Let denote the set of degrees ≤ 0′. A degree a ≤ 0′ is said to be complemented in if there exists a degree b ≤ 0′ such that b ∪ a = 0′ and b ∩ a = 0. R.W. Robinson (cf. [11]) showed that every degree a ≤ 0′ satisfying a″ = 0″ is complemented in and the author [8] showed that every degree a ≤ 0′ satisfying a′ = 0″ is complemented in . Also, in [2], R. L. Epstein showed that every r.e. degree is complemented in . In this paper we will show that in fact every degree ≤ 0′ is complemented in . We will further show that the same is true in the upper semilattice of degrees ≤ c, where c is any complete degree. This is in contrast to the situation in the upper semilattice of r.e. degrees in which, as Lachlan [6] has shown, no degree other than 0 and 0′ is complemented.

It is shown that if and are sets of degrees uniformly recursive in 0′ with 0 ∈ then there is a degree b with b′ = 0′, b ∪ c = 0′ for every c ∈ , and a ≰ b for every a ∈ ˜ {0}. The proof is given as an oracle construction recursive in 0′. It follows that any nonrecursive degree below 0′ can be joined to 0′ by a degree strictly below 0′. Also, if a < 0′ and a″ = 0″ then there is a degree b such that a ∪ b = 0′ and a ∩ b = 0.

Consider those structures that consist of a countable universe and a finite number of predicates and functions. Let = ‹∣∣, P1, …, Pn, f1, …, fm› be such a structure. We will restrict our consideration to structures, , whose universe, ∣∣, is a set of natural numbers, and thus we will be able to apply the notions of recursion theory to structures. Using deg(S) to refer to the degree of unsolvability of a set S, we can assign a degree of unsolvability to the structure by defining deg() to be the least upper bound of the degrees of the universe, predicates, and functions of . If we view as a presentation of the class of all structures which are isomorphic to (in the usual sense), then the deg() can be called the degree of the presentation.

While deg() is a natural degree to assign to the structure , it is not the only possibility. Indeed since a structure may have isomorphic presentations with different degrees, deg() has the deficiency of not being isomorphically invariant. We can assign degrees to some (but not all) structures in an isomorphically invariant fashion by looking at the class of the degrees of all presentations isomorphic to . If this class of degrees has a least element, we define it to be the degree of the isomorphism class of which we write deg([]).

Adjoin, to a countable standard model M of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF), a countable set A of independent Cohen generic reals. If one attempts to construct the model generated over M by these reals (not necessarily containing A as an element) as the intersection of all standard models that include M ∪ A, the resulting model fails to satisfy the power set axiom, although it does satisfy all the other ZF axioms. Thus, there is no smallest ZF model including M ∪ A, but there are minimal such models. These are classified by their sets of reals, and there is one minimal model whose set of reals is the smallest possible. We give several characterizations of this model, we determine which weak axioms of choice it satisfies, and we show that some better known models are forcing extensions of it.

Where AR is the set of arithmetic Turing degrees, 0(ω) is the least member of {a(2) ∣ a is an upper bound on AR}. This situation is quite different if we examine HYP, the set of hyperarithmetic degrees. We shall prove (Corollary 1) that there is an a, an upper bound on HYP, whose hyperjump is the degree of Kleene's . This paper generalizes this example, using an iteration of the jump operation into the transfinite which is based on results of Jensen and is detailed in [3] and [4]. In § 1 we review the basic definitions from [3] which are needed to state the general results.

We prove the hereditary undecidability of the Lt theories of:

(1) torsion-free Hausdorff topological abelian groups;

(2) locally pure Hausdorff topological abelian groups.

It is probably because intuitionism is founded on the concept of (abstract) proof that it has been possible to develop various kinds of models. The following is but a partial list: Gabbay [5], Beth [2], Kripke [8], Kleene [7], Läuchli [9], McKinsey and Tarski [10], Rasiowa and Sikorski [14], Scott [15], de Swart [16], and Veldman [17].

The original purpose for having the models appears to have been for obtaining independence or consistency results for certain formalizations of intuitionism [see Beth [2], Prawitz [13]]; of course, if the models could be also justified as being plausible interpretations of intuitionistic thinking, so much the better. In fact, having some kind of plausible interpretation makes it much easier to work with the models. Occasionally the models were used to suggest possible extensions of the formal systems; for example, the Kripke models with constant domains have motivated interest in the formal logic CD which extends the Intuitionistic Predicate Calculus (IPC) by having the axiom schema

Let p be an odd prime. A method is described which given a structure M of finite similarity type produces a nilpotent group of class 2 and exponent p which is in the same stability class as M.

Theorem. There are nilpotent groups of class 2 and exponent p in all stability classes.

Theorem. The problem of characterizing a stability class is equivalent to characterizing the (nilpotent, class 2, exponent p) groups in that class.

The model companions of the theories of n-dimensional partial orderings and n-dimensional distributive lattices are found for each finite n. Each model companion is given as the theory of a structure which is specified. The model companions are model completions only for n = 1. The structure of the model companion of the theory of n-dimensional partial orderings is a lattice only for n = 1. Each of the model companions is seen to be finitely axiomatizable, and a set of basic formulas, each of which is existential, is specified for each model companion. Finally a topolo-gically natural notion of dense n-dimensional partial ordering is introduced and shown to have a finitely axiomatizable undecidable theory.

In this paragraph we shall define the notion of model companion (cf. [4]) and indicate the way in which we shall demonstrate that one theory is the model companion of another in this paper. For T and T* theories in a common language, T* is called a model companion of T if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied: first, Tand T* are mutually model consistent, which means that every model of either is embeddable in some model of the other; secondly, T* is model complete, which means that if and are both models of T* and is a substructure of , then is an elementary substructure of . A definition of model completion may be obtained by strengthening the notion of model companion to also require that T* admit elimination of quantifiers. In all of our examples the model companion will have only one countable model. Although the ℵ0-categoricity of the model companions follows from Saracino [8], we give specific proofs since these proofs fit so naturally in our analyses.

This paper is a sequel to [3] and it contains, among other things, proofs of the results announced in the last section of that paper.

In §1, we use the general method of [3] together with reflection arguments to study the properties of forcing with Δ perfect trees, for certain Spector pointclasses Γ, obtaining as a main result the existence of a continuum of minimal Δ-degrees for such Γ's, under determinacy hypotheses. In particular, using PD, we prove the existence of continuum many minimal Δ½n+1-degrees, for all n.

Following an idea of Leo Harrington, we extend these results in §2 to show the existence of minimal strict upper bounds for sequences of Δ-degrees which are not too far apart. As a corollary, it is computed that the length of the natural hierarchy of Δ½n+1-degrees is equal to ω when n ≥ 1. (By results of Sacks and Richter the length of the natural hierarchy of -degrees is known to be equal to the first recursively inaccessible ordinal.)

We will follow in this paper standard notation and terminology, as in Moschovakis' book [7]. Letters e, i, j, k, l, m, n vary over the set of natural numbers ω, a, b, c over the Cantor space 2ω and α, β, γ, δ, … over the set of reals ωω. Finally ξ, η, κ, λ always denote ordinals.

A generalized version of Martin's axiom, called BACH, is shown to be equivalent to one of its combinatorial consequences, a generalization of P(c).

Since the discovery of forcing in the early sixties, it has been clear that many natural and interesting mathematical questions are not decidable from the classical axioms of set theory, ZFC. Therefore some mathematicians have been studying the consequences of stronger set theoretic assumptions. Two new types of axioms that have been the subject of much research are large cardinal axioms and axioms asserting the determinacy of definable games. The two appear at first glance to be unrelated; one of the most surprising discoveries of recent research is that this is not the case.

In this paper we will be assuming the axiom of determinacy (AD) plus the axiom of dependent choice (DC). AD is false, since it contradicts the axiom of choice. However every set in L[R] is ordinal definable from a real. Our axiom that definable games are determined implies that every game in L[R] is determined (in V), and since a strategy is a real, it is determined in L[R]. That is, L[R] ⊨ AD. The axiom of choice implies L[R] ⊨ DC. So by embedding ourselves in L[R], we can assume AD + DC and begin proving theorems. These theorems true in L[R] imply corresponding theorems in V, by e.g. changing “every set” to “every set in L[R]”. For more information on AD as an axiom, and on some of the points touched on here, the reader should consult [14], particularly §§7D and 8I. In this paper L[R] will no longer even be mentioned. We just assume AD for the rest of the paper.

Let T be an inductive, first-order theory in a language L, let E(L) denote the set of existential L-formulas, and let E(T) denote the distributive lattice of equivalence-classes φT of formulas φ ∈ E(L) with respect to equivalence in T. We consider three types of ‘complements’ in E(T): Let φT, ψT ∈ E(T) and suppose φT ∏ ψT = 0. Then ψT is a complement of φT, if φT ∐ ψT = 1; ψT is a pseudo-complement of φT, if for all μT ∈ E(T), (φT ∐ ψT) = 0 implies μT ≤ ψT; ψT is a “weak complement of φT, if for all μT ∈ E(T), (φT ⋰ ψT) ∐ μT = 0 implies μT = 0. The following facts are obvious: A complement of φT is also a pseudo-complement of φT and a pseudo-complement of φT is also a weak complement of φT. Any φT has at most one pseudo-complement; it is denoted by φT*. The relations ‘ψT is the complement of φT’ and ‘ψT is a weak complement of φT’ are symmetrical. We call φT (weakly, pseudo-) complemented if φT has a (weak, pseudo-) complement, and we call E(T) (weakly, pseudo-) complemented if every φT is (weakly, pseudo-) complemented.

The object of this note is to characterize (weakly, pseudo-) complemented existential formulas in model-theoretic terms, and conversely to characterize some classical notions of Robinson style model theory in terms of these formulas. The following theorems illustrate the second approach.

Profinite groups are Galois groups. The effective study of infinite Galois groups was initiated by Metakides and Nerode [8] and further developed by LaRoche [5]. In this paper we study profinite groups without considering Galois extensions of fields. The Artin method of representing a finite group as a Galois group has been generalized (effectively!) by Waterhouse [14] to profinite groups. Thus, there is no loss of relevance in our approach.

The fundamental notions of a co-r.e. profinite group, recursively profinite group, and the degree of a co-r.e. profinite group are defined in §1. In this section we prove that every co-r.e. profinite group can be effectively represented as an inverse limit of finite groups. The degree invariant is shown to behave very well with respect to open subgroups and quotients. The work done in this section is basic to the rest of the paper.

The commutator subgroup, the Frattini subgroup, the p-Sylow subgroups, and the center of a profinite group are essential in the study of profinite groups. It is only natural to ask if these subgroups are effective. The following question exemplifies our approach to this problem: Is the center a co-r.e. profinite group? Theorem 2 provides a general method for answering this type of question negatively. Examples 3,4 and 5 are all applications of this theorem.