The recent credit crisis has highlighted the importance of market liquidity and its interaction with the price of credit risk. We investigate this interaction by relating the liquidity of corporate bonds to the basis between the credit default swap (CDS) spread of the issuer and the par-equivalent bond yield spread. The liquidity of a bond is measured using a recently developed measure called latent liquidity, which is defined as the weighted average turnover of funds holding the bond, where the weights are their fractional holdings of the bond. We find that bonds with higher latent liquidity are more expensive relative to their CDS contracts after controlling for other realized measures of liquidity. Analysis of interaction effects shows that highly illiquid bonds of firms with a greater degree of uncertainty are also expensive, consistent with limits to arbitrage between CDS and bond markets, due to the higher costs of “shorting” illiquid bonds. Additionally, we document the positive effects of liquidity in the CDS market on the CDS-bond basis. We also find that several firm- and bond-level variables related to credit risk affect the basis, indicating that the CDS spread does not fully capture the credit risk of the bond.

Recent papers have debated whether the negative correlation between measures of firm asset growth and subsequent returns is of little importance since it applies only to small firms, is justified as compensation for risk, or is evidence of mispricing. We show that the asset growth effect is pervasive, and evidence to the contrary arises due to specification choices; that one measure of asset growth, the change in total assets, largely subsumes the explanatory power of other measures; that the ability of asset growth to explain either the cross section of returns or the time series of factor loadings is linked to firm idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL); that the return effect is concentrated around earnings announcements; and that analyst forecasts are systematically higher than realized earnings for faster growing firms. In general, there appears to be no asset growth effect in firms with low IVOL. Our findings are consistent with a mispricing-based explanation for the asset growth effect in which arbitrage costs allow the effect to persist.

Studies of size and earnings/price ratio effects together have produced contradictory results. Does one effect subsume the other or are there two separate effects? This paper demonstrates that equity returns are related to both size and earnings/price ratio as well as the month of January. Reinganum [20] and Basu [4] are reexamined to find the reasons for their contradictory results. Reinganum's finding that size subsumes earnings/price ratio is caused by a fortuitous choice of methods. Basu's finding that earnings/price ratio subsumes size appears to be sample-specific.

This paper examines the implied standard deviation (ISD) estimated from transactions data on options, using the Black-Scholes pricing model. It was found that the distribution of the ISD is symmetric, though not normal. Also, the ISD based on the last daily observation deviates significantly from the daily average ISD. It is suggested that the daily average is a more reliable estimate of the standard deviation.

Traditional measures of interest rate risk assume that prices of financial assets and liabilities are set in perfectly competitive markets. However, evidence suggests that many retail financial markets do not follow the competitive paradigm. In this paper, we employ a general contingent claims framework to value rents earned by banks in demandable retail deposit markets. Our analysis provides a natural and economically meaningful measure of interest rate risk for these imperfectly competitive markets. Using monthly survey data on NOW accounts and MMDAs, we estimate the value of retail deposit rents and deposit durations for more than 200 commercial banks.

This study examines the informational content of options trading on acquirer announcement returns. We show that implied volatility spread predicts positively on the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), and implied volatility skew predicts negatively on the CAR. The predictability is much stronger around actual merger and acquisition (M&A) announcement days, as compared with pseudo-event days. The prediction is weaker if pre-M&A stock price has incorporated part of the information, but stronger if the acquirer’s options trading is more liquid. Finally, we find that a higher relative trading volume of options to stock predicts higher absolute CARs. The relation also exists among the target firms.

Unlike seasoned equity or public debt offerings, bank loan financing elicits a significantly positive announcement return, which has led financial economists to characterize bank loans as “special.” Here, we find that firms announcing bank loans suffer negative abnormal stock returns over the subsequent three years. In the long run, bank loans appear no different from seasoned equity offerings or public debt issues. Our evidence suggests that larger loans (relative to borrower equity) are followed by worse stock performance. We also find that lender protection is negatively related to borrower performance, suggesting the lender is somewhat shielded from the poor performance.

The purpose of this study is to extend the analysis of estimation of the term structure. The ability of the exponential/polynomial present-value function of equation (5) to approximate the theoretical present-value function is analyzed empirically. This study confirms previous results that indicate that the function does not provide an acceptable fit using least squares regression. In most samples, the near end of the estimated term structure appears substantially in error. Lengthening the polynomial tends to improve the fit only at the far end. Since the data appear to be subject to maturity-related heteroschedasticity, we have generalized the disturbance variance specification to allow for this possibility.

Our correction permits determination of sample-specific degrees of heteroschedasticity. The reason is that the intensity of the heteroschedasticity appears to change from period to period. Although previous studies have attempted heteroschedasticity corrections (see [4]), the same specification was imposed on each sample in such studies. Maximum likelihood estimation was proposed and implemented in this paper. The results indicate that the difficulties of providing a good fit using the exponential/polynomial function are substantially eliminated.

Recent literature regarding term structure estimation emphasizes the selection of more sophisticated estimating functions to provide a reasonable fit throughout the entire maturity range. This study emphasizes more careful modeling of the pricing disturbances. The prior approach involves somewhat complicated estimating functions and a potential loss of efficiency due to the lack of influence that each portion of the term structure is able to exert on other portions (with spline functions, for example.) Our maximum likelihood approach is somewhat difficult to implement and computationally burdensome. Nevertheless, it appears to provide a useful term structure estimation procedure.

The solution to the problem of portfolio choice is relevant in a positive financial economics context because it provides models of individual maximizing behavior which when aggregated to the level of the market provide models of equilibrium asset pricing. These models generally assume that the parameters of the probability distribution of security returns are known to individual investors. In practice, however, the individual has to estimate these parameters. To the extent that there is parameter uncertainty or “estimation risk”, what are the observable implications of a market equilibrium derived on the assumption that the information set of all investors is equivalent to a given set of sample data?

Almost two decades ago, Markowitz [12] formulated the portfolio selection problem as a parametric quadratic programming problem. The crux of his formulation was the mean-variance assumption which asserted that a portfolio is efficient if (and only if): (1) it has less variance than any other feasible portfolio with the same return and (2) it has more return than any other feasible portfolio with the same variance.

We examine the relation between mutual fund votes on shareholder executive compensation proposals and pension-related business ties between fund families and the firms. In unconditional tests, we find that fund families support management when they have pension ties to the firm. We find no relation when we stratify by fund family in conditional tests, which suggests that fund families with pension ties vote with management at both client and nonclient firms. We confirm this result in an analysis of nonclient firms. Overall, our results suggest that pension-related business ties influence fund families to vote with management at all firms.

Extant theoretical research posits that information asymmetry and agency issues affect the cost of external financing and hence impact the ability of firms to finance their growth opportunities. In contrast, the literature on disclosure policy posits that expanded and credible disclosure lowers the cost of external financing and improves a firm's ability to pursue potentially profitable projects. An empirical implication is that disclosure can help firms grow by relaxing external financing constraints, thereby allowing capital to flow to positive net present value projects. This paper empirically evaluates this prediction using firm-level data over an 11-year period. As anticipated by theory, we find a positive relation between firm disclosure policy and the externally financed growth rate, after controlling for other influences.

Previous empirical research has established that dividend changes are associated with significant abnormal returns. This association is rationalized on the basis that the dividend announcement acts as a signal of future earnings. Another body of research has documented the existence of intra-industry transfers of information where news about one firm is extrapolated to other companies in the same industry. Earnings information transfers have been found to be positive in nature, with good news about one company leading to stock price increases for rival firms. Linking dividend signaling and information transfer, tests were constructed to ascertain whether the dividend change of one firm is associated with the stock price performance of other companies in the same industry. The results indicate there is some small positive information transfer. The magnitude of information transfer is related to the degree of the dividend surprise, the recent dividend history of the other companies, and correlations in stock returns between the dividend announcer and the other companies. Information transfer is found to affect earnings and earnings growth estimates of the other firms and this leads to revisions in their stock prices.

The purpose of this paper is to derive and test a model of the dividend-saving decision for a shareholder wealth-maximizing firm. Starting with the basic proposition that shareholders should prefer capital gains income to dividend income in a world of differential taxes and transactions costs, dividends are viewed as basically a residual in the corporate decision process. The term residual does not imply that there is no dividend decision or that dividend policy does not affect the worth of the firm since, as argued, the selection of an optimal level of dividends in an uncertain environment still involves the forecasting of future investment needs and the selection of a dividend-saving program to finance these needs at minimum cost. The relevant costs in this context relate to the possible accumulation of excess liquidity resulting from insufficient dividends on the one hand and the possible need for external equity financing resulting from excessive dividends on the other.

This paper develops a specialized principal-agent model of the investor-investment advisor relationship and embeds the standard advisory compensation schedule in the model. Advisors are endowed with information-gathering abilities and investors are endowed with funds. Information-gathering services are traded indirectly through the investor's receipt of portfolio returns net of advisory fees. Model results show that the parameters of the compensation schedule are both a function of the idiosyncracies of an advisor's information services and the degree of risk sharing between the advisor and investor. Several predictions of the model are supported using data on mutual fund advisors. Unsupported predictions may be due to self-selection of advisors by risk tolerance.

Using a large hand-collected database of chief executive officer (CEO) bonus structures, we find that when a CEO’s bonus is directly tied to earnings per share (EPS), his company is more likely to conduct a buyback. This effect is especially pronounced when a company’s EPS is right below the threshold for a bonus award. Share repurchasing increases the probability the CEO receives a bonus and the magnitude of that bonus, but only when bonus pay is EPS based. Bonus-driven repurchasing firms do not exhibit positive long-run abnormal returns.

Previous studies of Treasury market illiquidity span short time periods and focus on particular maturities. In contrast, we study the time series of illiquidity for different maturities over an extended period of time. We also compare time-series determinants of on-the-run and off-the-run illiquidity. Illiquidity increases and the difference between spreads of long- and short-term bonds significantly widens during recessions, suggesting a “flight to liquidity,” wherein investors shift into the more liquid short-term bonds during economic contractions. Macroeconomic variables such as inflation and federal funds rates forecast off-the-run illiquidity significantly but have only modest forecasting ability for on-the-run illiquidity. Bond returns across maturities are forecastable by off-the-run but not on-the-run bond illiquidity. Thus, off-the-run illiquidity, by reflecting macro shocks first, is the primary source of the liquidity premium in the Treasury market.

This paper empirically analyzes REIT mutual funds. We show that, contrary to mostmutual fund studies, the average and median alphas (net of expenses) are positive. We also findthat time-varying positive alphas are much more likely to occur when the real asset market is performing poorly, suggesting that managers add more value in down markets than in up markets. We examine the cross-sectional determinants of both standard alphas and the average of time-varing alphas and find that both increase with assets and turnover. Cross-sectinally, we find that actively managed funds have higher alphas than passively managed funds.

We compile a comprehensive international dividend and capital gains tax data set to study tax-based explanations of corporate payout for a panel of 6,035 firms from 25 countries for the period 1990–2008. We find robust evidence that the tax penalty on dividends versus capital gains corresponds closely with firms’ propensity to pay dividends and repurchase shares, and with the amount of dividends and shares repurchased. Our coefficient estimates suggest a smaller tax effect than reported in recent single-country, single-event studies. Instead, our results correspond more closely with historic long-term estimates of the elasticity of dividends.

The quadratic form of the covariance-co-skewness model by Kraus and Litzenberger and arbitrage pricing theory are used for an empirical investigation of market equilibrium with skewed seecurity returns. Empirical tests similar to the ones in Black-Jensen-Scholes and Gibbons are discussed. The empirical estimates give some support to the Kraus-Litzenberger hypothesis on skewness preference. However, there is some evidence that the tested arbitrage equilibrium is not a complete description of security pricing.

Lease valuation models often begin with the assumption that leases and debt are substitutes. This paper demonstrates that, because leasing is a mechanism for selling excess tax deductions, it can motivate the lessee firm to increase the proportion of debt in its capital structure relative to an otherwise identical firm that does not use leasing. Thus, debt and leases can be complements. We also show that a competitive lessor will use diversification to reduce risk and increase the probability that tax deductions are fully utilized so that it can lower lease payments.