This article provides the first empirical analysis of court decisions that review the exercise of executive power, or judicial review, in Singapore, a single-party-dominated state known for its use of law to achieve economic progress and curtail civil-political liberties. Our findings suggest that judicial review could have the effect of buttressing the ruling party’s legitimacy while deferring to the executive’s curtailment of dissent and civil-political liberties, thus reinforcing the political status quo. We also find judicial review to be a scarcely utilized recourse. The article contributes to the study of law and courts, particularly administrative law in nonliberal regimes.

The emergence of constitutional review in France has attracted substantial attention from scholars of public law. Yet little has been written about the political implications of the expansion of rights-based review on the part of France’s highest administrative jurisdiction, the Conseil d’Etat. The argument is made in this article that repeat litigation by French lawyers defending the cause of immigrants is an important site for observing the symbolic power of legal forms. The analysis focuses on cases challenging immigration-related administrative regulations and shows how the process of repeatedly adjudicating these issues has focused attention away from litigants and their claims at the same time that it has reinforced the centrality of the Conseil d’Etat and its formalist jurisprudence in administrative governance. This detailed examination of the practical operation of France’s highest administrative jurisdiction leads to the surprising conclusion that this distinctly nonadversarial form of adjudication has contributed over the long term to institutionalizing a juridification of immigration-related administrative policy making.

Recent research reveals judicial tendencies to decide cases more conservatively during times of war. Building on studies in political psychology, we use the observed movement in favor of increased security versus liberty in times of war on the courts to investigate differences in how liberals and conservatives are motivated by threat concerns. We find that war mainly conditions decision making by liberal judges in criminal and civil liberties cases. The results furthermore suggest that ideological differences play little role in wartime decision making for civil liberties cases.

A trio of Supreme Court decisions between 2002 and 2005 intensified debate over judicial reliance on foreign law. The literature has been dominated by arguments over the desirability of foreign law citations in the abstract, without sufficient attention to how the Court actually has used foreign law. To ground the normative debate, this article presents analysis of a newly created database containing cases from the Court’s earliest period to the present day in which the lead opinions relied on foreign law in deciding constitutional rights cases. The article uses this analysis to (1) make sense of why the recent trio of decisions was so controversial, even though the practice of citing foreign law was not new, and (2) show why many of the justifications offered by scholars for judicial reliance on foreign law bear no relation to how the Court has employed foreign law in practice.

Because decision making is complicated, political elites seek advice when making decisions, and the ways in which they use that advice has systematic features. But, analyses of decision making among elites usually fail to account for advice. We take advantage of unique information about the advice provided to one set of elites to empirically uncover the effect of advice. Specifically, we examine law clerk recommendations on cert to Justice Blackmun. We find that, even after controlling for known determinants of cert and considering sequential decision making, the advice of a trusted advisor matters greatly.

Dissenting opinions are part of the ongoing constitutional dialogue among elites both inside and out of the judiciary. In order to illustrate how dissents contribute to the ongoing constitutional dialogue among elites, we examine the effect of dissents on majority opinions in the US Supreme Court. We empirically assess their operation on the contemporary Court. We find that dissents with certain characteristics are more effective than others on prompting the majority opinion to cite and discuss them. Specifically, majority opinions cite and discuss dissents that have a negative emotional tone; contain formal, logical, and hierarchical thinking; use adverbs; have a mixed ideological coalition; and cite a high number of Supreme Court precedents. These results suggest that strategic dissenters will have more in-house impact than others.

Research on judicial behavior has yet to systematically examine the extent to which ideology affects voting behavior outside of rights-based issues. This study explores the predictive effect of judicial ideology on judicial votes in a country without a bill of rights: Australia. We develop an ex ante measure of judicial ideology and use original data on every Australian High Court decision between 1995 and 2019 to test whether, and in which types of cases, votes of Australia’s justices align with their ideology. The results show that ex ante ideology is predictive of voting behavior, regardless of policy area.

We examine whether state judicial selection methods influence people’s evaluations of US Supreme Court nominees. We find that people from appointing states use nominee characteristics in their evaluations differently than people in electing states. Those from appointing states appear to be more concerned with traditional legal factors, while people from electing states appear to be slightly less concerned with them. Although the importance varies from characteristic to characteristic, state judicial selection system has a broad role in shaping how people evaluate judicial nominees. These findings counsel further research on judicial institutions and the public’s expectations of judges.

In 2006, the Bush administration directed nine US attorneys to resign. This decision was a partial cause of the attorney general’s departure from the administration, and it prompted investigations and congressional hearings. Seen as largely ad hoc, we argue that theory predicts a more systematic decision-making process. We investigate this empirically and find, consistent with literature on principal-agent theories and bureaucracy, that performance on easily monitored metrics and adverse-selection concerns predict the firings. We explore the implications of these findings for efforts to centralize decision-making in the Department of Justice and to exert political control over US attorneys.

International courts are increasingly affecting domestic and international politics and are receiving increased attention in political science research. In addition to their political importance, international courts provide new opportunities for testing theories of judicial politics, yet further progress requires access to data, particularly on the courts that have so far received less scrutiny. This article introduces a new database on Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) judgments. The database contains information on case proceedings, judicial behavior, judgment content, the actors involved, and compliance with remedial orders. The current version of the database contains data on 201 IACtHR cases. We illustrate how the database can be used to address important questions in judicial politics by analyzing whether the propensity of the IACtHR to rule against a responding state correlates with the positions taken by the same state early in the proceedings before the court. We find evidence of such a relationship.

Governments reform the process of nominating judges to constitutional courts, seeking to reduce the courts’ involvement in state affairs. Since 2008, reformers have tried to appoint judges who would be more judicially restrained. We examine the rulings of judges on Israel’s Supreme Court in its capacity as Israel’s High Court of Justice on the Israeli executive’s decisions. We show that reformers did achieve their goal of reducing High Court of Justice judges’ decisions supporting petitions against the executive. However, that trend has abated due to existing legal conventions regarding particular policy subsystems.

Understanding how attorneys’ perceptions of “insider” and “outsider” status affect negotiations is of both theoretical and practical importance for understanding the judicial system. We utilize a comprehensive survey of attorneys from one state to explore views of trustworthiness and negotiations. Overall, as attorneys become more embedded in their in-group, they increasingly report lower trust levels and less effective negotiations with outsiders. These relationships do vary somewhat by the scope and location of the attorney’s practice. Our findings provide insight into one possible causal mechanism underlying the “repeat player” advantage; they also suggest new directions for research on case outcomes.

Models of behavior on the US Supreme Court almost universally assume that justices’ behavior depends, at least in part, on the characteristics of individual justices. However, few prior studies have attempted to assess these characteristics beyond ideological preferences. In contrast, we apply recent advances in machine learning to develop and validate measures of the Big Five personality traits for Supreme Court justices serving during the 1946 through 2015 terms based on the language in their written opinions. We then conduct an empirical application to demonstrate the importance of these Supreme Court Individual Personality Estimates and discuss their proper use.

Students of judicial behavior debate whether justices time their retirement to allow for the nomination of like-minded judges. We formalize the assumptions of strategic retirement theory and derive precise hypotheses about the conditions that moderate the effect of partisan incentives on judicial retirements. The empirical implications are tested with evidence for Supreme Court members under democracies and dictatorships in six presidential regimes between 1900 and 2004. The theory of strategic retirement finds limited support in the United States and elsewhere. We conclude that researchers should emphasize “sincere” motivations for retirement, progressive political ambitions, and—crucial in weakly institutionalized legal systems—political pressures.

The struggles Indigenous Peoples face are unique from other minority groups living in the United States because they exist in an odd, semisovereign status. While the US Constitution outlines that First Nations are sovereign entities, current federal law and policies hold that tribes are simultaneously sovereign and not sovereign. Using an original data set consisting of all cases involving Indigenous Peoples before state supreme courts from 1995 to 2010, we find Indigenous Peoples are more likely to receive positive judicial outcomes when the judiciary is elected and the indigenous population of the state is relatively high.

Researchers often study the impact of legal change by investigating judges’ decisions and ignoring litigants. Many scholars believe the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal increased how specific factual allegations must be to avoid dismissal, but studies generally fail to find an effect. Using text analysis, I find evidence that litigants and their lawyers changed the information they provided after the decisions in certain types of cases. These results call into question prior studies and illustrate the need to consider the behavior of litigants. They also help shed light on issues of access to courts and separation of powers.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s death near the end of the Trump presidency set off a fight in which Republicans moved to rapidly replace her over Democrats’ objections. I use a survey that was in the field at the time to assess whether this period affected the Court’s legitimacy. I find that Democrats who responded in the days just after Justice Ginsburg’s death saw the Court as less legitimate than those who responded shortly before it. These findings connect to broader questions about the sources of Court legitimacy, the mechanisms through which it changes, and the impact of contestation over appointments.

We evaluate the politics of interim judicial appointments at the state level. Although nominating commissions have been established to promote merit-based selection, we argue that governor-applicant ideological concordance and financial support for a governor’s campaigns increase one’s odds of being appointed. We focus on the impact of political factors, as well as the qualifications of prospective judges. We analyze over 4,000 applications to fill interim judicial vacancies in Georgia from 1991 to 2014. Our findings indicate that ideological proximity and campaign donations to the governor increased the likelihood of appointment to the bench with their influence overpowering some indicators of competence.

Scholars sometimes refer to the civil jury decision-making process as a “black box,” because researchers cannot view juries’ interior workings. However, state institutions structure the environment in which disputes arise and determine the rules courts apply, while environmental factors condition courts’ responses to claims. This article utilizes an original data set of civil jury verdicts in five states to examine the influence of cross-state institutional variation and trial location on courts’ dispute resolution and resource allocation functions. The results indicate that institutions and trial location significantly influence patterns of winners and losers, while case-specific factors predict the amount awarded.

This paper develops and tests a theory that in states with judicial elections, criminal justice outcomes will be more punitive than in states without elections. Leveraging a data set previously unused in the judicial politics literature, I estimate time-series regressions of state sentencing and incarceration rates over a 38-year period while distinguishing between types of judicial elections to establish support for the theory. I find that states where trial judges are reelected are generally more punitive than states without judicial elections, and this punitiveness is in response to the public’s ideological preferences, indicating that elections serve as an important judicial accountability mechanism for citizens.