Rather than assuming a fixed recovery rate in estimation, we estimate recovery rates from credit default swap spreads, using 3 years of daily data on 152 corporations. We use a quadratic pricing model, which ensures nonnegative default probabilities and recovery rates. The estimated cross section of recovery rates is plausible, with an average recovery rate of 54% and substantial cross-sectional variation. Estimated 5-year default probabilities are on average 67% higher than default probabilities obtained using the standard 40% recovery assumption. This finding critically impacts the valuation of structured credit products. Larger firms and firms with more tangible assets have higher recovery rates.

We study earnings management (EM) efforts surrounding seasoned bond offerings using discretionary current accruals. We find that issuers tend to inflate earnings performance prior to an offering. In order for EM efforts to effectively mislead ratings agencies and the bond market, they must lead to inflated bond ratings and decreased offering yields. Regression results indicate the opposite; aggressive EM efforts are associated with lower initial ratings and higher offering yields. We also find a statistically lower proportion of subsequent downgrades for firms with the most aggressive EM efforts, which is inconsistent with these firms’ inflated initial ratings. While some firms may attempt to mislead ratings agencies and market participants by window-dressing earnings, these efforts appear to be counterproductive.

We investigate the role of extreme positive payoffs in the distribution of monthly fund returns in investors’ mutual fund preferences. We document a positive and significant relationship between the maximum style-adjusted monthly return (MAX) and future fund flows. The relationship is robust to controlling for average performance, volatility, skewness, and various other fund characteristics. Our findings are consistent with the notion that fund investors overweight the probability of high payoff states in the past return distribution. We further show that MAX is not a useful predictor of future performance and that an increase in a fund’s visibility does not explain our findings.

We find that in allocating initial public offerings (IPOs), underwriters favor institutions they have previously worked with. Regular investors benefit more than casual investors in IPOs through greater participation in underpriced issues. Relationship participation is more important in the distribution of IPOs with stronger demand, IPOs of less liquid firms, and deals by less reputable underwriters. Overall, our results are consistent with book-building theories of IPOs. Interestingly, for 1999–2000 we find that regular investors receive even more underpriced IPOs relative to previous years while we do not find evidence that they provide additional services in IPOs.

The opponents and proponents of competitive brokerage commission rates for the New York Stock Exchange have, for nearly a decade, been dueling in the hearing rooms of Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The contest developed because financial institutions, in attempting to skirt the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and its fixed commission rates, had used a variety of trading practices that were sharply criticized by the government overseers of the securities markets. The securities industry, the government overseers, and scholars have debated what would be the most effective regulatory approach to improving the social performance of the securities marketplace. Would it be through initiating even more stringent federal regulation of exchange behavior? Or, would it be through selective deregulation to increase competition, particularly in the determination of commissions? Competitive forces might constrain and direct that behavior. The policy that has been developing would deregulate and restructure the marketplace to create a “central market system.” Competition would replace regulation to whatever extent may be possible, in determining both commission rates and the quality of marketplace services provided [6]. But, the contest has been long and often heated. From the thrusts and parries, there can be identified some fundamental issues concerning the economics of the stock exchange as a form of marketplace organization.

A popular view is that private equity (PE) firms tend to expropriate other stakeholders of their portfolio companies. Bonds offered during 1992–2011 by companies after their initial public offerings (IPOs) do not reflect this view. We find that yield spreads on bonds offered by PE-backed companies are, on average, 70 basis points lower, holding other things constant. We also find that PE-backed companies have more conservative investment and dividend policies after bond offerings compared with non-PE-backed companies. These results suggest that PE firms’ reputational concerns dominate their wealth expropriation incentives and help their portfolio companies reduce the costs of debt.

This study applies an option pricing model to empirically derive pension put values for a sample of 176 individual pension plan sponsors insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). This study finds that the pension put values for a group of 22 underfunded sponsors were significantly greater than the insurance premiums paid to the PBGC. On the other hand, for a group of 154 overfunded sponsors, the put values were also greater than the pension premiums paid to the PBGC, although the difference was not statistically significant. These findings suggest that underfunded plan sponsors are significantly undercharged by the PBGC, while overfunded plan sponsors are approximately fairly charged.

This paper examines the relation between the performance and valuations of publicly traded subsidiaries in the United States and the ownership stake of their parent companies. Cross-sectional and time-series tests demonstrate that subsidiaries of parents that own a substantial minority stake exhibit negative peer-adjusted operating performance and are valued at a 23% median discount relative to peers. In contrast, majority-owned and fully divested subsidiaries show no abnormal performance or valuations. The results of our study indicate that the association between parent ownership and subsidiary performance is nonlinear and that some parents behave opportunistically toward their publicly traded subsidiaries.

This paper measures changes in mutual fund trading costs following two reductions in the tick size of U.S. equity markets: the switch from eighths to sixteenths and the subsequent switch to decimals. We estimate trading costs by comparing a mutual fund's daily returns to the daily returns of a synthetic benchmark portfolio that matches the fund's holdings but has zero trading costs by construction. We find that the average change in trading costs of actively managed funds was positive following both reductions in tick size with a larger and statistically significant increase following decimalization. In contrast, index fund trading costs were unaffected.

In a world characterized by perfect and complete capital markets, the success (or failure) of a merger is judged by the merger's impact on stockholder wealth. With completeness, the merger's impact on the probability distribution generating stockholder returns is unimportant. The perfect market assumption guarantees that the stockholder not satisfied with the consolidated firm's return distribution can frictionlessly sell his shares and reorder his portfolio; hence his only concern is the merger's impact on wealth. However, if we acknowledge the existence of commissions, taxes, and other frictions, or if markets are not complete, the merger's impact on the stockholder return distribution becomes relevant. In this study we will analyze 149 mergers involving large N.Y.S.E. firms. We will examine four different hypotheses related to the impact of merger on attributes of the stockholder return distribution. We focus our analysis on risk-related attributes including beta, total variance, residual variance, and several other risk-related attributes. In a companion paper, merger's impact on wealth is calculated for the same sample but will not be reported here.

Does more leverage always worsen the debt agency problem? This paper presents a unified analysis that accounts for both risk-shifting and under-investment debt agency problems. For firms with positive marginal volatility of investment (defined as the change in cash flow volatility corresponding to a change of investment scale), equity holders' risk-shifting incentive will mitigate the under-investment problem. This implies that, contrary to conventional views, the total agency cost of debt does not uniformly increase with leverage. This model further predicts that, for high growth firms in which the under-investment problem is severe, the optimal debt ratio is positively related to the marginal volatility of investment. Empirical results support this prediction.

The informational role of prices contributes positively to their variability. In a noisy rational expectations equilibrium, traders rationally respond to price changes by revising their estimates of other traders' private signals and hence their own expectations of future dividends. The resultant shifts in traders' demands amplify any supply shock-induced price changes. We develop an infinite horizon noisy rational expectations model and calibrate, simulate, and test it using U.S. stock market data. The price variability in a heterogeneous information economy is shown to be 20% to 46% higher than in an otherwise equivalent economy in which all signals are publicly announced.

A vector autoregressive (VAR) model is used to examine the relation between aggregate insider transactions and stock market returns. Consistent with the extant literature, there is some predictive content associated with aggregate insider transactions, but its magnitude is slight. In contrast, market returns have substantial influence on the aggregate purchases and sales of corporate insiders. The findings suggest that: 1) the degree of mispricing observed by insiders is small; 2) very little of the mispricing is associated with unanticipated macroeconomic factors; and 3) investors cannot use aggregate insider transactions to profitably predict future market returns over the following eight weeks.

We examine the impact of merger announcements on protfolios of acquiring firm and target firm common stock from 1919 to 1930. despite vast changes in the economic and regulatory environment, overall acquisition profitability has remained remarkably constant over the last 70 and 80 years. Target firm shareholders in the 1920s clearly gained from takeovers, averaging abnormal retruns in excess of 15%, while acquiring firm shareholders essentially broke even. synergistic or monopolistic gains from consolidation were minimal. Unlike the more recent experience, target firm and acquiring firm abnormal returns were largely unaffected by the mode of acquisition, the means of financing, or the degree of industrial relatedness.

This research examines the relations between tournament-based incentives and corporate cash holdings and the value of cash. We find robust evidence that tournament-based incentives are positively related to cash holdings and the value of cash. Moreover, the effect of tournament-based incentives on the value of cash is stronger for financially constrained firms. Our evidence indicates that as tournament-based incentives motivate riskier corporate policy choices that lead to not only larger expected shareholder value but also greater cash-flow uncertainty, firms increase cash holdings to cushion potential liquidity shortfalls that may cause underinvestment.

We provide empirical evidence on order submission strategy of investors with similar commitments to trade by comparing the execution costs of market orders and marketable limit orders (i.e., limit orders with the same trading priority as market orders). The results indicate the unconditional trading costs of marketable limit orders are significantly greater than market orders. We attribute the difference in costs to a selection bias and provide evidence suggesting the order submission strategy decision is based on prevailing market conditions and stock characteristics. After correcting for the selection bias, the results show the average trader chooses the order type with lower conditional trading costs.

The Capital Asset Pricing Model has been challenged recently by several studies that point to certain anomalies in the capital market related to firm size. Banz [3] reported a nonlinear relation between the aggregate market value of a firm's common stock and the stock's mean return. He found that firms with small market values had large and positive residual returns over a period of at least 40 years. Reinganum [23] found that high earning-price (E/P) stocks had higher returns than low E/P-ratio stocks and that, after controlling for size, the E/P effect largely disappeared. Although they rejected the hypothesis that the anomalies are due to inefficiency in the capital market, the two authors are not able to identify the economic factors that might explain the effect of firm size on the functioning of the capital market.

Signaling and agency cost theories of dividend policy predict that omissions will produce a larger average decline in equity values than will reductions of less than 100 percent. However, this paper identifies a U-shaped relation between announcement day risk-adjusted excess returns and the percentage decline in dividends. The significantly smaller than expected price reaction to dividend omissions cannot be traced to growth opportunities, nor to a tendency for firms to delay omission announcements. While omitting firms provide higher per share dividends within five years of the dividend action than do firms that severely reduce payments, future dividends are unrelated to the market's response.

We study IPO pricing in Germany to determine whether when-issued trading provides information that is useful for setting IPO offer prices, and whether such trading supplants bookbuilding as a source of information. We find that when-issued trading reveals relevant information for pricing IPOs, and that, once when-issued trading has begun, bookbuilding is not a source of costly information for pricing. But bookbuilding does not appear to be fully supplanted as a source of pricing information. We find evidence consistent with bookbuilding being used to gather information prior to the onset of when-issued trading.

We study managerial turnover for both internally managed mutual funds and those managed externally by subadvisors. We argue that turnover of subadvisors provides sharper tests and helps address several unresolved issues and puzzles from the previous literature. We find dramatically stronger inverse relations between subadvisor departures and lagged returns, and new evidence on how past flow predicts turnover. We find no evidence of improvements in return performance related to departures, but flow improvements are associated with departures of poor past performers. Our findings represent new evidence on how investors, sponsors, and boards learn about and evaluate mutual fund management performance.