We investigate incentive effects of a typical hedge fund contract for a manager with power utility. With a one-year horizon, the manager displays risk taking that varies dramatically with fund value. We extend the model to multiple yearly evaluation periods and find that the manager's risk taking is rapidly moderated if the fund performs reasonably well. The most realistic approach to modeling fund closure uses an endogenous shutdown barrier where the manager optimally chooses to shut down. The manager increases risk taking as fund value approaches that barrier, and this boundary behavior persists strongly with multiyear horizons.

We analyze how the availability of internal funds affects a firm's investment. We show that under fairly standard assumptions, the relation is U-shaped: investment increases monotonically with internal funds if they are large but decreases if they are very low. We discuss the tradeoff that generates the U-shape, and argue that models predicting an always increasing relation are based on restrictive assumptions. Using a large data set, we find strong empirical support for our predictions. Our results qualify conventional wisdom about the effects of financial constraints on investment behavior, and help to explain seemingly conflicting findings in the empirical literature.

During the 1990s and beyond, countries around the world witnessed calls and/or mandates for more outside directors on publicly traded companies' boards even though extant studies find no significant correlation between outside directors and corporate performance. We examine the connection between changes in board composition and corporate performance in the U.K. over the interval 1989–1996, a period that surrounds publication of the Cadbury Report, which calls for at least three outside directors for publicly traded corporations. We find that companies that add directors to conform with this standard exhibit a significant improvement in operating performance both in absolute terms and relative to various peer group benchmarks. We also find a statistically significant increase in stock prices around announcements that outside directors were added in conformance with this recommendation. We do not endorse mandated board structures, but the evidence appears to be that such a mandate is associated with an improvement in performance in U.K. companies.

Many investors confine their mutual fund holdings to a single fund family either for simplicity or through restrictions placed by their retirement savings plan. We find evidence that mutual fund returns are more closely correlated within than between fund families. As a result, restricting investment to one fund family leads to a greater total portfolio risk than diversifying across fund families. We examine the sources of this increased correlation and find that it is due primarily to common stock holdings, but is also more generally related to families having similar exposures to economic sectors or industries. Fund families also show a propensity to focus on high or low risk strategies, which leads to a greater dispersion of risk across restricted investors. An investor considering adding an additional fund, either in the same family or outside the family, would need to believe the inside fund offered an extra 50 to 70 basis points to have the same Sharpe ratio.

The pricing of corporate debt is still a challenging and active research area in corporate finance. Starting with Merton (1974), many authors proposed a structural approach in which the value of the assets of the firm is modeled by a stochastic process, and all other variables are derived from this basic process. These structural models have become more complex over time in order to capture more realistic aspects of bankruptcy proceedings. The literature in this area emphasizes closed-form solutions that are derived by either partial differential equation methods or analytical pricing techniques. However, it is not always possible to build a comprehensive model with realistic model features and achieve a closed-form solution at the same time. In this paper, we develop a binomial lattice method that can be used to handle complex structural models such as ones that include Chapter 11 proceedings of the U.S. bankruptcy code. Although lattice methods have been widely used in the option pricing literature, they are relatively new in corporate debt pricing. In particular, the limited liability requirement of the equity holders needs to be handled carefully in this context. Our method can be used to solve the Leland (1994) model and its extension to the finite maturity case, the more complex model of Broadie, Chernov, and Sundaresan (2007), and others.

Recent studies suggest that the underperformance of IPOs in the post-1970 sample may be a small sample effect or “Peso problem.” That is, IPO underperformance may result from observing too few star performers ex post than were expected ex ante. We develop a model of IPO performance that captures this intuition by allowing returns to be drawn from mixtures of outstanding, benchmark, or poor performing states. We estimate the model under the null of no ex ante average IPO underperformance and construct small sample distributions of various statistics measuring IPO relative performance. We find that small sample biases are extremely unlikely to account for the magnitude of the post-1970 IPO underperformance observed in data.

This paper examines whether self-described market timing hedge funds have the ability to time the U.S. equity market. We propose a new measure for timing return and volatility jointly that relates fund returns to the squared Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio. Using a sample of 221 market timing funds during 1994–2005, we find evidence of timing ability at both the aggregate and fund levels. Timing ability appears relatively strong in bear and volatile market conditions. Our findings are robust to other explanations, including public information-based strategies, options trading, and illiquid holdings. Bootstrap analysis shows that the evidence is unlikely to be attributed to luck.

We examine the yield curve behavior and the relative performance of affine term structure models (ATSMs) using government bond yield data from Canada, Germany, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. We find strong predictability of forward rates for excess bond returns and reject the expectations hypothesis in all five countries. A three-factor model is sufficient to capture movements in the yield curve of Canada, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S., but may not be enough for Germany. An exhaustive comparison among ATSMs with no more than three factors reveals that the three-factor essential affine model (A1(3)E), with only one factor affecting the volatility of the short rate but with all three factors affecting the price of risk, performs best in all five countries. Simulations provide inconclusive evidence on whether this best affine model can successfully generate the rich yield curve behavior observed in the data.

Policy risk, rather than information asymmetry, explains the cross-sectional underpricing of privatized initial public offerings. The issuer governments of high policy risk issues tend to retain a large equity stake and underprice more with underpricing increasing in retained equity. While the issuer government's retained equity is an observable signal for policy risk, we find that the quality of a country's bureaucratic machinery is a more intuitive and practical measure of policy risk. Policy risk also explains the absence of a systematic relation between the initial returns on privatized and private initial public offerings.

There is a large and growing literature on how to model the dynamics of the default-free term structure to fit the observed historical data. Much less is known about how best to model the dynamics of defaultable yield curves. This paper develops a class of defaultable term structure models that is tractable enough to be empirically implemented and flexible enough to capture some important behaviors of the credit spreads in the data. We compare two non-nested models within this class using a Bayesian estimation technique, which helps to solve the problem of latent state variables. The Bayesian approach also enables us to test the two non-nested models on the basis of the Bayes factor. The results strongly suggest that models with constant transition probabilities will not be able to fit the observed dynamics of inter-rating spreads.

We analyze a new class of linear factor models in which the factors are latent and the covariance matrix of excess returns follows a multivariate stochastic volatility process. We evaluate cross-sectional restrictions suggested by the arbitrage pricing theory (APT), compare competing stochastic volatility specifications for the covariance matrix, and test for the number of factors. We also examine whether return predictability can be attributed to time-varying factor risk premia. Analysis of these models is feasible due to recent advances in Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. We find that three latent factors with multivariate stochastic volatility best explain excess returns for a sample of 10 size decile portfolios. The data strongly favor models constrained by APT pricing restrictions over otherwise identical unconstrained models.

This paper tests the expectations hypothesis (EH) using U.S. monthly data for bond yields spanning the 1952–2003 sample period and ranging in maturity from one month to 10 years. We apply the Lagrange multiplier test developed by Bekaert and Hodrick (2001) and extend it to increase the test power by introducing economic variables as conditioning information and by using more than two bond yields in the model and testing the EH jointly on more than one pair of yields. While the conventional bivariate procedure provides mixed results, the more powerful testing procedures suggest rejection of the EH throughout the maturity spectrum examined.

Analysts' earnings forecasts are influenced by their desire to win investment banking clients. We hypothesize that the equity bull market of the 1990s, along with the boom in investment banking business, exacerbated analysts' conflicts of interest and their incentives to strategically adjust forecasts to avoid earnings disappointments. We document shifts in the distribution of earnings surprises and related changes in the market's response to surprises and forecast revisions. The evidence for shifts is stronger for growth stocks, where conflicts of interest are more pronounced. However, shifts are less notable for analysts without ties to investment banking and in international markets.

In this paper, we analytically derive the expected loss function associated with using sample means and the covariance matrix of returns to estimate the optimal portfolio. Our analytical results show that the standard plug-in approach that replaces the population parameters by their sample estimates can lead to very poor out-of-sample performance. We further show that with parameter uncertainty, holding the sample tangency portfolio and the riskless asset is never optimal. An investor can benefit by holding some other risky portfolios that help reduce the estimation risk. In particular, we show that a portfolio that optimally combines the riskless asset, the sample tangency portfolio, and the sample global minimum-variance portfolio dominates a portfolio with just the riskless asset and the sample tangency portfolio, suggesting that the presence of estimation risk completely alters the theoretical recommendation of a two-fund portfolio.

I investigate what leads controlling families of publicly traded firms to sell their remaining ownership stake. The sale of a controlling stake is best explained in the context of theories of the firm related to optimal risk bearing, the separation of ownership and management expertise, the CEO succession process, and the monitoring provided by outside blockholders. A timing explanation is only marginally supported. The sale of a controlling stake is not explained by insufficient financial resources to fully invest in growth opportunities. This study offers insights into the final stage of the process in which entrepreneurs sequentially sell their firm to outside parties and also identifies the nature of costs of concentrated ownership.

We find that among firms that file Chapter 11 those that are smaller have better operating performance, and are in higher operating margin industries spend less time in Chapter 11. Firms are more likely to emerge as going concerns and to achieve positive post reorganization profitability if they significantly reduce assets and liabilities while in Chapter 11. Higher pre-bankruptcy industry-adjusted operating margins and improvements in margin are associated with post-reorganization profitability but do not impact the decision to reorganize. These results reveal characteristics and actions associated with successful reorganizations and, furthermore, suggest that Chapter 11 allows promising firms to successfully reorganize.

Given the growth in the importance and popularity of share repurchases, we use an alternative time-series approach to test two hypotheses on the motives for share repurchases and dividends: the flexibility hypothesis and the substitution hypothesis. By investigating both share repurchase and dividend payout policies in the context of a time-series vector autoregression, we account for the dynamic and multi-dimensional nature of the two payout policies. We find that share repurchases are associated with temporary components of earnings, whereas dividends are not, and that share repurchases and dividends are imperfect substitutes.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Rule 605 (formerly Rule 11Ac1–5) on November 15, 2000. The Rule requires market centers to make monthly public disclosure of execution quality. The Rule is intended to achieve a more competitive and efficient national market system by increasing the visibility of execution quality. The effective and quoted spreads for our study sample of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks declined significantly after implementation of the Rule. The decline cannot be attributed to a secular trend in spreads, concurrent changes in stock attributes, or the effect of decimal pricing. Although the quoted depth of NYSE stocks also declined, overall market quality is higher after implementation of the Rule. Based on these results, we conclude that the SEC's goal to improve execution quality through more transparent markets has been achieved.

International asset pricing models suggest that barriers to portfolio flows and availability of market substitutes affect the degree and time variation of world market integration. We use GARCH-in-mean methodology to assess the evolution in market integration for eight emerging markets over the period 1977–2000. Our results suggest that while local risk is still a relevant factor in explaining time variation of emerging market returns, none of the countries appear to be completely segmented. We find that there are substantial crossmarket differences in the degree of integration. The evolution toward more integrated financial markets is apparent although at times we do observe reversals. In addition, we provide clear evidence on the impropriety of directly using correlations of market-wide index returns as a measure of market integration. Finally, financial market development and financial liberalization policies play important roles in integrating emerging markets.

We provide evidence of a link between firm dividend policy and stock market liquidity. In the cross section, owners of less (more) liquid common stock are more (less) likely to receive cash dividends. Predictions of the proportion of dividend payers based on 1963–1977 cross-sectional estimates account for most of the declining propensity of firms to pay dividends as documented by Fama and French (2001). Furthermore, historic liquidity is an important determinant of dividend initiations and omissions. Finally, we show that sensitivity of firm value to aggregate liquidity declines after dividend initiations, suggesting that investors view stock market liquidity and dividends as substitutes.