This article reexamines one of the most enduring questions in the history of human rights: the question of human rights universality. By the end of the first decade after the end of the Cold War, debates around the legitimacy and origins of human rights took on new urgency, as human rights emerged as an increasingly influential rubric in international law, transnational development policy, social activism, and ethical discourse. At stake in these debates was the fundamental status of human rights. Based in part on new archival research, this article offers an alternative interpretation of the rediscovery by scholars in the late 1990s of a 1947 UNESCO survey that purported to demonstrate the universality of human rights through empirical evidence. The article argues that this contested intellectual history reflects the enduring importance of the “myth of universality”—a key cultural narrative that we continue to use to find meaning across the long, dark night of history.

In 1917, Congress created the status of temporary labor migrant. A new kind of restricted worker born from nineteenth-century free labor politics, employer and citizen worker demands under modern liberal capitalism, and state labor market regulation, temporary migrants have always had an employer-dependent legal status and been subject to deportation. Yet, since 1942, changing rights and legal processes have governed migrant employment termination across sectors. By drawing on employment cases from archival and unpublished files made available to me under FOIA, and court decisions, I compare the impact of laws of employment termination on deportable laborers beginning in 1942, when government agencies planned migration, and under privatized migration after 1964. From agriculture and war to today's service and knowledge economies, I demonstrate how employment rights have always shaped deportable workers' legal status. Yet, I also show how today's rights and legal processes, in contrast to the past, hardly mitigate employer control over migrants under contemporary capitalism.

This article examines the persistent authority of lobola, the customary practice for forming marriages in many South African communities. South African marriage rates have sharply fallen, and many blame this on economic challenges completing lobola. Using in-depth, qualitative research from a village in KwaZulu-Natal, where lobola demands are the country's highest and marriage rates its lowest, I argue that lobola's authority survives because lay actors have innovated new approaches for pursuing emerging desires for marriage via lobola. I argue that dyadic narratives of marriage increasingly circulate alongside “traditional” extended-family narratives, especially among the young women who strongly support lobola while yearning for gender-egalitarian marriages. My argument synthesizes actor-oriented analyses of legal pluralism with Ewick and Silbey's theorization of lay actors’ role in producing legality to illuminate how lay actors contribute not only to the form and content of different legal systems, but also to the reach of their authority.

For-profit penal servitude flourished in Gilded Age America. Prisoners produced consumer goods inside factory-penitentiaries for private enterprise. Regulations protecting free labor encountered litigation by businesses invested in carceral capitalism. Judges who defended “liberty of contract,” maintained “state neutrality,” and condemned “class legislation” exhibited a different approach when evaluating labeling laws. Such statutes were seemingly consonant with the free labor ideology that dominated appellate benches—they remediated markets distorted by state-created privileges. Yet courts routinely struck them down. This article argues that judges were motivated by a class-infused framework structuring interpretation of facts and aliening lower-class Americans. Judges perceived workingmen who sought remedial assistance as seeking class legislation; they saw prison inmates and products as ordinary workers and goods, not as captive manpower and state-subsidized wares. Jurisprudence bent and bowed from judges’ values and associations. This article thus reintroduces the explanatory power of class to the Lochner era through judicial subjectivity.

Sexually violent predator (SVP) statutes define some sex offenders as dangerous enough to be segregated from society, but then require their release into local communities. This article examines how decision makers and community members interpret and respond to this inherent contradiction during disputes over SVP placements. The article departs from traditional moral panic explanations of reactions to sex offenders by linking literature on local siting conflicts to insights from legal mobilization studies in order to understand the origins and features of community opposition to sex offenders. Data from three case studies of SVP placements in California suggest that interpretations of what I call legal signals, or implicit messages embedded in state laws, produced these conflicts. The findings shed new light on the role of law in siting conflicts and collective action by explaining how state laws facilitate communities’ exclusion from siting decisions, encourage local opposition, and disempower already marginalized communities.

This article analyzes rights consciousness as distinct from legal consciousness, and uses the post-1989 housing restitution in Romania to study property rights consciousness as a type of rights consciousness. I argue that property rights consciousness is only partially an outcome of state power and the political regime, and that rights consciousness more generally must be explicitly analyzed beyond formal rights, legal mobilization, and litigation. I explore sources of rights consciousness for former owners and their heirs, state tenants, and lawyers. Sources of rights consciousness include state policies under distinct property regimes, value systems and ideologies, history, identity, practices, supranational actors, and expectations of what rights can deliver. I find clear distinctions between legal and rights consciousness, as well as variations between and within the groups. The article is based on extensive archival research, interviews conducted in the city of Timişoara, Romania, textbooks, academic articles, and court decisions pre- and post-1989.

Critics have highlighted the complicity of human rights law in mass disempowerment and domination—a criticism equally applicable to child law. This article investigates this issue, as evidenced by three recent developments that Israel has justified by invoking these legal frameworks: an increased separation of Palestinian adults and children in Israeli custody; the Israeli legal system's growing preoccupation with “rehabilitating” the now-segregated Palestinian children; and the Israeli authorities' ever-diminishing interest in such rehabilitation for adult Palestinian prisoners. By canvassing the legal architecture, judicial rationalizations, adverse effects, and sociopolitical context of these developments, this article foregrounds their divide-and-rule logic and structure of driving a generational wedge between Palestinians and potentially weakening their political ties, solidarity, and resistance.

In South Africa, municipal noncompliance with legislation promoting the constitutional right to sufficient water is both a failure of the rule of law and a betrayal of that right. Judicial intervention has prompted formalistic compliance with water law, but the underlying commitment to sufficient water remains unfulfilled. Does the inability of courts to achieve social justice despite enforcing social legislation confirm the thesis that commitments to the rule of law and to social justice are inconsistent, that upholding the rule of law may not advance social justice? This article offers an alternative to this “inconsistency thesis,” arguing that the rule of law can accommodate social justice if it demands normative congruence alongside congruence with formal rules. Empirical investigation reveals that structural challenges and the multifarious normative demands on officials create a condition of normative incongruence that impedes the pursuit of social justice, even as courts compel congruence with formal rules.

The coevolution of private detective agencies and municipal police bureaucracies in mid-nineteenth-century Chicago arose from the breakdown of an older system in which the provision of law enforcement was delegated to local communities. The growth of anonymity and the presence of strangers in a city undergoing massive changes in transportation undermined this delegative system and created the perception of new public security threats. These threats were compounded by the mobilization of ethnicity in partisan politics. To address these new concerns, political and economic elites did not innovate, but turned to traditional practices like special deputization. The use of deputization allowed some law officers to sell their services as entrepreneurs to private firms, while also paving the way for a new bureaucratic police department. Networks of security providers locked in this transformation and made public and private policing alike a permanent feature of the city's institutional landscape.

What role does the death penalty play in contexts of protracted political violence? What does it symbolize for its opponents and proponents in such contexts? Can it survive as a potent topic of political life even without actual executions? Since 1967, the death penalty has been a lawful sanction in Israel's military courts, which have jurisdiction over Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Though it has never been carried out, it has been intensely debated throughout this period and the topic has retained major political, cultural, and judicial significance. I argue that both sides in these debates use the topic mostly symbolically, rather than as an issue of public policy. For opponents, refraining from using the death penalty has become a symbol of restraint, used in self-legitimation. For proponents, death penalty advocacy serves as what I term a penal fantasy, an outlet for frustration, symbolizing defiance against the image of restraint.

This article examines the conditions under which judiciaries become politicized under authoritarian regimes, focusing on the 2007–2009 lawyers’ movement of Pakistan. The prodemocracy movement arose after the sacking of the Supreme Court Chief Justice by General Musharraf, and was remarkably successful in removing Musharraf and restoring the sacked judges. Although the conventional wisdom is that such judiciaries are quiescent, I argue that judicial actors can play important roles in democratization, but only under certain conditions. In the case of Pakistan, civil society actors were vital in helping the judiciary become politicized and in linking the lawyers’ movement to the larger cause of democratization. I argue that, otherwise, the lawyers’ movement could not have headed the movement that eventually led to the restoration of democracy. Specifically, I argue that civil society played a crucial role, framing the movement as broad, national, and prodemocracy, which enabled it to overthrow the authoritarian regime.

This study explores the role of corporate lawyers in the construction and operation of a key area of the Brazilian economy over a thirty-year period. It looks at three periods in the history of the Brazilian telecoms sector: the fall of state monopoly; global restructuring, neoliberalism, and privatization; and the recent resurgence of state activism. In the first two periods, lawyers worked to facilitate privatization and to create a lightly regulated market for telecoms services that attracted foreign capital. Things changed, however, when the industry was faced with new industrial and social policies. In this period, lawyers oscillated between resisting government intrusion and negotiating engagement with regulators. This sequence of events encompasses changes in the field of state power, hierarchies in the legal profession, and core-periphery relations, which invite new syntheses of existing theoretical traditions about law, lawyers, and capitalist development in emerging economies.

Exploiting a range of archival materials, we argue that state-level variation in judicial backlash to Brown was as much the result of strategic choices by southern political elites as it was the ingrained prejudices of the region's white voters. Presenting case studies of massive resistance in Mississippi, Louisiana, Virginia, and Arkansas, we show that elite agency profoundly shaped the patchwork development of grassroots resistance to integration across the South. These findings challenge the prevailing view that backlash to Brown signaled the unequivocal triumph of racial conservatives. Rather, we argue that the region's response offered individual members of the southern elite significant autonomy to direct massive resistance in their home states. We also argue that southern lawmakers were responsible for the South's embrace of popular constitutionalism post-Brown, and thus that it may not have been “popular” at all. We conclude that studies of judicial backlash would do well to reevaluate the assumption that backlash is necessarily a grassroots phenomenon.

Using a unique data set comprised of original research of both the corporate Web sites of the Big Four—PwC, Deloitte, KPMG, and EY—and their affiliated law firms, as well as archival material from the legal and accountancy press, this article documents the rise and transformation of the Big Four legal service lines since the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. Moreover, it demonstrates that there are good reasons to believe that these sophisticated players will be even more successful in penetrating the corporate legal services market in the decades to come, as that market increasingly matures in a direction that favors the integration of law into a wider category of business solutions that these globally integrated multidisciplinary practices now champion. We conclude with some preliminary observations about the implications of the reemergence of the Big Four legal networks for the legal profession.

Character plays a crucial role in US law. This article explores flaws in how moral character requirements determine who can work in licensed occupations, who can practice law, and who can immigrate to the United States or become a citizen. Section I summarizes psychological research on character, which raises questions about a central legal premise that individuals have a settled disposition capable of accurately predicting their behavior independent of situational influences. Section II examines the role of moral character as an employment credential. Almost a third of the workforce is covered by licensing laws that typically require proof of good character and often unjustly penalize the seventy million Americans with criminal records. Section III examines the idiosyncratic and inconsistent application of moral character requirements for lawyers. Section IV focuses on similar flaws in immigration contexts. Section V identifies reform strategies to improve the fairness of character-related decisions in the law.

Activists on the left and right have increasingly turned to the courts to make policy, raising questions about the potential risks of judicialization. One possibility is that litigation is more prone to negative episodic media coverage than alternative modes of policymaking. Using across- and within-policy area comparisons of stories about the Federal Black Lung Program, collective asbestos litigation strategies, and individual asbestos tort suits, we find that coverage becomes steadily more episodic and critical as it focuses on policy regimes that feature increasing amounts of adversarial legalism. Moreover, even the broadest coverage of asbestos litigation fails to explain why victims of asbestos turned to the courts, how powerful interests constrained their policy options, or how judges urged Congress to act. This limited and relatively critical anecdotal reporting implies that litigation may engender less favorable media coverage than its alternatives and that activists should weigh this risk when deciding to litigate.

Is Alexander Graham Bell's fame owed to law and lawyers? Two recent histories argue that some popular tales of invention originated with lawyers and judges as part of patent litigation battles (Stathis Arapostathis and Graeme Gooday, Patently Contestable: Electrical Technologies and Inventor Identities on Trial in Britain [2013]; Christopher Beauchamp, Invented by Law: Alexander Graham Bell and the Patent That Changed America [2015]). Bringing law into the historical project of understanding the social construction of technology, the authors unsettle “great man” narratives of invention. A tale of a recent patent war is a case study in the persistence of such narratives, highlighting the uses of legal storytelling (Ronald K. Fierstein, A Triumph of Genius: Edwin Land, Polaroid, and the Kodak Patent War [2015]). Together, these works invite consideration of the cultural power possessed by invention origin stories, the role of narratives in law and history, and the judicial performance of truth finding in Anglo-American law.

This essay considers what tools should be used to study the legal history of intellectual property. I identify three historiographical strategies: narration, contest, and formation. Narration identifies the diverse “narrative structures” that shape the field of intellectual property history. Contest highlights how the inherent instability of intellectual property as a legal concept prompts recurrent debates over its meaning. Formation recognizes how intellectual property historians can offer insight into broader legal history debates over how to consider the relationship between informal social practices and formalized legal mechanisms. I consider Kara W. Swanson's Banking on the Body: The Market in Blood, Milk and Sperm in Modern America (2014) in light of these historiographical strategies and conclude that Swanson's book guides us to a new conversation in the legal history of intellectual property law.