A basic intuition is that arbitrage is easier when markets are most liquid. Surprisingly, we find that momentum profits are markedly larger in liquid market states. This finding is not explained by variation in liquidity risk, time-varying exposure to risk factors, or changes in macroeconomic condition, cross-sectional return dispersion, and investor sentiment. The predictive performance of aggregate market illiquidity for momentum profits uniformly exceeds that of market return and market volatility states. While momentum strategies have been unconditionally unprofitable in the United States, in Japan, and in the Eurozone countries in the last decade, they are substantial following liquid market states.

Using a proprietary database of currency trades, this paper explores the effects of trading gains and losses on risk-taking among large institutional investors. We find that institutional investors, unlike individuals, are not prone to the disposition effect. Instead, institutions aggressively reduce risk following losses and mildly increase risk following gains. This asymmetry is more pronounced later in the calendar year and among older and more experienced funds. We show that such performance dependence is consistent with dynamic loss aversion (Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001)) and overconfidence. In addition, prior institutional gains and losses have palpable implications for future prices.

In this article, we survey the literature that studies fixed-income trading rules and outcomes, including Treasury securities, corporate and municipal bonds, and structured credit products. We compare and contrast the microstructure and regulation of fixed-income markets with equity markets. We highlight the nature of over-the-counter trading in the face of search costs and the associated slow evolution of electronically facilitated intermediation. We discuss the databases available to study fixed-income microstructure, as well as measures and determinants of trading costs, and the important roles dealer networks and limited transparency play. We also highlight unresolved issues.

Stocks with high uncertainty about risk, as measured by the volatility of expected volatility (vol-of-vol), robustly underperform stocks with low uncertainty about risk by 8% per year. This vol-of-vol effect is distinct from (combinations of) at least 20 previously documented return predictors, survives many robustness checks, and holds in the United States and across European stock markets. We empirically explore the pricing mechanism behind the vol-of-vol effect. The evidence points toward preference-based explanations and away from alternative explanations. Collectively, our results show that uncertainty about risk is highly relevant for stock prices.

I examine the impact of mutual fund manager replacement on subsequent fund performance. Using a sample of 393 domestic equity and bond fund managers that were replaced over the 1979–1991 period, for the underperformers, I document significant improvements in post-replacement performance relative to the past performance of the fund. On the other hand, the replacement of overperforming managers results in deterioration in post-replacement performance. I find evidence supporting the presence of strategic risk shifting in the fund portfolios prior to replacement. Futhermore, consistent with the notion of window dressing, I document that the level of portfolio turnover activity decreases significantly in the post-replacement period. Lastly, the replacement of poor performers is preceded by significant decreases in net new inflows in the fund.

The mean-variance model is precisely consistent with the expected utility hypothesis only in the special cases of normally distributed security returns or quadratic utility functions. There is little evidence, however, that security returns follow normal distributions (see [13] for references) and quadratic preferences can be shown to generate implausible results, exhibiting increasing absolute risk aversion in the Pratt [ll]–Arrow [1, 2] sense and displaying negative marginal utility after some finite wealth level. In addition, Hakansson [4] has shown that single–period, mean-variance-efficient portfolios can have disastrous consequences over time—even when return distributions are stationary. Such criticisms of the mean-variance approach within the Von Neumann-Morgenstern framework have prompted several writers to suggest that investors maximize the expected value of utility functions with more “realistic” properties, while others have criticized the single-period focus of the model. One popular alternative utility function is the logarithmic function which exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion and (conveniently) leads to myopic decision processes through time (i.e., investors treat each period as if it were the last, basing investment decisions on that period's wealth and return distributions only [8, 4]). (Other utility functions with constant relative risk aversion—such as the power function—also imply myopic decision rules within a multiperiod setting.)

Using a demographics-based proxy for smartness, we show that the portfolio distortions of “smart” investors reflect an informational advantage, while the distortions of “dumb” investors reflect psychological biases. Specifically, smart investors outperform dumb investors by about 3% annually on a risk-adjusted basis. Furthermore, among investors with high portfolio distortions, smart investors outperform passive benchmarks by 2%, and the smart-dumb performance differential is 5%. At the stock level, a portfolio of stocks with smart investor clientele outperforms the dumb clientele portfolio by 3.50% annually. These findings suggest that behavioral and information-based explanations for portfolio distortions apply to distinct subsets of investors.

This paper develops an approximate analytical solution to a two state-variable model of the term structure similar to the one proposed by Brennan and Schwartz. Unlike the BS model, which was based on the consol rate and the short rate of interest, our model is based on the consol rate and the spread (i.e., the difference) between the consol rate and the short rate. This change, merely a redefinition of variables, is made to exploit an assumption, for which there is substantial empirical evidence, that these two variables (the consol rate and the spread) are orthogonal. Employing orthogonal state variables provides the key simplification in providing an approximate solution to the fundamental valuation equation.

Acquisitions, mergers, and other business agreements face increasing regulatory scrutiny, even when they involve firms domiciled outside the territory of regulatory authorities. Recent examples include mergers between American firms that were approved by American regulators but blocked by European regulators. Regulatory reciprocity seems a likely future trend. There are obvious consequences for the successful completion of future business combinations. This paper explains the regulatory procedures of the European Commission with respect to business combinations, documents the price reactions of subject firms on dates from the initial announcement to the final regulatory decision, and studies whether European regulators tend to shield European firms from foreign competition. Our main results are: i) the market clearly reacts to European regulatory intervention even when the subject firms are non-European, ii) the probability of intervention is not related to the nationality of the bidder, however, iii) when intervention does occur, the market anticipates it will be more costly when the bidder is non-European, so protectionism cannot be rejected outright, and iv) regulatory interventions are anticipated by investors, so they affect the initial announcement returns.

In this paper, we develop a state-dependent sensitivity value-at-risk (SDSVaR) approach that enables us to quantify the direction, size, and duration of risk spillovers among financial institutions as a function of the state of financial markets (tranquil, normal, and volatile). For four sets of major financial institutions (commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies), we show that while small during normal times, equivalent shocks lead to considerable spillover effects in volatile market periods. Commercial banks and, especially, hedge funds appear to play a major role in the transmission of shocks to other financial institutions.

We examine the impact of block ownership on the firm’s trading activity and secondary-market liquidity. Our empirical results show that block ownership takes potential trading activity off the table relative to a diffuse ownership structure and impairs the firm’s market liquidity. These adverse liquidity effects disappear, however, once we control for trading activity. Our findings suggest that block ownership is detrimental to the firm’s market liquidity because of its adverse impact on trading activity—a real friction effect. After controlling for this real friction effect, we find little evidence that block ownership has a negative impact on informational friction. Our results suggest that the relative lack of trading, and not the threat of informed trading, explains the inverse relation between block ownership and market liquidity.

We offer a new social approach to investment decision making and asset prices. Investors discuss their strategies and convert others to their strategies with a probability that increases in investment returns. The conversion rate is shown to be convex in realized returns. Unconditionally, active strategies (e.g., high variance and skewness) dominate, although investors have no inherent preference for these characteristics. The model has strong predictions for how the adoption of active strategies depends on investors’ social networks. In contrast with nonsocial approaches, sociability, self-enhancing transmission, and other features of the communication process determine the popularity and pricing of active investment strategies.

This paper tests the ability of the American option pricing model proposed by Parkinson [18] or Mason [14] to explain the pricing of the foreign currency options traded on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange from February 28, 1983 to March 26, 1985. We find that the model underprices out-of-the-money options relative to at-the-money and in-the-money options. This relative underpricing is driven by an underpricing of out-of-the-money call options of short maturity. In addition, the degree of relative mispricing for most categories of options is shown to be a decreasing function of the time to maturity of the options. Longer maturity options appear to trade at similar levels of implied volatility whether they are in, at, or out of the money. Most of these biases appear consistent with the fact that the underlying spot currency rate follows a mixed jump diffusion process as described in [17].

When a firm's management needs to raise external capital in order to finance an investment project, it is likely to have better information about the project's future return than do potential investors. In such a case, as has been shown in the literature, management may be able to signal its information through the use of certain financial variables. However, the possibility that management may be able to use the level of investment in the project itself to signal their information has not been considered. The purpose of this paper is to examine this possibility. It is shown here that the level of capital investment may be able to perfectly reveal management's information, with a higher input level signalling more favorable information. It is further demonstrated that even in this equilibrium, financial variables still play an important role. Among other results, it is shown, in contrast to a conclusion of a study by Leland and Pyle, that in this setting the number of shares held by management may be negatively correlated with the favorableness of their information.

Critics argue that shelf registration greatly reduces the ability of underwriters to perform adequate due diligence. This argument suggests underwriters will demand greater compensation for shelf issues compared to such traditional issues as an insurance premium for protection against potential litigation or loss of reputation caused by inadequate due diligence. Our findings suggest the presence of such a premium, that the premium is higher for firms with higher expected due diligence liabilities, and that underwriters perceive that shelf registration erodes due diligence and, subsequently, price the due diligence erosion accordingly. This pricing behavior is consistent with our findings that firms with higher expected due diligence liabilities are more likely to choose traditional registration.

To the extent that investors diversify internationally, large-cap stocks receive the dominant share of fund allocation. Increasingly, however, returns to large-cap stocks or stock market indices tend to comove, mitigating the benefits from international diversification. In contrast, stocks of locally oriented, small companies do not exhibit the same tendency. In this paper, we assess the potential of small-cap stocks as a vehicle for international portfolio diversification during the period 1980–1999. We show that the extra gains from the augmented diversification with small-cap funds are statistically significant for both in-sample and out-of-sample periods and remain robust to the consideration of market frictions.

In recent years, a number of firms and banks have decided to “go dark,” i.e., deregister with the Securities and Exchange Commission and delist from the major exchanges despite having a large number of outside shareholders. This paper seeks to answer two important questions: Why do firms choose to go dark? What are the consequences for shareholders? We find that firms with fewer valuable growth opportunities, greater insider ownership, lower institutional ownership, higher leverage, and lower market momentum are more likely to go dark. Furthermore, the cost of regulatory compliance is a driving force behind the going dark phenomenon.

The proliferation of electronic limit order books operating without dealers raises questions regarding the need for intermediaries with affirmative obligations to maintain markets. We develop a simple model of dealer participation and test it using a sample of less liquid firms that trade on the Paris Bourse. The results indicate that firms with designated dealers exhibit better market quality, and that younger firms, smaller firms, and less volatile firms choose a designated dealer. Around the announcement of dealer introduction, stocks experience an average cumulative abnormal return of nearly 5% that is positively correlated with improvements in liquidity. Overall, these findings emphasize the potential benefits of designing better market structures, even within electronic limit order books, and suggest that purely endogenous liquidity provision may not be optimal for all securities.

The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that three financial performance variables, namely, growth, profitability, and risk, are determinants of corporate debt ratios in the manufacturing sector in industrialized countries. In particular, a linear model is hypothesized and Ordinary Least Squares is used to estimate the coefficients for the relationship. The sample used contains 816 firms in four selected industries in five industrialized countries during the period 1966–72.

The recent credit crisis has highlighted the importance of market liquidity and its interaction with the price of credit risk. We investigate this interaction by relating the liquidity of corporate bonds to the basis between the credit default swap (CDS) spread of the issuer and the par-equivalent bond yield spread. The liquidity of a bond is measured using a recently developed measure called latent liquidity, which is defined as the weighted average turnover of funds holding the bond, where the weights are their fractional holdings of the bond. We find that bonds with higher latent liquidity are more expensive relative to their CDS contracts after controlling for other realized measures of liquidity. Analysis of interaction effects shows that highly illiquid bonds of firms with a greater degree of uncertainty are also expensive, consistent with limits to arbitrage between CDS and bond markets, due to the higher costs of “shorting” illiquid bonds. Additionally, we document the positive effects of liquidity in the CDS market on the CDS-bond basis. We also find that several firm- and bond-level variables related to credit risk affect the basis, indicating that the CDS spread does not fully capture the credit risk of the bond.