Considerable attention has been focused recently on models of firms under uncertainty in which there is an incomplete set of securities markets. In these models, each firm can issue only one security and consumers can generate consumption plans only through the purchase of firms' securities. Consequently, if the economy is competitive, each stockholder of a firm will impute the same value to the firm in equilibrium, where this value is given by the market price of the firm's security. However, stockholders will not, in general, have the same implicit prices for state-contingent consumption. Since the financial market is said to be incomplete if the number of independent securities is less than the number of states of nature, consumers cannot hedge perfectly, whichimplies that unconstrained Pareto-optimal allocations are not generally attainable (see [2] and [3]). Finally, it is unclear what firms' objectives should be in these models because profit maximization is not well defined; firms' profits in different states cannot be aggregated into a single index. It is still generally accepted, however, that firms should operate in their own stockholders'interests, a necessary condition for allocative efficiency.

The structure and analytical representation of investors' utility-of-wealth functions has long been of interest in portfolio theory. In proposing convenient analytical utility functions most economists have used (i) constant elasticity (power) functions, (ii) the negative exponential function. Both (i) and (ii), of course, restrict the preference structure; Moreover, one may object to (i) because such functions are not uniformly bounded on [0, ∞). And, as has been shown by Arrow [1], this is undesirable in an axiomatic system. The negative exponential function has no such disadvantage, but objections may be raised on empirical grounds. Thus, no simple convenient specification of bounded utility functions on [a, ∞) is available. In fact, even polynomials in wealth of arbitrary order are restrictive since they immediately impose the requirement that moments of wealth are finite. (If the polynomial is of order n, then the nth moment must be finite.)

In placing a new security issue, an investment banker has an opportunity to obtain private information by conducting preselling activities during the registration period. The task of the issuer is to design a contract that both induces the banker to use this information to the issuer's advantage and provides a disincentive for the banker to price the issue too low in order to reduce the effort required to sell the issue. This paper characterizes the class of price response functions that the issuer can induce the banker to choose under a delegation scheme and demonstrates that delegating the pricing decision to the banker can be optimal.

The concept of profit sharing—whereby a company provides employees with a contribution above and beyond their regular wages based upon business profits—is very old indeed. Implementation of this concept is witnessed by the many profit sharing plans of all kinds in existence today. However, even though the concept is old and the use widespread, there is a complete void in published literature on the nature of optimal profit sharing plans. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate this subject.

We have confirmed that Corrado and Schatzberg's (1990) criticism of our test for serial independence in stock returns (Ashley and Patterson (1986)) is correct. The corrected results still favor rejection of the null hypothesis that the daily returns for several stocks (notably Holly Sugar (HLY) and E Systems (ESY)) are serially independent, but only at the 12-percent and 14-percent significance levels, respectively. Evidently, this kind of test is long on simplicity and intuitive appeal, but short on power.

This paper points out errors in the stable variate generator used by Frankfurter and Lamoureux (1987) in a recent simulation study. The study was aimed at determining whether or not the assumption of the distributional form of stock returns is important in the construction of optimal portfolios.

The well known Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin capital asset pricing model (CAPM) assumes the existence of stability in the price level so that the market price of risk (MPR) measured in nominal terms is the same for all risky assets in an equilibrium market. Friend, Landskroner and Losq [5, hereafter F-L-L] have recently shown that CAPM measured in nominal terms understates the MPR if an uncertain inflation is expected and if a covariance between the rate of return on the market and the rate of inflation is positive (p. 1287).

We examine whether financing commitments from a target firm’s financial advisor, in the form of stapled financing, provide certification of target value. Using a data set of leveraged buyouts spanning 2002–2011, and addressing endogeneity issues, we find that stapled financing has significant positive effects on sellers’ shareholder wealth, especially for targets suffering from greater adverse selection. Stapled financing facilitates deal financing by allowing buyers to obtain lower-cost and longer-maturity debt, and it is positively associated with bidding intensity. Investment banks offering stapled financing appear to trade off higher expected advisory fees against loss of lending efficiency ex post.

We investigate whether firms’ number of credit relationships with financial institutions affects labor market outcomes. Using 5 million observations on matched credit and labor panel data from Brazil, we estimate IV regressions, employing exogenous variation in firm-lender relationships due to nationwide bank M&A activity. Firms with more relationships employ more workers and pay higher wage bills. Credit availability, cost of credit, and financial institution heterogeneity are economic channels. The firm-level results translate into positive macroeconomic effects in municipalities and states. The evidence is novel and indicates the positive effects of multiple relationships on labor market outcomes in an emerging economy.

This study examines the historic security market performance of REIT shares during the six-year period 1968–1973. Performance measures suggested by Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen were calculated for a sample of 30 larger and older REITs on both a pre- and post-tax basis. Principal conclusions are: 1) The average mortgage trust sampled had “outperformed” the S&P 500 while equity and hybrid trusts have fared poorer than the S&P 500. 2) The differences in performance levels are due principally to return levels and not risk differentials. 3) A substantial portion of the risk inherent in an REIT is diversifiable risk. This together with other evidence suggests that most REITs have not diversified risk exposure to the extent they indicated they would and were able to. 4) Performance rankings using before- and after-tax returns were identical, suggesting that certain espoused tax advantages unique to REITs have been virtually meaningless on a practical level.

We present evidence that short sellers alternate between stock picking during expansions and market timing during recessions. First, firm-level short interest is a much stronger negative predictor of the cross-section of stock returns during expansions than it is during recessions. High short interest also only predicts negative future earnings announcement returns during expansions. We attribute these findings to short sellers’ emphasis on collecting firm-specific signals. Second, short sellers appear to make factor bets more so during recessions than during expansions. These bets tend to pay off as we observe a strong negative relation between the betas of highly shorted stocks and future stock market returns, a result that disappears during expansions. Together, these findings are consistent with theories of information acquisition under attention constraints, endogenous information production, as well as theories of time variation in aggregate overconfidence amongst traders.

I study the effect of patent-infringement claims by patent trolls on acquisitions of small firms. Exploiting staggered adoption of state anti-patent troll laws, I find that the laws have two effects. First, the number of acquisitions of small firms declines after these laws are adopted. Second, the anti-troll laws increase the acquisition price for acquirers. The market reflects the increased cost of acquisition as measured by lower acquisition announcement returns. Large firms increase R&D after the adoption of state laws, replacing external innovation. Using a sample of acquisitions that are plausibly unaffected by the laws, I disentangle alternative explanations.

Using an international sample of IPO firms and two country-level measures of financial literacy, we find strong evidence that financial literacy is negatively associated with IPO underpricing. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the effect of financial literacy in reducing IPO underpricing is more pronounced when the information environment is less transparent. Employing path analysis, we document that information friction, firm transparency, and stock market participation are mechanisms that mediate this relationship. Our study contributes to and extends the literature by providing strong evidence that citizens’ financial literacy has an important and consistent influence on IPO underpricing.

Using firm-level survey information, we investigate whether relationship lending affects firms’ employment decisions in the face of negative sales shock. We find that firms with a durable relationship with their main bank display significantly less employment growth sensitivity to such shocks, especially where these are transitory. The result is stronger for younger and smaller firms that benefit from tighter bank-firm relationships, and for firms in sectors or economic environments where the costs of employment adjustment are greater. Our findings indicate that relationship lending provides liquidity insurance to firms to meet their demand for labor hoarding.

We find that male participants in Harvard Business School’s New Venture Competition who were randomly exposed to more venture capital (VC) investors on their panel were substantially more likely to start a VC-backed startup post-graduation, indicating that access to investors impacts fundraising independent of the quality of ideas. However, female participants experience no benefit from exposure to male or female venture capitalists (VCs), which appears related to a reduced propensity to reach out to VCs to whom they were exposed. Our results therefore also demonstrate gender-based differences in the degree to which increased exposure to investors can address networking frictions in venture capital.

Using data from the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE), we study the value added by (as distinct from the abnormal returns to) analysts’ recommendations. Recommending brokers’ clients trade profitably around positive recommendations at the expense of other brokers’ clients. Significant profits come from transactions before recommendation dates. Value added is greatest for upgrades to large caps, and largely insignificant for downgrades and recommendations of small caps, despite high abnormal returns. Brokers making profitable recommendations generate abnormally high commission income, recouping much of their clients’ abnormal profits, and their abnormal commission income varies in line with the abnormal profits for their clients.

In a dynamic general equilibrium model, we derive conditions for a mutual fund separation property by which the savings decision is separated from the asset allocation decision. With logarithmic utility functions, this separation holds for any heterogeneity in discount factors, while the generalization to constant relative risk aversion holds only for homogeneous discount factors but allows for any heterogeneity in endowments. The logarithmic case provides a general equilibrium foundation for the growth-optimal portfolio literature. Both cases yield equilibrium asset pricing formulas that allow for investor heterogeneity, in which the return process is endogenous and asset prices are determined by expected discounted relative dividends. Our results have simple asset pricing implications for the time series as well as the cross section of relative asset prices. It is found that on data from the Dow Jones Industrial Average, a risk aversion smaller than in the logarithmic case fits best.

We investigate how men and women fare in the managerial labor market in the plausibly exogenous circumstance of their firms being acquired when most target-firm managers (about 90%) are displaced. These career disruptions result in a larger drop in rank and compensation for female managers, despite similar job search attributes. Gender differences are mitigated when hiring firms have more women in upper-echelon positions. Rich managerial experience and external board service also reduce gender-related differences. Overall, results point to a (implicit) “gender penalty” in terms of managerial job mobility, but also indicate contexts in which penalty is alleviated, and even reversed.

Stock-market effectiveness in attracting and retaining firms under public ownership depends not only on stand-alone firms’ net listing benefits but also on gains from merging with a public acquirer. Using a novel merger-adjusted listing count, we show that the dramatic (≈50%) post-1996 U.S. listing decline—often attributed to declining listing benefits—is reversed as the “missing” firms de facto continue existing inside their public acquirers. Our merger adjustment also eliminates the U.S. listing gap, pointing instead to a distinct U.S. listing advantage: providing access to a well-functioning market for complex merger transactions.