This article analyses how governments across Australia and the world have employed ‘soft law’ in their responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Rather than simply directing the public to the text of voluminous, complex and everchanging public health orders, executive officials have utilised a variety of non-legal soft law instruments to inform the community of their rights and obligations. These instruments are beneficial — especially in a public health crisis — as they are comprehensible, adaptable and effective. However, their non-legal nature also presents significant accountability issues which challenge the Australian conception of the separation of powers. Soft law exists independent of any parliamentary authorisation or oversight. Subsequently, those affected by soft law lack almost any ability to challenge its use in court. To remedy such issues, this article recommends a greater role for administrative complaint mechanisms (such as Ombudsman recommendations and discretionary payment schemes) in combatting abuses of soft law. It further suggests that the limited adoption of two foreign doctrines — substantive legitimate expectations and epistemic deference — into Australian judicial review could aid in addressing this dilemma.

This article examines the 2020 decisions of the High Court on constitutional law through the lens of the Communist Party Case, taking the 70th anniversary of that decision as an opportunity to reflect on the ongoing utility and efficacy of the constitutional principles it espoused. It focuses on the way in which constitutional meaning may be informed by ordinary legislation, the common law and the rich backdrop of principles and values against which the Constitution was drafted — particularly, the rule of law. In doing so, the article highlights enduring questions about the scope of the High Court’s power to remedy those deficiencies in the Constitution that reveal themselves over time.

This article addresses a gap in the scholarly literature on the legal regulation of temporary labour migration by tracing the legislative history and regulation of work visas for short stay specialists and occupational trainees. By reason of their acute temporariness, both short stay workers and occupational trainees could be regarded as having a migration status that makes them vulnerable in their work relations. In addition, this vulnerability means they may accept terms and conditions that undercut domestic labour standards. Although the detailed legislative tracing of both visas reveals various attempts to re-regulate both visas in favour of greater scrutiny of employer requests for overseas labour, tightening access requirements and increasing enforcement and monitoring capacity, these have been largely incapable of preventing instances of egregious exploitation. These case studies on two little-known visas mirror the growing concerns around the integrity of Australia’s temporary labour migration program more generally and point to the myriad tensions, challenges and complexities inherent in the regulation of temporary labour migration programs around the globe.

This article extends current understandings of regulation of tertiary education, in particular, work experience undertaken by tertiary students, by contributing a ‘law in practice’ analysis of the effect of the existing regulatory regime on work integrated learning practice within Australian universities. It considers how Australian universities are responding to, implementing, or overlooking the formal regulatory framework regarding work experience placements. The analysis is informed by data gathered in a series of 68 semi-structured interviews conducted with individuals from 15 universities around Australia and provides unique insights into how Universities are acting as regulators in the broad sense of the word. Understanding the enforcement of educational regulation is important, because it is the only national tool directed to ensuring work experience opportunities afford real learning which will facilitate skills development and increase future employment opportunities and are equitable and safe for student participants.

‘Penalty privilege’ is sometimes referred to as ‘the right to silence’ or more correctly the privilege against self-exposure to civil penalty. It is a procedural rule that applies equally to trade unions and corporations in Australian federal courts. This article critically investigates this equality of this treatment, revealing its historical evolution and arguing that it results in unequal outcomes, relative to the social and historical roles of unions and corporations. But it also discovers distinct incoherence in the application of penalty privilege, along with a host of related legislative interventions that have sought to entrench the equal treatment of trade unions and corporations more broadly. Accordingly, this article proposes a range of reform, with a particular focus on the application of penalty privilege in the federal arena. A more coherent application of penalty privilege, it is proposed, is one that applies in proportion to the social power exercised by persons and entities before the Court.

Exclusion of evidence when its probative value is exceeded by its risk of creating unfair prejudice has long been a fundamental safeguard against unfair trials and wrongful convictions. In 2016, IMM v The Queen (IMM) curtailed that safeguard by holding that trial judges should assess probative value on the assumption that the evidence is reliable and credible. The IMM majority placed emphasis on the capacity of the evidence. In doing so, it provided a mysterious qualification: some evidence may lack probative value not because it is unreliable, but because it is ‘simply unconvincing’. The majority illustrated unconvincingness with the example of an unreliable eyewitness identification. Courts and legal scholars criticised the majority judgment for its harmful implications and for its apparent incoherence. From a review of almost 4 years of post-IMM jurisprudence and deeper exploration into one particular case, we find that ‘simply unconvincing’ has accentuated the confusion and inconsistency in Australian evidence jurisprudence.