This article considers the relationship between the uses and forms of history within international law and questions of method in the development of histories of international law. It focuses on the advantages of genealogy as an approach to the history of international law given its capacity to both explain the way in which the law itself makes use of the past and intervene in this.

Elaborating on the compatibility between genealogy and elements of the contextual approach to history associated with the ‘Cambridge School’, this article challenges recent suggestions that anachronism is irrelevant, unavoidable, or even a ‘method’ that might be fruitfully embraced in studies of international law’s past directed towards explaining and potentially altering its present. It argues that historians of international law should take the dangers of anachronism seriously, particularly if the histories they develop are to operate as a form of critique and basis for change. Genealogy is a form of history that allows a particularly potent critique of international legal thought and practice. It opens up possibilities for more radical change by questioning and moving beyond the normative framework that usually structures (and limits) calls for reform in international law.

Expanding now familiar debates about the impact of the ‘historical turn’ upon the field of international law, this article considers some of the different ways in which ‘turn to history’ scholars have confronted the methodological and theoretical tensions arising from the central, yet paradoxical, role occupied by the sources doctrine in international law. We suggest that the anxiety over the sources of international law as the basic methodological precepts of the discipline has been a catalyzing element for a radical reengagement with the canon of international law, one with a significant impact on the field’s existing parameters and doctrinal limits. Within the three streams of scholarship we explore here, history has become a site of creative engagement for scholars in opening up the discipline to diverse ends, one in which a new doctrinal universe can be created, and new issues, sources, subjects, and approaches can be explored. Yet, by opening up international law’s sources doctrine, reactionary causes and unjust ends may equally well be the result. This account is an attempt at diversifying the narrative surrounding the causal relationship between history and the ongoing changes to the field of international law, along with the differential practices, techniques and epistemological foundations behind the history of international law as an evolving discipline, and of the different scholarly motivations of its specialists.

The article addresses the relationship between judicial autonomy and the autonomy of the parties principles. The issue is not addressed so much through the lens of the procedural rules on the conduct of the proceedings, as through the prism of the general principles of adjudication which dictate the boundaries of judicial, or arbitral, decision-making. The focus will be on the combination between the principles ne, ultra and infra, petita and non liquet as they flow from the consensual nature of international adjudication and arbitration, on the one hand, and the principle jura novit curia which mirrors the autonomy of the judicial function, on the other. The analysis does not draw from national legal systems, nor from commercial arbitration. Due to the significantly different configuration of the principles at issue in different jurisdictions, it will focus on international litigation as an autonomous phenomenon. It will address firstly inter-state adjudication and then international investment arbitration. Special attention will be given to the ICSID system in consideration of its unique annulment mechanism. The article draws from researched case law an encouragement, if not simply the need, for international adjudicative bodies to undertake a proactive attitude in the conduct of the proceedings. More generally potentials emerge from the analysis, to the effect that not only inter-state adjudication may impact on investor-state arbitration, but also vice versa.

In framing investment treaty claims against host states, foreign investors routinely assert that the state’s conduct was ‘politically’ motivated. Arbitral tribunals must then grapple with these allegations. Yet, tribunals lack both a coherent conception of what constitutes politically motivated conduct and a consistent understanding of the relevance, if any, of such motivations for the disposition of an investor’s legal claims. This uncertainty points to an underlying tension within the investment treaty regime between the protection of investors’ interests on the one hand, and the legitimate scope for democratic decision-making and responsive politics on the other.

Using concepts drawn from political science, we develop a new framework to map the variety of conduct that tribunals characterize as ‘political’. Our framework draws attention to different types of influence over government decision-making, as well as differences between government actors responsible for the conduct. We use this framework to show that tribunals have adopted different conceptions of what constitutes illegitimate political influence over government decision-making in factually similar cases. We then evaluate tribunals’ competing approaches in light of normative theories spanning both public law and private law. Engaging with multiple normative theories allows us to examine whether tribunals’ different approaches to politically motivated conduct might reflect diverse underlying normative commitments. We argue, however, that many arbitral tribunals demonstrate a reflexive distrust of domestic political contestation that is difficult to justify within any of the theories that we consider.

This article reassesses how members of the UN Security Council exercise influence over the Council’s decision-making process, with particular focus on the ten elected members (the E10). A common understanding of Security Council dynamics accords predominance to the five permanent members (the P5), suggesting bleak prospects for the Council as a forum that promotes the voices and representation of the 188 non-permanent members. The assumption is that real power rests with the P5, while the E10 are there to make up the numbers. By articulating a richer account of Council dynamics, this article contests the conventional wisdom that P5 centrality crowds out space for the E10 to influence Council decision-making. It also shows that opportunities for influencing Council decision-making go beyond stints of elected membership. It argues that the assumed centrality of the P5 on the Council thus needs to be qualified and re-evaluated.

Non-permanent members’ strategies to augment their influence in the United Nations Security Council usually seek parity of status with the permanent members. A more radical and transformative strategy would seek to change the Council itself. Working methods reform holds more potential in this respect than composition reform. At present, however, working methods reform is oriented to increasing non-permanent members’ status and focuses on redistributing administrative roles like sub-committee chairing and penholding. The price non-permanent members pay for their offices, however, is bureaucratic drudgery, which both keeps them from pursuing their own political priorities, and socializes them into the permanent members’ rhythms of work. Using Hannah Arendt’s concepts of work, labour, and natality, this contribution analyses strategies for influence in the Security Council, and offers a negative reading of Arendt’s ideas to suggest that non-permanent members should present a more obstructive counterforce in the Council, by cultivating their difference.

This article analyses the decision-making process of the UN Security Council when it adopts outcome documents, such as resolutions, Presidential statements and press statements. It is commonly assumed that because of their veto power and permanency China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have greater influence than their elected counterparts in shaping those outcomes. In recent years, that control has been strengthened by the penholdership system. Under this practice, one or more members, usually France, the United States or the United Kingdom (P3), take leadership over a situation on the agenda of the Council. When ‘holding the pen’ a member often decides what action the Council should take, then drafts an outcome document that it negotiates with other permanent members before sharing the text with elected members. This article explores the development of this practice and its impact on the respect for the rule of law in the Security Council’s decision-making process. It argues that, while concentrating power in the hands of the P3, hence diminishing transparency and the opportunity for all members to participate in the decision-making of the Council, at the same time the penholdership system also provides an avenue to strengthen elected members’ influence in ways that promote respect for the international rule of law.

While the cholera outbreak in Haiti still claims victims every month, it is also the backdrop of one of the biggest legal battles the UN has been engaged in – one for the recognition of harm caused and for reparations for victims of cholera. Having used its immunity to disengage from the issue, the UN finally changed its stance in December 2016 and apologized for the organization’s role in the cholera outbreak. This article analyses the role of the elected members of the Security Council – alongside other key stakeholders – in contributing to the UN’s change of policy. Based on privileged access to a number of actors in this politico-legal fight, this article argues that elected members of the Security Council have played a crucial role in pushing the UN to ‘do the right thing’. This article, along with other contributions to this special issue, sheds a different light on the practices inside the Security Council, demonstrating that elected members are far from being powerless, as most of the literature on the subject tends to assume. They can successfully play a significant role inside the organization when the right conditions permit them to play this role.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) follows its own rules regarding the responsibility of states, although the international law of state responsibility enshrined in the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) remains, as general international law, relevant to its decisions. However, case law of the ECtHR shows that the Court is departing from certain ARSIWA principles as it adopts a broad interpretation of rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) giving rise to positive obligations.1

Exploring those trends in the state responsibility regime of the ECHR, this article argues that, by clarifying certain ARSIWA provisions, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) can play an important role by contributing to a higher degree of judicial integration on the law of state responsibility. It is desirable that the ICJ takes any upcoming opportunity to provide greater clarity on the challenges and nuances of the applicability of the law of state responsibility, in particular as it relates to positive obligations. That would contribute to a more systematic use of those rules by regional courts such as the ECtHR, and ultimately to guaranteeing a greater protection of human rights.

This article is about a relatively new version of the ‘emerging’ jus post bellum concept. It asks whether the jus post bellum as ‘integrity’ is useful as a normative guide in the interpretation of international criminal law during transitions when the requirements of international criminal law are ambiguous or unclear. It develops the main elements of the jus post bellum as integrity as an analytical framework. It then evaluates the theoretical and practical application of the concept in relation to the task of the International Criminal Court in evaluating the ‘alternative sentences’ regime in Colombia. It argues that a Dworkinian approach to international criminal law must make certain assumptions about the international legal order which are difficult to sustain. The difficulties discussed here are related to the structural conditions needed for a ‘community of principle’ to arise in Dworkin’s theory. The article demonstrates that the jus post bellum as integrity may be useful for identifying the principles of international criminal law that should apply to states in transition from conflict to peace. However, despite its usefulness, the concept is susceptible to the usual arguments against adopting ‘natural law’ constructions in international legal method (and post-conflict law).

International criminal tribunals have developed a number of legal theories designed to hold individuals responsible for their role in collective criminal conduct. These doctrines of criminal participation, known as modes of liability, are the subject of significant scholarly commentary. Yet missing from much of this debate, particularly as regards the International Criminal Court, has been an analysis of how current doctrine on modes of liability responds to the need to hold collective perpetrators criminally responsible for crimes of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Indeed, many writings in this area of the law address perceived shortcomings in the theoretical underpinnings of modes of liability doctrine in the abstract but ignore the application of this doctrine in concreto. As a result, facially neutral writings on modes of liability may in fact be gendered in application, either because they fail to account for the specific characteristics of sexual and gender-based violence or because they are applied in a manner that requires higher thresholds for finding culpability for the commission of SGBV crimes. This article fills the gap between theory and practice, examining past and present doctrine, and suggesting ways in which the treatment of modes of liability by international criminal courts and tribunals can both properly respond to the need for personal culpability and the dangers of collective criminal activity, particularly as regards SGBV crimes.