Recent jurisprudence in investment arbitration, almost all of which originated in disputes arising out of Argentina’s turn-of-the-century fiscal crisis, has raised difficult questions about the existence, nature, and advisability of necessity as a defense to state responsibility. The jurisprudence has contributed to a sophisticated literature focusing on necessity’s role in the special context of investment arbitration. But the growing prominence of necessity pleas in international law has not been so limited. Nor will its effects be. In the first place, investor-state arbitral jurisprudence contributes to the evolution of general international law. Investment tribunals invoke the latter, for example, to inform their interpretation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or to cure lacunae in the law. More significantly, beyond the realm of investment arbitration, the past few decades have seen a striking growth in necessity pleas in fields ranging widely across the landscape of international law.

In debates over the scope of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), one historical document has played an especially prominent role. That document is a short opinion by U.S. Attorney General William Bradford, issued in the summer of 1795, concerning the involvement of U.S. citizens in an attack by a French fleet on a British colony in Sierra Leone. In the opinion, Bradford concluded that “[s]o far ... as the transactions complained of originated or took place in a foreign country, they are not within the cognizance of our courts; nor can the actors be legally prosecuted or punished for them by the United States.” He also expressed the view that the actors could be prosecuted for crimes on the high seas, while noting that “some doubt rests on this point” in light of the language of the relevant criminal statute. Finally, he stated—in an obvious reference to the ATS—that

The Bradford opinion contains one of the few early historical references to the ATS, so it not surprisingly has received a lot of attention. Numerous academic articles, judicial opinions, and litigation briefs have invoked the Bradford opinion, for a variety of propositions. Reliance on the opinion has increased since the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, in which the Court cited the opinion in support of the proposition that the ATS provides jurisdiction over certain common law causes of action derived from the law of nations. As an illustration of its perceived significance, both sides discussed the opinion in the oral argument before the Supreme Court in the first hearing in the pending ATS case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.

Much of the recent debate about the status of customary international law in the U.S. legal system has revolved around the alien tort provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, currently section 1350 of Title 28. In Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, the decision that launched modern human rights litigation in the United States, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied on the view that customary international law has the status of federal common law in upholding section 1350’s grant of federal jurisdiction over a suit between aliens. The court’s position that customary international law was federal law was the prevailing view at the time—a view that has subsequently been dubbed the “modern position.” It was the view set forth in the black letter of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law. Filártiga triggered a revisionist challenge to the modern position, with revisionists arguing that customary international law has the status of federal law only if given that status through statute or treaty, or perhaps through sole executive action; in the absence of such incorporation, customary international law has, at best, the status of State law in our legal system.

Although careful scholarly treatment of the history of international law is now thriving, within U.S. courts that history now begins with one eighteenth-century treatise published in Neuchâtel, Switzerland, in 1758 and published in translation for modern readers under the aegis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1916. This treatise is Emer de Vattel’s Droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains. My aim in this article is to appraise the elevation of Vattel to vaunted originalist heights in U.S. law. The claim that Vattel’s theory of the law of nations completely represents how the Founding Fathers (Founders) understood the law of nations should be rejected as a matter of history.

One year ago, the U.S. Supreme Court refused a request by the Obama administration to stay the lethal injection by Texas of a convicted prisoner even though that execution would violate a U.S. treaty obligation. Instead, the Supreme Court deferred to contravening Texas state law and policy that denied the prisoner, Humberto Leal García, a hearing on the merits as to whether the government of Texas’s failure to advise Leal of his right to meet with a consular representative prejudiced his criminal convictions in Texas courts. The State of Texas, which opposed the stay, carried out the execution hours after the Supreme Court stood down.

The International Court of Justice rendered four judgments in 2011: on April 1, a ruling on the respondent’s preliminary objections in Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), upholding one objection and finding that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application; on May 4, two rulings on Costa Rica’s and Honduras’s applications for permission to intervene in Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), rejecting both; and on December 5, a final decision on jurisdiction, admissibility, and the merits in Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), finding for the applicant. The Court also issued three orders in incidental proceedings: on March 8, one on Costa Rica’s request for the indication of provisional measures in Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); on July 4, one on Greece’s application for permission to intervene as a nonparty in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy); and on July 18, one on Cambodia’s request for the indication of provisional measures in Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand). The Court indicated provisional measures in response to both requests, and granted Greece permission to intervene.