Within and across Southeast Asian national borders, there has been a growing circulation of labour, capital, people, and goods. Meanwhile, urbanisation, agrarian changes, and liberal economic restructuring have been drawing a large section of the rural population into mobile economies and trade networks. This special issue explores the linkage between mobility and the growing precaritisation of labour resulting from neoliberalised development policies, nationalist citizenship regimes, and discourses, and arbitrary state power. Arguably, the consequent insecurity and uncertainty have profound implications for the social and economic life of migrant labourers. Although these conditions engender dangers and risks, they also hold possibilities for crafting translocal livelihoods and social relations. In this introduction, we investigate the diverse trajectories of labour migration in Southeast Asia through a critical discussion on the concept of ‘precarity’ that underscores the resilience of labour migrants despite the precarious conditions of their lives. The special issue suggests that, while precarious labour has long been part of regimes of control and exploitation in the region, precarity today is shaped by the blurry boundaries between the legal and the illegal, between local and global lives, and between different worlds of belonging.

Religious architecture, often called ‘monuments’ within the current understanding of ancient shrines, are prominent features of the landscape in South and Southeast Asia. Many of these sites are admired for their artistic and aesthetic appeal and are centres of tourism and travel. This paper traces the historical trajectory of three contemporary monuments of Buddhist affiliation across the Bay of Bengal, namely Nalanda in north India, Borobudur in Central Java, and Nakhon Pathom in Central Thailand to address both their distinctiveness and their interconnectedness. The paper also focuses on the extent to which these shrines reflect the religious theories that prevailed between the sixth and the thirteenth centuries AD and are currently known to us through religious texts. It is not often appreciated that ‘collections’ of religious texts, as well as the ‘discovery’ of monuments were mediated through the priorities and practices of European and Western scholars from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The history of the study of Buddhism shows that it centred on religious texts and philosophical doctrines produced by a small group of monastic elites, with little attention paid to the more difficult questions of the contexts underlying textual production and circulation. This paper suggests that it is important to factor in the colonization of South and Southeast Asia into any discussion on the understanding of religions and monuments, as well as current interest in these monuments, which are also World Heritage Sites and associated with present interests in maritime heritage.

In past and present Vietnam, the dialectic of precarity and resilience shapes the everyday lives of mobile labourers. Vietnamese labour mobility is characterised by an interplay between precariousness ‘at home’ and the uncertainties of migration. The paper aims to highlight continuities and contingencies in the longue durée of Vietnamese work migration through a historical contextualisation of precarious labour relations. Both colonial ‘coolie’ workers and present-day labour migrants share similar experiences, for example socioeconomic marginalisation in the regions of origin, opportunity and risk, and emerging translocal identities.

This article examines issues of island sovereignty and lighthouse administration in maritime Southeast Asia in the context of post-war decolonisation. It does so by demonstrating how lax and complacent colonial governance in British North Borneo led to the construction of a lighthouse on contested island territory. By the late 1940s these islands became the focal point of a regional dispute between the Philippines, North Borneo's colonial government, and the United Kingdom. While lighthouses were, in the colonial mind-set, deemed essential for illuminating the coasts and projecting order onto the seas, the Philippine government sought to renege on colonial-era obligations and wrest a new sense of post-colonial legitimacy.

The legacy of the Turtle Island transfer was therefore significant in recalibrating imperial lighting in the Sulu Sea, as well as giving rise to a Philippine post-colonial authority that was characterised by an acknowledgement of indigenous Suluk maritime heritage. Similarly, it reflected an extension of previous instances of transnational disputes in the region, where the island shoal had been simultaneously claimed and administered by the United States, the United Kingdom and the historical Sulu Sultanate. While the lighthouse remained destroyed, and the seas dimmed, by mid-1948 the Turtle Islands had attained a new post-colonial and transnational status. Utilising a range of archival sources, memoirs and published material, this article sheds light on an under-examined period of Southeast Asian history.

This article discusses the everyday practices of a mobile network of migrant waste traders originating from northern Vietnam, locating them in an expanding urban waste economy spanning across major urban centres. Based on ethnographic research, I explore how the expansion of the network is foregrounded by the traders’ dealing with the precarious nature of waste trading, which is rooted in the social ambiguity of waste and migrants working with waste in the urban order. Characterised by waste traders as a “half-dark, half-light zone”, the waste economy is unevenly regulated, made up of highly personalised ties, and relatively hidden from the public. It is therefore rife with opportunities for accumulating wealth, but also full of dangers for the waste traders, whose occupation of marginal urban spaces makes them easy targets of both rent-seeking state agents and rogue actors. While demonstrating resilience, their practices suggest tactics of engaging with power that involve a great deal of moral ambiguity, which I argue is central to the increasing precaritisation of labour and the economy in Vietnam today.

The conflict between the Thai state and the Malay-Muslim insurgency in the country's Deep South is one of Southeast Asia's most persistent internal security challenges. The start of the current period of violence dates back to the early 2000s, and since then, a significant number of studies exploring the renewed escalation have been published. In this study, we argue that existing scholarship has not adequately accounted for the external environment in which political decisions were taken on how to deal with the southern insurgency. We seek to show how the internationally dominant, hegemonic security agenda of so-called non-traditional security (NTS) influenced the Thai government's approach to the conflict. Building upon the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory, we show how the insurgency became securitised under the dominant NTS narrative, leading to the adoption of harsh measures and alienating discourses that triggered the escalation of violence that continues today. The specific NTS frameworks that ‘distorted’ the Thai state's approach of one that had been informed solely by local facts and conditions were those of anti-narcotics and Islamist terrorism, albeit in different ways. Based on the findings from the case study, the article concludes with a reflection on the role of the hegemonic NTS agenda and its implications for Southeast Asian politics and scholarship.

This study probes the relationship between legal precarity and transborder citizenship through the case of the Karen from Myanmar in Thailand. Collected through ethnographic multi-sited fieldwork between 2012 and 2016, interconnected individual life stories evolving across the Myanmar-Thailand border allow the critical interrogation of the political and legal categories of ‘migrancy’, ‘refugeeness’, and ‘citizenship’, teasing out their blurry boundaries in migrants’ experience. Following the recent critical research in legal ethnography, this study demonstrates that legal precarity is not simply an antithesis to citizenship. The social and legal dimensions of citizenship may diverge, creating in-between areas of not-yet-full-citizenship with varying levels of heft (Macklin 2007). The article consists of three parts. First, it offers a theoretical framework to reconcile the Karen legal precarity (even de facto statelessness) and citizenship, even on both sides of the border (legally impossible). Second, it presents the three groups of Karen in Thailand, produced by the interaction of three major waves of Karen eastward migration and tightening Thai citizenship and migration regulations: Thai Karen, refugees, and migrant workers. All three face varying levels of legal precarity of temporary status without full citizenship. However, the last part demonstrates the intertwined nature of those groups. A grassroots transborder perspective reveals the resilience of the Karen networks when pooling together resources of the hubs established on Thai soil by the three waves. Even the most recent arrivals in Thailand use those resources to move from one precarious legal status to another and even to clandestinely obtain citizenship.

On September 2015, countries around the world pledged to end poverty, protect the planet, and hit specific developmental targets within fifteen years at the signing of th|e United Nations 2030 Agenda. Within the 2030 Agenda are seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). Goal 16 of the SDG contains twelve targets; of these, Target 16.3 is aimed at ensuring equal access to justice for all and Target 16.10 at ensuring public access to information. Malaysia as a signatory has pledged its commitment to fulfilling these SDGs. This paper's primary focus is on the fulfilment of Targets 16.3 and 16.10 within Malaysia's legal environmental framework. At present, there are provisions that ensure equal access to justice and those that ensure public access to information; however, it is suggested that these are insufficient, uncommon, and limited. This paper proposes an amendment to the Federal Constitution to include the express right to a clean environment, and demonstrates, through comparative study, the success similar provisions have had on the environmental protection laws of other countries such as India, the Philippines, South Africa, Nepal, the Netherlands, and Nigeria. It then considers what possible lessons Malaysia could glean from these national experiences in fulfilling its goals for Targets 16.3 and 16.10 before concluding with the proposition that Malaysia should consider an express constitutional right to a clean environment if she intends to meet her SDG goals.

The invisibility of migrants has been widely analysed in relation to states’ policies and practices. I argue in this article that emphasising the role of states and institutions in marginalising vulnerable populations by rendering them invisible throws a shadow over the multifaceted ways in which migrants interpret and relate to invisibility. Among Myanmar migrants in Thailand, as we shall see here, the notion that invisibility provides a protective shield to migrant bodies is in fact widespread. While invisibility is at times perceived as a threat to the future of these people, conceiving of invisibility solely as a tool of domination precludes us from fully understanding the complexity of Myanmar migrants’ experiences in Thailand and, more specifically, the many forms of empowerment that shape these experiences. Privileging the discourses and practices of Myanmar migrants in Thailand about their sartorial choices reveals that migrants appreciate invisibility for its capacity to create control over their own bodies. Further, it reveals the complexities of negotiating and expressing diasporic sartorial conventions.

The article examines the idea of a ‘floating’ ummah in Indonesia today that affects the workings of Indonesian Islamic politics and democracy itself. It is asserted that the ummah, or community of believers, are more disconnected from the large mainstream Islamic organisational vehicles in Indonesia than is often claimed. A considerable cross-section of this community has become increasingly disaffected with the status quo, as social inequalities sharpen and educated youths who face uncertain futures find appeal in the tough rhetoric of fringe Islamic organisations. This rhetoric emphasises absolute standards of morality as a solution to social and economic predicaments, thereby resulting in the mainstreaming of rigid religious attitudes. Consequently, organisations seen as guardians of ‘religious moderation’ have also picked up on them in an attempt to remain relevant to their increasingly socially heterogeneous constituencies. The overall result is an Islamic politics that has become more intolerant, especially when identity politics gets absorbed into conflicts between different oligarchic factions. This was seen in the dramatic fall of the ethnic-Chinese and Christian former governor of Jakarta known as ‘Ahok’ in 2017.

Recent scholarship on the shift to the right in Asian democracies has predominantly been focused on political organisations, leaving social movements outside of them largely understudied. This article brings forth the link between the rise of right-wing politics in Indonesia—often associated with Islamic populist narratives—and the role of the market. It studies the way halal consumerism has helped shape the narrative of the ummah, an idea that was mobilised during the largest religiously-driven demonstration in the capital city Jakarta on 2 December 2016. By explicating the melding of Islamic piety and consumerism, this study illustrates how halal consumerism aid middle-class Muslims in navigating the neo-liberal social world they live in. The article uses survey data to explore the social status and religious views of participants in the mass rally, and delves deeper through interviews with urban, middle-class female Muslims who envision a cross-class ummah that defends Islam against an imagined oppressor. This paper discusses their role in social process related to politico-religious conservatism, specifically in defending the ideal marriage and family through market mechanisms. Through this analysis, I find that the combination of Islamic morality and neo-liberal values politicises the domestic and traditional role of the female Muslim; this has contributed to social changes that hinder democratic developments.

During the last two decades, rural-urban migration and government programs have improved livelihood conditions in Javanese villages and brought down levels of poverty considerably. This article, based on two extended surveys in nine villages in Central Java, aims to understand the nature of change in rural Java by focusing on gender and precarity. As a result of migration, old forms of precarity have not completely disappeared: Families without children, elderly and people unable to work continue to live precarious lives. For those who work in the cities, dependence on single-source, low incomes, predominantly earned by men who work in construction, continues to keep families and especially women vulnerable for livelihood shocks and stresses. Increasingly, women from poor families work in low-paid agricultural jobs or keep the family farm running.

Migration to the cities makes it possible for many families to stay in the village and live the ‘good’ village life. The village is generally perceived, socially and ideologically, as a ‘better’ place. The flip-side of this preference is a reproduction of traditional family values and limited room to maneuver for women. Very few interesting and suitable jobs for educated women exist in rural areas. Women from poorer families need to work in agriculture. Their dependence on working men with single sources of income, continues the risk to end up or fall back into living precarious lives.

In the labour brokerage state of systematic recruitment and export for the maximisation of labour, development, and profit, the Philippines continues to simultaneously fashion migrant workers as temporary, yet heroic and sacrificial. As the largest migrant-sending country in Southeast Asia and the third largest remittance recipient in Asia, the Philippines’ discourse of migrants as modern-day heroes and martyrs reveals the interplay of nationalist myths and cultural values, alongside the neoliberal favouring of finance and flexible labour, to craft filial migrants and celebrate mobile, capitalist subjects over migrants’ welfare and well-being. The article explores the contemporaneous institutionalisation of migrant labour and migrants’ institutionalised uncertainty lived every day to investigate how this profound precariousness in the Philippines is perpetuated historically to shape the resilience and realities of migrants and their left-behind children today. Drawing from news reports and films on migrant lives and ethnographic fieldwork in the Philippines, this article considers how the formation and deployment of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) turns from a focus on sustaining the nation to supporting migrant families and developing translocal communities. Through this examination, the paper seeks to uncover who profits and is indebted from the precarity created and sustained by the larger economic system built on transnational labour migration.