The Leiden Journal of International Law (LJIL) is many things. In the present editorial we highlight three of its activities – both old and new. First, we look back briefly at the symposium on ‘The Changing Role of Scholarship in International Law’ that we held in March 2015. Second, we present the winner of the second LJIL Prize and draw attention to her contribution. Third, we announce the first LJIL lecture and introduce the inaugural laureate. We do this in a way that continues to reflect on the roles of the journal. We do not aspire to define its identity simply because we value its diversity too much. But we wish to contribute to the ongoing debates on how a journal of international law might position itself in light of many new outlets for scholarship, in the context of porous or battled disciplinary frontiers, and in response to expectations that scholarship ought to meet. These are recurrent issues in the journal and its editorials. In particular, Carsten Stahn has drawn attention to the theme that shaped the symposium, the changing role of scholarship. He has since stepped down as an Editor-in-Chief and Ingo Venzke has assumed this position, continuing to work alongside Eric De Brabandere. Once again we thank Carsten for his immensely valuable contributions to the journal – past, present, and future.

This article starts with a paradox: international law-making is ridden with reasonable disagreement and yet no state can be bound by international law without its consent and hence without agreement. Breaking away from the pragmatic resignation that prevails among international law scholars on this question, the article proposes an interpretation of the role of state consent that both fits and justifies its central role in the practice of international law-making and, hopefully, strengthens the latter's legitimacy in the future. Its proposed justification actually lies in the circumstances of reasonable disagreement among democratic states and this proposal dissolves the paradox. The article argues that, in international law as it is the case domestically, consent is neither a criterion of validity of law nor a ground for its legitimate authority. It also dispels two myths about state consent: its necessary relationship to legal positivism and state sovereignty. Instead, the article argues, the role of democratic state consent is that of an exception to the legitimate authority of international law and hence to its bindingness in a concrete case. While the legitimacy of international law is not democratic, the democratic nature of states and their democratic accountability to their people matter. This is especially the case in circumstances of widespread and persistent reasonable disagreement as they prevail among democratic states in international law-making. In these circumstances, respecting the sovereign equality of democratic states by requiring their consent is the way to grant an equal voice to their people. Of course, there are limits to the democratic state exception that are inherent to both its democratic dimension (it requires respecting basic political equality) and its consensual dimension (it requires that consent is expressed in a free, fair and informed fashion). The article concludes by showing how the proposed disagreement-attuned account of democratic state consent explains various characteristics of the main international law-making processes, i.e., treaties and custom.

Accountability has become a cornerstone of current discussion on the prospects of legitimate and effective global governance. In spite of its rather high currency, accountability does not partake in the select group of first-order political ideals: democracy, human rights, constitutionalism and rule of law have all been historically uttered in much more vocal tones and still remain at the forefront of public demands for legitimate authority. Rather than radiating a comprehensive legal or political vision, accountability supplies a power-constraining toolbox that allows for a variety of more or less attractive permutations. This rather commonplace story, though, tells very little about the concrete configurations, underlying values and ends of accountability. The concept of accountability remains unstable because, among other things, its descriptive and normative aspects lack a clearer articulation; traditional taxonomies fail to precisely illuminate its political and extra-political instantiations, and their respective connection with law; the relevant descriptive variables that shape accountability arrangements are not yet systematized in a comprehensive way; the specific normative goals that lurk behind the calls for more accountability tend to be taken for granted, and the trade-offs or internal tensions that necessarily occur are usually camouflaged. Conceptual clarification, thus, is indispensable whenever one comes across such multifaceted umbrella terms. The article attempts to diagnose such shortcomings, to elucidate a minimalist concept of accountability and to provide a large analytical map that can aid both the description and the critical assessment of accountability arrangements in light of their potential purposes. This analytical exercise is a pivotal starting point if accountability is to get a better grip on the debates about the improvement of global governance.

The article argues that, by bringing a number of changes of systemic proportions in the order of international law, the internationalization of national constitutional human rights law has led to the ‘constitutionalization’ of international law. To build that argument, the paper first critically assesses the constitutionalization narrative. To that end it explains the reasons for its agnostic stance vis-à-vis the constitutionalization narrative and highlights the fact that international law has always contained some general, “constitutional” features that are particular to its systemic physiognomy. The article then explains how human rights law, as a special branch of international law, expands beyond the so-called humanization of international law narrative, acting as an important ingredient in a number of other narratives such as the constitutionalization of international law and the ones that are comparable to it, like legal pluralism and fragmentation. As to the systemic changes the internationalization of human rights has brought to the order of public international law, the examples given are those of collective enforcement at the decentralized level for the protection of common interests/values, sui generis normative hierarchy beyond jus cogens and the idea of the responsibility of states to act in a protective manner linked with the principle of due diligence and the so-called positive effect that human rights develop.

This article argues that some familiar principles, like the protection of reasonable expectations or fair play, can justify the normative force and binding character of some types of customary international practices. We have no reason to think that any one of those principles can justify all customary practices that are typically taken to have such force. Accordingly, instead of proposing a unifying justification for all customary international law-making, I will suggest that the impact of past international practices on the normative situation of international agents is determined not by one master principle, but by a range of different normative principles, each applicable in different situations. If this is correct, i.e., if the principles that give customary practices their normative force vary depending on the kind of principle governing the practical problem that those practices are meant to respond to, both the critique and the defence of customary law-making must proceed on what I will call a ‘disaggregative’ basis.

This article examines the tensions within the international drug control system which are putting the until now consensual position in regard to the prohibition on drugs supply and use for anything other than medical and scientific use – the Vienna Consensus – under strain. The article examines a number of areas where policy stress is leading to controversy about potential violation of international drug control treaty obligations by states parties. Drawing a comparison with earlier periods of stress when drug control fell under the League of Nations, it suggests that what appears to be occurring is a shift in the Vienna consensus, and that the drug conventions are sufficiently flexible to permit resulting shifts in practice, although reform would be preferable.

This article critically examines the dynamics between public health, intellectual property, and international trade in the context of the TRIPS Amendment and its theoretical implications in international law. The article suggests that international efforts in the TRIPS 2003 Waiver and 2005 Amendment addressing public health concerns have not been very successful due to the birth defect of TRIPS, i.e., hoping a private-rights-in-nature regime could accommodate public interests in health concerns. TRIPS’ birth defect further reveals itself in post-TRIPS development and contributed to the failure of the TRIPS Waiver and Amendment due to the resulting practice fragmentation and procedural hurdles in domestic compulsory licensing administration. Moreover, the TRIPS Amendment raised a fundamental theoretical issue, i.e., how the WTO as an international organization in public international law can regulate compulsory licensing of intellectual property rights as private rights – in particular the proprietary right to remuneration – while recognizing that TRIPS grants no positive rights. The paper suggests that the key to the issue is the treatment of private rights in public international law. It is submitted that the TRIPS Amendment has no legal basis in international law due to its unwarranted intrusion into members’ domestic affairs and individuals’ private proprietary rights. The article thus calls for alternative thinking about the TRIPS Amendment, in particular to leave administration of compulsory licensing fully with domestic authorities as it is in the Paris Convention.

In the Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) was called upon to clarify the existence of its advisory jurisdiction as a full Tribunal under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). ITLOS unanimously upheld its advisory jurisdiction, yet its reasoning is not convincing. ITLOS’s interpretation of Article 21 of its Statute appears unpersuasive. The article discusses the interpretation of Article 21 ITLOS Statute pursuant to the rules on interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Arts. 31–33). First, the article addresses the article's textual reading, and criticizes the Tribunal's interpretation of the term ‘matters’. Second, the article considers the interpretation of Article 21 according to the subsequent practice of the parties, argued by some states but not addressed by ITLOS. Third, the travaux préparatoires of the UNCLOS are examined, with a view to understanding whether the drafters intended the Tribunal to have advisory jurisdiction. Fourth, the six authentic texts of UNCLOS are compared in order to highlight potential differences that may help understand the exact meaning of the provision. Fifth, the article discusses the relationship between advisory jurisdiction and state consent. The conclusion is that the basis for ITLOS's advisory jurisdiction under UNCLOS seems weak. Some general considerations conclude the article, together with a possible solution that takes stock of ITLOS's decision.

The development of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) has often revealed the tight interrelation between refugee law, humanitarian law and international criminal law. It has been argued that the latter bodies of law have, in fact, played a major role in the development of most key concept of the European Union asylum acquis.

Drawing from the judgment issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Diakité, this article aims to prove that this assumption is not always true, especially with reference to the interpretation of specific concepts of international humanitarian law (IHL) and, in particular, the controversial notion of ‘internal armed conflict’. In tackling the sensitive issue of clarifying the meaning of ‘internal armed conflict’ in order to investigate the grounds to warrant subsidiary protection under the Qualification Directive, the Court provided an autonomous interpretation that goes beyond IHL, thus offering another occasion to investigate the interrelation between international law and the EU legal order.

While contributing to the ongoing debate on the relationship between international law and the EU legal order, the article will consider the impact of the Court's reasoning on the EU asylum acquis, and will consider whether disconnecting the Qualification Directive from IHL, instead of producing further fragmentation of international law, may contribute to its defragmentation, conceived of as a harmonic co-ordination of different branches of law.

The newest convention of the Council of Europe requires states parties to criminalize all activities related to the trafficking in human organs. It is the first international agreement specifically aimed at addressing this form or criminal trade. Trafficking in human organs is mostly a transnational criminal enterprise: the article highlights how contracting states will have to face specific problems in prosecuting offences committed in foreign countries. The effectiveness of the convention depends on the parties’ determination in solving such problems and in avoiding taking advantage from some reservations that – though admitted by the convention – could undermine its possible value as a means of combating transnational crime.

This article explores the role of international climate change adaptation law in promoting the use of genetically engineered crops as an adaptation strategy. The severity of climate change impacts and the realization that, by now, some adverse effects are inevitable, has intensified the urgency to devise effective adaptation strategies. Genetically engineered climate-resilient crops are presented as one possible means to adapt to the predicted adverse impacts of climate change on agriculture and crop yields. Despite increased attention on the research and development of climate-resilient crops, particularly by private sector seed corporations, there are many controversies surrounding this proposed adaptation strategy. The key contentions relate to apprehensions about genetically engineered crops more generally, the effectiveness of climate-resilient crops, and the involvement of the private sector in international climate change adaptation initiatives.

The main argument in this article is that the emerging field of international climate change adaptation law contributes to promoting genetically engineered climate-resilient crops as a possible means of adaptation. Moreover, international adaptation law creates an enabling environment for the active engagement of private sector corporations in devising adaptation strategies. Notwithstanding controversies over genetically engineered crops and the role of the private sector, there has been little consideration so far of the influence of the growing international legal regime on climate change on the types of adaptation strategies that are devised and promoted.

The 2014 judgment of the International Court of Justice, regarding Whaling in the Antarctic, brought into focus scientific fact-finding in disputes before the Court. This article examines the Court's practice with respect to first, the mode of appointment and method of examining experts assisting the Court in fact-finding; and second, the standard of review employed in analysing a scientific fact to arrive at a judicial decision. In doing so, the article also refers to jurisprudence of the World Trade Organization to draw parallels and best practices therefrom. This analysis is aimed at structuring a coherent and predictable approach for scientific fact-finding before the International Court of Justice.

This article examines the problem of colliding international regimes by reference to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the UN Security Council. Given the different logics or rationalities of these institutions – the Security Council is first and foremost a (power) political organ, while the ICC is in charge of legal assessments – the collision potential is high. A collision rule was therefore introduced into the Rome Statute in the form of Article 16; however, all instances of its application so far have been highly controversial. While norm application is always controversial to some extent, we argue – in reference to Thomas Franck's work on the legitimacy of international norms – that regime responsiveness, secondary rules or a neutral application control of Article 16 could contribute to successful collision management.

The ICC's Regulation 55, which allows the Trial Chamber to modify the legal characterization of facts in the final judgment, has been used too often and too carelessly. Recharacterization must not exceed the facts and circumstances described in the charges, but material facts and their legal qualification are like communicating vessels; changing the latter affects the former (and vice versa). In their application of Regulation 55 to date, chambers have underappreciated this, treating cases as if they have blurry factual boundaries where material facts can be swapped, neglected, or created at will. This article is not a plea for abolition of Regulation 55, though, but explores which modifications are permissible, and finds that when comparing a change regarding the contextual elements or (sub)categories of crimes to a change regarding the mode of participation the latter is most problematic and often detrimental to the rights of the accused.