particularly as they pertain to the brokerage and proprietary trading divisions of investment banks. This distinguishes it from past studies, which have researched conflicts of interest between underwriting and brokerage divisions. We examine whether or not an investment bank issues buy recommendations to the market and buys (sells) the same recommended stocks through its proprietary trading division before (after) recommendations, and if so, to what extent this goes on. We find that these conflicts of interest do exist and that these investment banks can profit from their recommendations in the short run.

We examine the influence of outside directors’ industry experience on segment investment, segment operating performance, and firm valuation for conglomerates. Given board composition is endogenous, we instrument for the presence of industry expert directors using the supply of experienced executives near conglomerate firms’ headquarters. We find that industry expert representation on the board causes increased segment investment. Consistent with experienced directors playing favorites rather than acting as dispassionate advisors, segment profitability (firm value) is lower for segments (firms) with industry expert outside directors. We do not find analogous negative profitability or valuation effects of director experience for single-segment firms.

How does the market value “toxic” structured-credit securities? We study the valuation of what is possibly the most toxic of all toxic assets: the equity tranche of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO). In theory, CDO equity should be similar in nature to bank stock since both represent residual claims on a portfolio of loans. We find CDO equity returns are much more related to stock returns than to fixed-income returns. CDO equity returns track the returns of financial stocks much more closely than any other industry. Nearly two-thirds of the variation in CDO returns can be explained by fundamentals.

We document that firms’ financing decisions are affected by historical high prices. The ratio of the monthly high price to the 12-month historical high price positively affects the probability of a seasoned equity offering (SEO). Furthermore, the postannouncement market reaction is muted and the offering discount is smaller if the preannouncement stock price is high relative to its historical high price. The results suggest that historical high price reference points may help managers rationally time SEOs to take advantage of market reception and minimize issuance costs.

The main focus of this study concerns the pricing of default-free bonds in a risky economy inhabited by risk-averse consumers. The methodology of the paper draws upon recent work in the fields of intertemporal asset pricing and valuation by arbitrage principles. We develop a general equilibrium model for the expected rates of return on “created financial assets” (such as bonds) dependent upon the risk attitudes of investors and the uncertain real investment opportunities available.

We develop hypotheses regarding the association between two types of creditor rights and bank loan losses. Contrary to prior research conclusions, bank lending risk is negatively associated with both restrictions on reorganization and the secured creditor being paid first. Using accounting disclosures, we develop novel empirical measures of the probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) at the loan-portfolio level. Different types of creditor rights have differential effects pertaining to PD and LGD and exhibit significant intertemporal variation. We corroborate our cross-country findings using the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) shock to creditor rights.

I exploit the leveraged exchange-traded funds’ (ETFs’) primary market to measure aggregate, uninformed, gambling-like demand, that is, speculation sentiment. The leveraged ETFs’ primary market is a novel setting that provides observable arbitrage activity attributed to correcting mispricing between ETFs’ shares and their underlying assets. The arbitrage activity proxies for the magnitude and direction of speculative demand shocks and I use them to form the Speculation Sentiment Index. The measure negatively relates to contemporaneous market returns (e.g., it is bullish in down markets) and negatively predicts returns. The results are consistent with speculation sentiment causing market-wide price distortions that later reverse.

This article has two goals. The first is to contrast two widely used definitions of risk aversion. The second is to establish the feasibility of plunging behavior, in the sense that a possibly large number of risk averse investors will not be diversifiers.

How does the structure of financial intermediaries’ liabilities affect their asset holdings? We investigate the consequences of the 2014 money market fund (MMF) reform, which imposed redemption gates and liquidity fees on prime MMFs and forced prime funds marketed to institutional investors to switch from constant to floating net asset value. These changes made prime MMFs’ liabilities less money-like. As a consequence, the affected MMFs experienced an increase in flow–performance sensitivity and started taking more risks. In addition, the total funding provided by MMFs to the corporate sector, and especially to safer issuers, has decreased.

A growing number of studies use dollar-weighted (DW) returns as evidence that bad timing substantially reduces investor returns, and that consequently the equity risk premium must be considerably lower than previously thought. This paper demonstrates that this method is subject to a hindsight effect (as prior returns influence levels of new investment) and derives a technique that corrects it. The results show that for mainstream U.S. equities, DW returns are low because of this hindsight effect (bad investor timing had very little impact). Thus, low DW returns do not imply that the risk premium is correspondingly low.