The International Court of Justice formed its first Chamber for dealing with a particular case in 1982; its second, in 1985; and, in 1987, its third and fourth ad hoc Chambers. This article examines what appears to be an accelerating trend toward recourse to ad hoc Chambers in the light of the provisions of the Statute and Rules of the Court and of its pertinent practice to date. The discussion seeks to elucidate four principal questions:

1. • What is the subject matter that such a Chamber may properly dispose of?

2. • Must such a Chamber be representative of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world?

3. • How many judges shall constitute an ad hoc Chamber?

4. • Shall the parties to the case have a voice in determining the composition of the Chamber as well as in the number of judges constituting it?

Finally, this article appraises the record and potential of recourse to Chambers for dealing with a particular case.

Many governments are reluctant to submit disputes voluntarily to the International Court of Justice for binding adjudication. Only a few disputes are brought to the Court with the current agreement of all the parties. When that happens, no matter what the technical basis for the Court’s jurisdiction may be—a compromis, compulsory jurisdiction, or a compromissory clause in a substantive international agreement or an optional protocol—the Court’s jurisdiction is unlikely to be questioned. When the respondent state does not wish the dispute to be submitted to the Court, however, the applicant state must compel adjudication by relying on jurisdiction founded upon the respondent state’s consent given in the past. Consent may be found in declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court provided for in Article 36(2) of its Statute. Alternatively, such consent may be found under Articles 36(1) or 37, which permit jurisdiction to be based on compromissory clauses.

Since 1982, a select group of states has been engaged in a series of multilateral negotiations to fashion a regime governing the exploration and exploitation of minerals in the Antarctic region. Because of the controversy in the United Nations over whether Antarctica constitutes a portion of the “common heritage of mankind,” these negotiations have attracted increasing publicity, but their modus operandi has been left largely unexamined. The chief purpose of this paper is to analyze the process by which this group of concerned states has pursued national priorities within the decision-making framework and context of the Antarctic minerals negotiations.