Global constitutionalists argue that the international legal order can only be meaningfully construed as having an objective, value-based purport. There is, however, something hybrid about the constitutionalist argument, as constitutionalists espouse a normative agenda whilst at the same time setting out to ground their approach in positive international law. It is contended that to avoid both this foundational problem and the charge of utopianism, and as a rejoinder to positivistic arguments for the denial of objective purport, constitutionalists are forced to reason along indirect, transcendental lines. Thus, constitutionalists are to be construed as avouching global values as necessary conditions for making sense of existing international legal practice, rather than merely invoking direct, positivistic evidence and/or mere normative arguments to ground their position. Moreover, it is submitted, first, that global constitutionalists would do better by adopting a less objectivist stance as regards global values, as on the ideal-agent theory of value. Second, it is argued that even though there might be room for so-called constitutionalist ‘mindsets’, these fall short of establishing the objective purport of the international legal order. Third, d'Aspremont's positivistic argument contra objective purport is construed as (also) an argument to the effect that the rules and architecture of the international legal order only warrant the existence of Hobbesian interests as necessary conditions for making sense of it. The constitutionalist case for objective purport, then, hinges on the issue of whether constitutionalism is necessitated by considerations as regards the intelligibility of international legal argument, by explanatory desiderata regarding trends in international law-making, and as a viable response to the problems posed by fragmentation, deformalization, and international legal scepticism.

It is now standard in contemporary international law commentary to note that the latter part of the twentieth century has seen a move away from the traditional understanding of international law as fundamentally based on the consent of states. As just two examples, customary international law has in some contexts become more influential than treaties and human rights obligations are now recognized as often binding states even when they have signed no treaty acknowledging their existence. Treaty interpretation, by contrast, has remained focused upon the parties to a treaty, with even textualist approaches to treaty interpretation justified as the best means of ascertaining the intent of the contracting states. The purpose of the present article is to highlight the existence of a subset of treaties for which even a teleological approach to interpretation fails to capture the central importance for the treaty of entities other than the contracting states. These ‘power-conferring treaties’ do not merely entrust tribunals with the power to effectively fashion the means by which a treaty's goals should be achieved. To varying degrees, they grant control of the treaty itself, including, at times, both its enforcement and the very meaning of its terms, to entities other than the contracting states. As a result, the traditional emphasis in treaty interpretation on the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty, and the precise language in which the treaty is written, will fail to generate an interpretation that faithfully captures the manner in which the treaty genuinely functions. The article then illustrates the potential impact of the power-conferring nature of a treaty through an analysis of the meaning of the term ‘investment’ in the International Convention for Settlement of Investment Disputes. This is one of the most controversial topics in contemporary international investment law, with an enormous impact upon the jurisdiction of ICSID arbitral tribunals. It is argued that recognizing the power-conferring nature of the ICSID Convention provides an enhanced understanding of the way in which this term should be interpreted.

The Kosovo Advisory Opinion gave rise to responses that suggest that the Court went too far, or not far enough, depending on one's perspective. In this article, the authors argue that the Court should either have done nothing or gone all the way. By accepting an inadequately drafted question, the Court was necessarily going to give an inadequate answer. This article adopts a strict approach to the legal nature of the question and considers that the ICJ should have declined its competence, not as an exercise of its discretion, but as a preservation of its core judicial function, which does not include primarily the conduct of non-state entities. Going further, the authors suggest that the Court could have rephrased the question and sought to establish the international responsibility of the United Nations, and, ultimately, of Kosovo, which, it is argued, is in fact implicitly recognized by the Court, both politically and legally.

In the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice took the position that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence did not violate any applicable rules of international law. This article does not dispute the final finding, but rather critically examines the Court's somewhat controversial reasoning and considers the added value of the opinion for the clarification of legal doctrine in relation to unilateral declarations of independence. An argument is made that the Court's interpretation of the question and the identification of the authors of the declaration had significant implications for the Court's final finding. Yet, the Court cannot be criticized for not answering the question of whether or not Kosovo is a state, whether Kosovo Albanians are beneficiaries of the right of self-determination, or even whether the ‘right to remedial secession’ is applicable. However, the Court may well have implicitly answered that recognition of Kosovo is not illegal.

Bert Swart passed away on 17 February 2011, at the age of 69.

We lose in Bert a great and loving friend and colleague. Those who knew him personally will remember his kindness, generosity, and modesty. Bert spoke with a soft voice and was genuinely interested in and friendly to others.

On 28 and 29 October 2011, a conference was held in The Hague on International Criminal Law (ICL) as a cultural and legal hybrid. The aim of the conference convenors was to facilitate an exchange of thoughts between legal scholars, practitioners, and social scientists on the nature of ICL and to discuss the role (legal) culture plays in international criminal justice. The recent discussion is dominated by the adversarial (common law)–inquisitorial (civil law) dichotomy and centres on the hybrid nature of the procedure in international criminal law. The debate focuses on how a fair and efficient trial can be safeguarded by observing the rights of the accused and other participants through an operational criminal procedure. Sometimes, this clash of legal systems has become an end in itself, resulting in a debate on which system is superior. At least in theory, however, modern international criminal procedural law seems to have overcome the adversarial–inquisitorial dichotomy, since it combines features of both common- and civil-law systems. This unique compromise structure poses a challenge to the practitioners who – although trained in and influenced by their respective national systems – have to apply the procedural norms at the international level and, in doing so, find an appropriate balance between adversarial and inquisitorial features. This is even more challenging since the single elements of the different legal traditions do not fit together seamlessly, leading to myriad, heated disagreements over how to combine them into a single, coherent, workable legal system.

International criminal justice is based to a large extent on extrapolations from criminal-law research on domestic systems. The difficult exercise of arriving at a common denominator is exacerbated by the systemic dichotomy of the so-called common-law and civil-law models, which, in turn, have now been joined by a third contender: public international law. Each of these has its own methods of approaching the task of solving legal problems. This paper queries the inter-model conversation that is happening so far and asks the question as to whether it is necessary to hold this discussion at a much more fundamental level than it would seem has been the case so far. It does so at the example of the relationship between German and English and Welsh law, but its concerns and conclusions merit consideration for the entire debate between the systems.

Although the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been mostly hailed as a victory, Islamic states still regard its application of international criminal-law norms with scepticism. The Rome Statute instructs the Court to apply general principles of law derived from national laws of legal systems of the world including the national laws of states that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime but, so far, the Court has relied purely upon Western inspiration and may fail to acquire the legitimacy to establish a universal system. Among the legal systems that are unjustifiably neglected by the ICC is the Islamic legal tradition. This paper argues that the principles of Islamic law are, for the most part, consistent with internationally recognized norms and standards, particularly those enshrined in the Rome Statute, and are on an equal footing with the common and Continental legal systems that are currently employed by the Court in the search for general principles of law.

On 10 May 2001, the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Cyprus v. Turkey pronouncing on the legal consequences of Turkey's invasion and occupation of the northern part of Cyprus since 1974. The Court found Turkey responsible for continuing violations of the right to the home and property of Greek-Cypriots. Invoking the Namibia principle, the Court found that remedies in the occupied part of Cyprus may be regarded as domestic remedies of Turkey and that the question of their effectiveness was to be considered in the specific circumstances in which it arises. On 1 March 2010, the Court decided that a Commission in the occupied area was a remedy that should be exhausted by the complainants for the above violations. Significant legal questions were determined relating to the effectiveness of this remedy with far-reaching consequences concerning the right to home and property as well as other aspects of human rights and international law.

This article deals with the fundamental evolution that the process of state recognition has gone through during the past few decades. Whereas the recognition of new states used to be subject to a relatively concise and clear-cut normative framework consisting of factual criteria, the dissolution of Yugoslavia marked the introduction of a new set of moral norms used to determine whether or not an entity should be recognized as a state. This evolution gave rise to a high level of uncertainty, among both authors and the state community, as was painfully shown by the international discord during the crises in Kosovo and South Ossetia/Abkhazia. A renewed normative framework for recognition that integrates both factual and moral criteria is needed if the international community wants to prevent each claim to statehood becoming a threat to international stability.

Counsel are regulated the world over in their dealings with a court of law through the enforcement of ethical duties that are owed by them. With the increased prevalence of arbitration in resolving disputes internationally, the question then arises: how are counsel kept in check when appearing before an arbitral tribunal? The issues involved are magnified when one considers the question in the context of international arbitral tribunals. This paper considers these issues by analysing them in three parts. First, is ethical regulation necessary in international arbitration? Second, does an arbitral tribunal have jurisdiction to consider and enforce ethical obligations owed to it by counsel? Third, what ethical obligations should be applied to counsel?