Import substitution industrialization was the postwar development policy of choice in Latin America, and the diagnosis of its weaknesses heavily influenced subsequent policy recommendations. Yet few attempts have been made to test the predominant sectorally based explanation of ISI's failings against alternatives. This article develops a model of direct (clientelistic) linkages between politicians and their supporters and tests it against the standard sectoral model based on indirect linkages. Examining three features of process (economic sector influence, legislative voting, and exchange rate policy) and analyzing the distributional implications of the overall policy in Brazil, this article demonstrates that a clientelist model provides a more complete and coherent account of the empirical record. By demonstrating that variation in linkage type alters the political constraints on policy choice, the analysis also provides new insight into enduring puzzles, including the better performance in East Asia.

Two competing narratives characterize the role of race in Brazil’s 2018 election. Journalists observe that Jair Bolsonaro “entranced” nonwhite voters while “insulting them.” Scholars argue that Bolsonaro politicized race, costing him nonwhite support. In contrast, this article argues that racialized patterns of voter behavior were not distinct from those in recent general elections, and that voters’ electoral choices varied within as well as between racial categories. This study incorporates recent findings on racial subjectivity in Brazil, which emphasize the interaction of racial identification and educational status in shaping racial consciousness. Survey data show that racial differences are driven by highly educated black voters, who are least likely to support Bolsonaro compared to educated white voters and more likely to support leftist candidates. By incorporating findings on racial subjectivity into theoretical predictions and leveraging the 2018 election, this study identifies conditions in which racial identification operates to shape electoral behavior.

In this analysis of contemporary economic and sociopolitical reality in the smaller states of the Commonwealth Caribbean— the so-called Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs) comprising Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis and Montserrat (the Leeward Islands) and Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent (the Windward Islands)—developments within the larger CARICOM countries—namely Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Barbados—will be discussed. All too often social science analysis of the Commonwealth Caribbean assumes a great deal of homogeneity among all CARICOM countries, therefore concluding that what might be a correct analysis of Jamaica, for example, is equally applicable to any of the smaller territories. This article shows that this assumption is often erroneous and can produce several pitfalls in perspective, diagnosis, and prognosis.

During the 1970s there have been several concrete developments in the Commonwealth Caribbean presenting the intellectual community with unprecedented tasks of interpretation. Broadly, the decade began with the massive “black power” upheavals in Trinidad and Tobago and culminated with the revolutionary overthrow of the neocolonial Gairy regime next door in Grenada.

One of the Most Notable Aspects of the Crisis in Central America has been the opportunity it has offered a number of actors, both within and without the region, to become involved in an area long considered a traditional reserve and zone of influence of the United States. Over the last decade, no European Socialist or Social Democratic party has been more important or influential with respect to Central American issues than the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD or Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands). Despite being in the opposition since 1982, the West German Social Democrats have retained their prominence on international issues—particularly on Central American ones—for a number of reasons, such as: (1) having a solid electoral base (37% of the votes in the 1987 Bundestag elections); (2) having leaders who are internationally prominent; (3) having a well-organized foreign policy apparatus at their disposal (the well-financed Friedrich Ebert Stiftung foundation); (4) having connections to a similarly endowed trade union movement, organized around the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund(DGB); as well as (5) having persisted in their efforts to coordinate joint initiatives with other Socialist and Social Democratic parties, both within the European Economic Community (EEC) and through the Socialist International (SI).

The human rights proclaimed and affirmed in the various international declarations, conventions, and covenants adopted since World War II fall into two broad categories: civil and political; and economic, social, and cultural. The former includes the traditional rights of man, such as the rights to life and liberty; the latter includes such rights as the right to work, to social security, and to the preservation of one's health and well-being.

International agreement in principle on most civil and political rights as human rights has been relatively easy to achieve; disagreement has occurred—and is likely to continue to occur-primarily over their precise meaning. Virtually everyone endorses, for example, a right to life; not everyone agrees, however, that capital punishment or abortion must therefore be prohibited by law.

Great cities have historically demonstrated an affinity for riverine locations. Current activity in Venezuela points to the creation of a major urban node on the south bank of the Orinoco River, at its confluence with the Caroni (Figure 1). Since World War Two, but especially in the last decade, an important series of events within this area of Venezuela has pointed up the opportunity, if not the necessity, of bringing this long dormant region into the nation's developed, effectivelysettled domain. The mining and shipping of iron ore from El Pao by Bethlehem Steel's subsidiary, Iron Mines Company, initiated before the war but not operational until 1950, was the first major stimulus. The region was further awakened with the arrival of United States Steel's Orinoco Mining Company which opened up the Cerro Bolívar iron ore deposit. The first shipment here was in 1954. In both these projects, the developers had to bring in everything necessary for the beginning of operations.

Many authors (for example, Ostrogorski, 1964; Michels, 1962: 175 ff.; Weber, 1946: 101 ff.; Duverger, 1967: 182-197; Schlesinger, 1965: 766-767, 1967: 268; Seligman, 1967: 315; Stinchombe, 1965: 153; McKenzie, 1963: 581-591; Epstein, 1967: 167-233, 289-314) have noted that contemporary political parties are predominantly electoral organizations engaged in public office-seeking and dominated by elected officials. While American parties have always been characterized by office-seeking, this phenomenon was not intially characteristic of socialist, labor, or communist parties which endeavored to create a working-class subculture and to whom public office-seeking was only one of several activities. In many such parties, however, office-seeking has come to dominate or even replace a previously wide range of activities.

Who is to blame when the political rhythm of an organized society slips into atrophy and chaos? This enigmatic question towers in the background of recent Colombian history. A country of relative political stability since the birth of Liberalism in the 1930's, Colombia's political life was suddenly rent in 1948 by a horrendous bloodletting which threatened to raze Bogotá and plunged the nation into anarchy. The real villain, wrote Vernon Fluharty, was the system itself. Although the civil war proportions of the violence that followed the bogotazo were ended during the military government of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-57), a fierce sequence of guerrilla activities continued to plague the countryside. Much of the violence was precipitated by young men who, having deserted their primary groups after the assassination of Gaitán, carried on the war against humanity as a way of life, often in the absence of any ostensible political motive or economic gain.

On a beaucoup étudié Dieu, autant pour en approfondir la nature que pour en nier l'existence. Par contre, bien peu de chercheurs ont daigné explorer l'essence du démon. C'est sans doute parce que l'idée de Dieu semble douée d'une vertu tranquillisante, tandis que le concept du diable évoque je ne sais quoi d'insolite et d’ “anxiogène” au regard de la conscience.

Pourtant les notions de Satan et de Dieu sont complémentaires, parfois même solidaires. L'une s'oppose à l'autre comme I'antithèse à la thèse, l'anti-matière à la matière, le pôle négatif au pôle positif, l'imperfection du contingent à la perfection de l'intelligible. S'il est impossible de penser à un être tout puissant sans postuler une limitation éventuelle de cette puissance, il est tout aussi impensable d'imaginer un déchaînement de forces diaboliques sans évoquer un pouvoir inhibiteur antagoniste susceptible de freiner l'action de cet agent maléfique.

This article analyzes how market reform policies already in place affect social interests, and the feedback effects of those interests on reform processes. The variety of societal responses includes the creation of new societal organizations, reflecting the variable content and asymmetrical distribution of costs and benefits of the policies implemented. Because of this variety even in Peru, where the disorganizing effects of neoliberal reform appear to be strongest, it would seem that the societal impact of economic reform elsewhere in Latin America would also warrant more careful examination.

In contrast to other countries in Latin America, Chile emerged from the chaotic postindependence period with a strong state apparatus. Fashioned by the leadership of Diego Portales and institutionalized in the Constitution of 1833, the Chilean state became (and remains) the central focus for national development. Portales was able to marry the existing social and economic order, which was sharply hierarchical, to the institutional structures of a corporate state. In doing so, he shaped political conflict throughout Chilean history into a series of struggles for inclusion in the coalition in control of the state apparatus at any given time. Problems of violence and instability can be seen as the the natural by-products of these multiple attempts to define and redefine both the legitimate scope and orientation of the state and the composition of the dominant groups exercising power.

In recent years, working cooperatively through the Council of Central American Universities and working vigorously, too, as independent universities, the five national universities of Central America have been carrying through a tremendous program of academic reform.

Five major movements in Central American higher education have worked toward the elimination or reduction of the traditional isolation of the virtually independent professional schools of which the universities have been composed. These are:

1. 1. The creation of university cities in which the various divisions are brought together physically.

2. 2. The creation of general studies programs of a year or more into which all entering university students are placed.

3. 3. The development of departments in the basic disciplines which serve the pre-professional general studies program and also tend to offer for all of the professional schools in the university the courses in these basic subjects needed in professional curricula.

4. 4. The strong interest that is arising in post-graduate studies, especially of a regionally planned type.

5. 5. The growing concomitant interest in research with a view that it, like the training of many kinds of professionals, is necessary for the social, economic, and industrial development of Central America.

Economic relations between the United States and Central and South America are pervasive, complicated and ever changing. The nature of these relations, i.e., conflict, cooperation or neutrality in settling issues, depends on the degree and the form in which their respective markets for inputs (labor, land, capital and technology), outputs (goods and services), financial assets and unilateral transfers interact. These relations evolve around and arise from the movement of people, goods, services and financial assets between the North and the South, and within the South.

In the early morning hours of July 27, 1974, the military government of Peru employed riot police to seize control of the country's principal daily newspapers. The government announced that the newspapers were being transferred to independent organizations representative of broad sectors of Peruvian society. Peru's “Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces,” which came to power in 1968, had already surprised students of the Latin American military with a series of radical measures which included an extensive land reform, the expropriation of a number of foreign companies, reorganization of the financial sector, and the creation of a system of worker control for industry. Now President Juan Velasco Alvarado presented the press takeover as an integral part of a fundamental reordering of the existing society along progressive nationalist lines.

When barbados became the fourth English-speaking Caribbean country to achieve its constitutional independence, in November 1966, one of its prime responsibilities was to assume defense of the new state. How Barbados approached this problem of defense planning and policy-making in its first 22 years of nationhood (1966-1988) will be the focus of this study. No previous study devoted exclusively to this subject has been published in all this time, a most surprising omission.

Barbados defense policy may be divided into three phases which correspond, roughly, with the periods during which its two major parties — the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) and the Barbados Labor Party (BLP) — have alternated in power.

This paper will attempt to evaluate the utility of exchange theory for analyzing and interpreting the currently available evidence about emerging campesino movements in Latin America. The focus will be on the transactions and exchanges campesinos engage in both horizontally (with their peers) and vertically (with the landlord and other patrons). My principal thesis is that in the past the gains campesinos could accrue from vertical exchanges have outweighed the actual and potential gains derived from horizontal solidarities within their own community; furthermore, the vertical solidarities between campesinos and landholders served to undermine the precarious horizontal relationships in the campesino community which did exist. As a result, the development of campesino movements, organized or spontaneous, has been directly related to changes in the relative outcomes campesinos obtain in exchanges with one another, with their landlord, or with alternative patrons.

In recent years the foreign policy of Mexico has often been criticized in the United States. The reaction of Mexico to steps taken by the United States in Latin America—in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere—has led to statements about Mexican foreign policy that indicate little understanding of Mexican mentality, history, and approach to international problems. Of primary concern in any attempt to shed light on the foreign policy of Mexico is the place of the Mexican Revolution in shaping the nation's approach to international problems.

The Mexican Revolution has had profound effects on the development of the country. Since the beginning of the Revolution in 1910, Mexico has followed a path to political stability unique in Latin America. The Revolution and its effects on subsequent Mexican attitudes have been studied by many scholars in attempts to learn lessons for the other developing nations of the hemisphere.

The appraisal of development projects is often complicated by the fact that they rarely occur in isolation. In Latin America, the effectiveness of public housing programs and the reactions of the people involved are, as a rule, bound up with the whole complex of heterogeneous developments we call “urbanization.” And when public housing reaches the villages, it typically goes hand in hand with agrarian reform. This is generally the case in Venezuela, where large public housing schemes have been in operation since 1958.

Consequently it is difficult to disentangle and then evaluate the impact of industrialization per se from social infrastructure development in the towns, or agrarian reform per se from social infrastructure development in the villages. The Guayana region of Venezuela is one of the few areas where a production-oriented project and a social welfare project have operated discretely, but within a uniform socioeconomic context.

One of the three basic themes slated for discussion at the 1994 Summit of the Americas (9-10 December) is “Making Democracy Work.” Under this heading are topics related to combatting official corruption, dealing with narcotics trafficking, encouraging and expanding the roles played in civil society by the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and enhancing the capacity of the Organization of American States (OAS) to strengthen democracy (Summit, 1994: 4-5). The other two major areas of consideration-Hemispheric economic integration and sustainable development - are also related to the need to stimulate and support the movement towards more democratic governments and societies.