Where a contract of employment is brought to an end during, rather than at the end of, a working period, the question arises of the employee's right to be paid for the part-period worked. If the termination has come about because of the employer's breach of contract, it is not difficult to see that the employee will at least have a claim for damages for breach, which must take into account what the employee has lost by not being allowed to work up to the end of the period in question.

The provisional proposals of the Law Commission for reform of the law relating to illegal transactions are examined in relation to proposals for reform of the same area of the law in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. The working in practice of the New Zealand Illegal Contracts Act 1970 is considered, and judicial development of the law in Canada and Australia is contrasted with the reluctance of the judiciary in England to embark upon systematic reform. The conclusion is reached that there is a proven need for a move away from rigidity and literalism towards a legitimated judicial discretion enabling the great variety of factors in illegality cases to be weighed. Furthermore, the artificial and arbitrary notion of ‘reliance’ upon illegality should be abrogated. Only statutory reform of the law along the lines provisionally proposed by the Law Commission is capable of bringing about these changes in England.

X (minors) v Bedfordshire County Council is by far the most important decision on the liability in negligence of public authorities since Anns v Merton London Borough Council. These two authorities, along with Dorset Yacht Co v Home Office, furnish the ground rules for such actions. The leading judgment in X v Bedfordshire CC, in which all his brethren concur, is given by Lord Browne- Wilkinson; the only other judgment being given by Lord Jauncey. The common thread running through this trilogy of cases is the emphasis on the significance of the element of discretion in the exercise of the statutory functions of a public authority: ‘Most statutes which impose a statutory duty on local authorities confer on the authority a discretion as to the extent to which, and the methods by which, such statutory duty is to be performed’.

Of the four Consultation Papers produced by the Department for Constitutional Affairs over the summer of 2003, in many ways the most interesting was Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, not just for what it did say, but also for what it did not. For example, respondents were not asked whether the Government should replace the House of Lords with a Supreme Court or not. That was taken as a given. Yet the omission was all the more curious in the light of the fact, as subsequently became clear, that at least half of the current Law Lords do not favour the introduction of a Supreme Court.

There is nothing new about legal rules which provide that a person who is in control of land owes a duty of care to entrants thereto. These occupiers’ liability rules are often seen as something primarily to do with tort, but their content and substance are also likely to reveal a good deal about the ‘property policy’ of the legal system in question, in the sense that they will indicate the respective weight and importance attachkd to various kinds of competing claim over land. A legal system containing rules that restrict the circumstances in which those with individual, controlling claims over land owe a duty of care to other persons entering that land would appear to indicate a policy preference for supporting and protecting ‘private property’ claims to land above others. On the other hand, a system which imposes on those controlling land a greater degree of legal responsibility for persons entering thereon may be one based on a policy of recognising, protecting and supporting a range of claims in land beyond those of a narrow, private nature.

One of the more vexed questions for tort lawyers in recent times has been whether recovery in negligence lies for the what has been described as the ‘loss of a chance’. The exact definition of ‘loss of chance’ is unclear, but it is generally accepted that it refers to the loss of an opportunity to obtain or receive a desired outcome; for example, recovery from a personal injury. Accordingly, where a patient receives negligent medical treatment in circumstances where, even if the treatment was properly carried out, that patient might not have been cured it is said that the patient has lost the chance of being cured as a result of the treatment.

This paper re-examines the Orientalist view that Islamic criminal justice operates without any constitutional protections for the individual. It takes the works of Noel Coulson as representative of the canon and subjects them to critical scrutiny. Rather than mimic Orientalist methods of analysis, the author integrates the views of a contemporary, but traditional Islamic scholar, and demonstrates that an accused receives similar, if not more, protection than in a secular, Western tradition.

Three forms of ‘material contribution’ are discussed within the context of the traditional ‘but for’ test of causation. The NESS test (Necessary Element in at least one Sufficient Set) is shown to offer a more appropriate approach when causal over-determination is present as in, for instance, Fairchild and other cases involving multiple sources of asbestos. The particular problems posed by the recent Sienkiewicz case are then examined. It is argued that removing the incoherence in the common law of causation in personal injury will require the judiciary to overcome its antipathy to statistical evidence.

A host of activities jeopardise the safety of an excised organ: an organ transported across local, regional, state or national boundaries could be damaged or lost in transit. A thief might snatch the organ from the possession of the transplant team; a transplant surgeon could use the organ for the treatment of their relative or patient, a celebrity or an influential political figure, instead of transplanting the organ into the properly selected and designated recipient. Also, the organ could be damaged maliciously by a third party. Furthermore, a live donor might change their mind after the organ had been retrieved, or the intended recipient might die before a scheduled transplant, after the organ had been retrieved from a live donor. In the above cases, the organ is in a state of limbo, prompting an enquiry into the appropriate remedial responses of the law for a claimant. Non-proprietary remedies might be helpful in the above scenarios, but fail to provide the necessary continuing control. Accordingly, the first section of this paper considers whether positive law recognises the existence of proprietary interests in excised organs; absent such protection, this paper suggests that the law should recognise proprietary interests in excised organs.

Litigation is a tactical business. The recognition of the tort of malicious prosecution of civil proceedings in Willers v Joyce in 2016, by the barest of majorities, adds to the tactical intrigue, for it is now feasible that failed civil proceedings could be swiftly followed by a counter-suit for malicious prosecution against the original unsuccessful claimant. The tort requires proof of ‘malice’. As a concept, malice may have a 400-year history, but insofar as the new tort is concerned, it has proven to be opaque. In this paper, a critical evaluation of the tort since the Supreme Court gave it the ‘green light’ in Willers is undertaken. As a cause of action, it has been sparsely used, and beset with difficulties and unforeseen consequences. Whilst tort law, as the rubric of civil wrongs, must remain ‘on the move’, it is important that judicial reform achieves desirable and useful outcomes. It is argued in the paper that the tort recognised by Willers has not met that objective to date. However, a detailed law reform study of this and other related torts, leading to a statutory tort of ‘abuse of litigious processes’, would serve to bring order to the present disarray.

As Sir Richard Eggleston has justly observed, ‘The whole subject of character evidence in criminal cases is complex and difficult and much has been written about it. Although this rings true for section l(f) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898, the remoter areas of that provision still remain comparatively unexplored. This paper will concentrate upon the abnormal operation of sub-provisos (ii) and (iii).

Section 1 (f) provides that, if he elects to give evidence, an accused shall neither beasked nor required to answer ‘any question tending to show that he has committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence other than that wherewith he is then charged, or is of bad character.’ The effect of this general prohibition is, in Cardozo CJ’s words, that ‘in a very real sense a defendant starts his life afresh when he stands before a jury.

This article provides a general overview, and analysis of the litigation surrounding General Augusto Pinochet's detention in London in 1998 and the subsequent attempts to extradite him to Spain, for trial on charges relating to human rights abuses committed during the period of his militaty dictatorship in Chile between 1973 and 1990. The complicated sequence of events, from proceedings in the Spanish courts (which started in 1996) up to Pinochet's release from British custody on medical grounds in 2000, is examined und the potential consequences of the two substantive House of Lords decisions are explored from a British-based public international lawyer's perspective. The focus of the analysis is not so much on the detailed technicalities of personal immunity in English law: as on the broad concepts of State jurisdiction over international crimes and immunity for such crimes in international criminal law: notable aspects discussed include the future of universal jurisdiction in customary international law and the position of that law in the UK's municipal courts.

Why does the mens rea of attempt require intention even though some lesser state of mind will suffice for the completed offence? What is the meaning of ‘intention’ in this context? Is intention required for all elements of the crime attempted or only for some? Can one draw a distinction between circumstances and consequences in this connection? Can crimes of negligence or of strict liability be attempted? Why do ‘impossiblc’ attempts cause such difficulty? Is there any meaningful distinction to be drawn between Anderton v Ryan and Shivpuri, or was Shivpuri the last word on the matter? It would be presumptuous to suggest that this article was the answer to all these questions: nevertheless it is suggested that light can be thrown on them by standing back and looking at the nature of a criminal attempt. The key to these and other puzzles, it is suggested, can be found in two concepts, the analysis of attempt as a crime with a missing element, and the notion ofintention as distinct from knowledge or foresight of consequences as stressed in Moloney and more recently by the House of Lords in Hancock and Shankland.

This paper attempts to analyse the extent to which elements of the criminal law admit uniform definition across offences, and the implications of that question. That debate contributes to recent scholarship on the scope, purpose and content of the general part. I argue that there are elements which can be defined uniformly, elements which cannot be defined uniformly and elements which, although they are subject to variation depending on offence context, ought to be considered in general by the courts. The considerations that are important in thinking about uniformity are outlined in each of these cases. This has implications for the way in which we think about the general part. Generality is a question of both degree and kind. Consequently, the scope, purpose and content of the general part are more complex than has previously been thought. In the final section I sketch some of the implications that this analysis of the general part might have for methodology generally and, in particular, for social theory.

The relationship between trade unions and the courts has always been a sensitive one, and no less so when the issue is how to deal with a union’s refusal to obey court orders. During most of this century enforcement has not been a serious problem because the nature of trade dispute law has meant that the courts have rarely had to establish their authority over trade unions; but during the era of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 and also since 1980 the situation has been rather different. This is because statute has drastically curtailed the ambit of lawful industrial action, and has also rendered unions directly liable, thus making conflict between unions and the courts inevitable.