This paper examines the interaction between ‘radical’ constitutional change, in the form of political devolution, and property systems in the UK, from the perspective of those at the margins of those systems. The paper adopts a property ‘from below’ approach and critically applies the theoretical framework developed by AJ van der Walt in Property in the Margins. In that book, van der Walt outlined how property systems frequently operate to resist democratic and constitutional change and transformation through the functioning of the property paradigm, which refers to a set of doctrinal, rhetorical, and logical assumptions and beliefs about the relative value and power of discrete property interests in law and in society. Building on van der Walt's work, this paper takes eviction, which represents the landlord's apex right, as a case study and considers how qualifications of that right have been reformed by the Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Act 2016. It is argued that while the strength of the property paradigm is apparent in both English and Scottish property systems, Living Rent, a national tenants’ union in Scotland, have organised tenants to effectively contest and, in some respects, displace the logic of the property paradigm during the reform process.

So-called ‘conversion therapy’ involves therapeutic attempts to change an individual's sexual orientation or gender identity. It is widely considered to be harmful to sexual minorities and there have been calls for it to be banned in the UK. In this paper, we examine whether victims of the practice could bring tort claims against ‘therapists’ for mental harm. Focusing on talking therapies, we assess tort doctrine in the law of negligence, the rule in Wilkinson v Downton, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and deceit. We conclude that while some forms of conversion therapy will be tortious, others will not and so this area of law may fail to assist many victims of the practice.

The Covid-19 pandemic highlights the pressing need to address common challenges faced by all countries and, in particular, provide special support to developing countries through international cooperation. Taxation, in particular Value Added Tax (VAT), is a key area for strengthening international cooperation because of its critical role in financing the Covid-19 crisis and supporting global recovery. This paper proposes the adoption of VAT treaties based on two considerations. First, there exist, in the interplay between states’ VAT laws, over-taxation and under-taxation that can be more effectively addressed by treaties than by unilateral state actions. Secondly, unlike income tax treaties, VAT treaties would distribute more benefits from cooperation to developing countries than to developed countries, leading to normatively attractive distributional consequences. The proposed model offers a new approach to taxing cross-border transactions under VAT and could form part of a coordinated response to a sustainable post-pandemic recovery.

This paper focuses on consumer-generated reviews (CGRs), which are an increasingly influential source of consumer information. In particular, the paper highlights specific problems associated with CGRs, which questions their role as a reliable information source. Flowing from this, the paper calls for closer regulatory scrutiny of review platforms, which play an important intermediary role in facilitating the provision of CGRs. To this end, the paper considers possible regulatory responses in the EU which may address some of the issues highlighted.

The purpose of this article is to examine the impact of two recent decisions on an immigrant’s right of appeal: Secretary of State for the Home Department v Sonia Mahli was decided in the Court of Appeal in December 1989 and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Oladehinde was decided by the House of Lords in October 1990. Both cases raised other substantive issues of considerable importance for public lawyers: Oldehinde made the important point that the Secretary of State for the Home Department could delegate to senior immigration officers his powers to make deportation decisions; Malhi demonstrated how limited are the natural justice rights of overstayers.

The landscape of legal duties imposed on financial investment intermediaries is characterised by the imposition of regulatory duties as well as duties arising under general law, in the realms of fiduciary duties and duties of care and skill. This article examines the relationship between public regulation and general private law in providing legal principles governing the conduct of financial investment intermediaries. This article also inquires into whether, in light of the Financial Services Authority's (FSA) desire to move into higher level ‘principles-based’ regulation of financial investment intermediaries, there may be a set of unifying principles that could govern financial investment intermediaries' relationships with their clients.

Unlike England and Wales, Ireland has not yet moved from the traditional common law rejection of prenuptial agreements. Nevertheless, similar policy concerns continue to be debated in both jurisdictions, particularly regarding the balance between autonomy and fairness concerns, and gender equity. In 2007, an Irish ministerial Study Group recommended limited recognition of prenuptial agreements, foreshadowing similar proposals by the Law Commission for England and Wales in 2014. However, the Irish recommendations were never implemented, despite sustained lobbying. This paper draws on relational theory to scrutinise the Study Group's proposals, identifying its core assumptions and their implications. The paper contends that Irish courts dealing with spousal agreements have tacitly accepted liberal conceptualisations of autonomy, which may lead to injustice. Furthermore, the Study Group's recommendations have been overtaken by events. Recent decisions on spousal agreements emphasise respect for party autonomy, without interrogating what this means. This could be problematic if applied to prenuptial agreements. Accordingly, the paper suggests modifications to the Study Group's proposals, to address relational concerns. In this regard, the paper speaks to the broader debate on family autonomy, and draws on comparative perspectives, including the recommendations of the Law Commission for England and Wales, and the Canadian experience.

In 1994, feminist activists made headlines at the United Nations Cairo Conference on Population and Development for their highly organised and influential lobbying. The final agreement negotiated at Cairo reflected this involvement by specifically referring to women's reproductive rights, and by recognising the complex relationship between population policy, environmental security and economic growth. International population policy, defined broadly as the array of international projects and actors involved in efforts to curb population growth, is an increasingly important arena for the contestation of social values and the meaning of global community. In this paper, I offer a re-reading of the 1994 Cairo agreement, and population policy more generally, in the context of colonial discourses around race and gender, which articulate with constructions of the population ‘problem’. Focusing on the language of environment and economic growth, I examine how racialised conceptions of ‘dangerous’ fertility are reinforced rather than challenged by the Cairo agreement. Through this analysis, I attempt to first, make explicit the international inequality that structures international law and policy, and secondly, outline some of the challenges facing feminist engagement with international law.

Schemes for compensating injury which operate alongside each other call for important policy decisions to be made concerning their inter-relationship. Are they to take account of one another and, if so, to what extent? These issues can arise in a variety of contexts. Within particular regimes they are the concern, for example, of the overlapping benefit regulations in social security law and the rules relating to contribution in insurance law. However, the focus of this article is upon personal injury litigation. It examines the policy reasons which have been used to justify the different results reached by the law when faced with the problem of ‘collateral benefits’ received by an accident victim also seeking damages. Typically, these benefits are received from the state, or an employer, or an insurer.

It is often said that distributive justice has no place in private law. However, distributive justice considerations feature strongly in cases involving the remedies imposed over bribes gained in breach of fiduciary duty. This paper argues that courts should exercise structured discretion, guided by principles of distributive justice, in ascertaining the appropriate remedy. The distributive factors of desert, needs and equality should inform the determination of what remedy is apposite to provide justice in the circumstances.

A principal concern of inheritance law is defining the relatedness of individuals. In this context the posthumously born child has to be defined in or out of a kinship network for inheritance purposes. Historically the concerns were ones of paternity and, with it, legitimacy. For the posthumously born child these were vital questions, as the illegitimate child was nullius filius, the son of nobody, and disentitled from inheritance. While modern inheritance law has moved away from the disabilities that illegitimacy once entailed, the responses to questions of relatedness in the context of children born through the new reproductive technologies suggest a different approach - one of exclusion. The frozen embryo which is implanted and born after the father's death raises anew the question of the validity of discriminating between children because of the circumstances of their birth. There is a struggle between the practicalities of the administration of an estate and the philosophy of equality which underpins the modern non-discriminatory approach to children born outside of marriage. This paper explores some of the issues and assesses some of the solutions in contemporary debate.

‘Doctrine’, from the legal point of view, is often understood, in France at least, as a collection of works. For example, Le Petit Robert defines it as ‘the entirety of legal works whose aim is to expound or interpret the law (as opposed to legislation and judicial decisions)’. This definition is not erroneous, but it only captures one aspect of the matter. If doctrine were only a collection of works, it would be nothing more than a university or law court library. However, it is clearly much more than that. Likewise, it is clear that poetry cannot simply be reduced to a huge collection comprising the works of all French poets. Beyond the production of doctrine (or poetry) lie the workings of doctrine (or poetry), that is to say the persons who devote themselves to it. It is at this point that one encounters other meanings of the term.

This paper, which is the revised text of the first Stephen Livingstone Memorial Lecture delivered in February 2006, surveys the human rights jurisprudence of the House of Lords over the past 10 years. It considers not just how the Law Lords have responded to the Human Rights Act 1998 but also how they have developed the law on equality, asylum and immigration. In assessing whether human rights are ‘safe’ in the hands of the Law Lords, it looks, first, at how willing the Law Lords have been to engage with human rights arguments, concluding that they have relished such discourse. The piece then examines how rigorously the Lords have protected rights guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950. The conclusion reached is that the Law Lords have been doing a good job on that front. What is preventing them from adopting an even more rights-based approach to their work in general is the UK’s stubborn adherence to the ‘dualist’ theory of international law. The author agrees with Lord Steyn that the time has come to reconsider that position.

On 20 February 1982 a baby girl was born in France to Jean-Pierre and Marie-Hélène C. They determined to call their child Manhattan, after an eponymous popular song that had enjoyed currency in the year they were married. The registrar (officier de l’état civil), however, declined to register the child under that name and, when the parents subsequently refused to select any others, the procureur de la République applied to the French civil courts to give the child a forename. The tribunal de grande instance gave the infant its parents’ forenames, refusing to grant the latters’ request to register the child under the name of Manhattan.

This paper connects two trends in contemporary legal scholarship that do not often intersect, namely commentary on the increasingly diverse nature of family law advice and support services, and calls for a refresh of the regulatory environment in which legal services in general are provided. Focusing on the law and landscape in England and Wales, we argue that regulatory challenges are particularly acute in the field of family law, where the range and reach of services provided by non-lawyers is extraordinary. We illustrate how particular aspects of debates over regulating and diversifying legal services apply to the family law context, noting that such concerns as there are have not always been well targeted. Finally, we identify a sub-set of innovative ‘extra-legal’ services that set private family law even further apart from other sub-fields of law when it comes to regulatory and professional challenge. These services clearly sit inside the landscape of family dispute resolution but equally clearly fall outside the boundaries of what is usually considered ‘legal’. This, we suggest, highlights the need for a concerted effort to define the contours of family law and family legal services so that a holistic approach might be taken to understanding and managing the standards and effectiveness of different service and support types.

This paper considers the utility of the concept of conscience or unconscionable conduct as a contemporary rationale for intervention in two principles applied where a person seeks to renege on an informal agreement relating to land: the principle in Rochefoucauld v Boustead; and transfers ‘subject to’ rights in favour of a claimant. By analysing the concept in light of our current understanding of the nature of judicial discretion and the use of general principles, it responds to arguments that unconscionability is too general a concept on which to base intervention. In doing so, it considers the nature of the discretion that is actually in issue when the court intervenes through conscience in these principles. However, the paper questions the use of constructive trusts as a response to unconscionability. It argues that there is a need, in limited circumstances, to separate the finding of unconscionability from the imposition of a constructive trust. In these limited circumstances, once unconscionability is found, the courts should have a discretion as to the remedy, modelled on that developed in the context of proprietary estoppel. The message underlying this paper is that many of the concerns expressed about unconscionability that have led to suggestions of alternative rationales for intervention can in fact be addressed whilst retaining an unconscionability analysis. Unconscionability remains a preferable rationale for intervention as it provides a common thread that links apparently separate principles and can assist our understanding of their scope.