This article examines the extent to which or how self-identified great powers resort to military aggression following events that challenge their sense of greatness. It problematises the prevalent notion that great powers and events exist and have effects independently of the narratives that constitute them. The article does this by engaging with Ontological Security Studies, Great Power Narcissism, and the psychology of vulnerable and grandiose narcissism, as well as by analysing Japanese identity narratives in two periods seemingly marked by equally challenging events – the Meiji era (1868–1912) and the post-war period (1950–71). It finds that Japan’s military aggression against China in 1894–5 was enabled by vulnerable narratives of shame and insult, while the decision to wage war with Russia a decade later was facilitated more by grandiose narratives. Despite Japan’s overwhelming defeat in the Second World War and the persistent desire among conservative elites for great power status and identity, however, overall post-war narratives did not feature similarly negative emotions and calls for revenge. Japanese great power aspirations were arguably curtailed in this period through intense narrative contestation, notably progressive counter-narratives featuring more self-reflective expressions of guilt and remorse, and even the self-reflexive desire for a non-great power identity.

This article proposes a hybrid legal framework combining jus ad bellum and jus in bello to govern the attribution of State responsibility for reparations at the end of a war of aggression. To this end, the article considers former international mass claims processes and proposes a complementary approach that, on the one hand, acknowledges the role of the aggressor State in waging the war, and on the other, takes a cautionary approach to prevent a disproportionate burden of compensation being imposed on the aggressor State as a form of collective punishment. The consequences of respective violations of the prohibition of the use of force and the law of war are blurred in a war of aggression, resulting in complexities around liability for aggressor States. In response, this article concludes with a nuanced proposal to calculate compensation based on (1) the aggressor party's capacity to comply with jus in bello; (2) the extent of damage caused by the war of aggression, factoring in jus ad bellum considerations if a party is found to be intentionally maximizing destruction; and (3) the incorporation of tort law principles for equitable attribution of responsibility.

Ukraine's war of self-defense against Russia is one of the clearest examples of a nation fighting a just war in recent history. Ukraine is clearly entitled to defend itself, and Russia is clearly obligated to cease hostilities, withdraw troops, and make repair. In light of this, some of the most salient moral questions related to Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine involve the international community; namely, what moral duties it has toward Ukraine, especially in light of Russia's extreme and pervasive human rights abuses. The first section of the essay argues that there is a pro tanto moral duty to intervene militarily in Ukraine to stop Russian human rights abuses and ensure that Ukraine achieves a military victory. This duty is grounded in duties of rescue, promissory obligations, and reliance obligations, as well as duties to nations’ own citizens and to the international community. The second section of the essay argues that the most relevant consideration in determining whether there is an all-things-considered duty for the international community to intervene militarily in Ukraine is Russia's nuclear coercion and the associated risk of nuclear war. This section highlights the nuclear risks involved in compliance with Russian nuclear coercion, which I argue have been neglected in prominent discussions. The moral stakes involved in this determination are very high, and succumbing to Russian nuclear coercion in the face of massive human rights violations would set a dangerous precedent. Any course of action should be guided by a thorough analysis of all the risks involved, both nuclear and moral.

The moral self-concept (MSC) describes how children view themselves as moral agents. Research suggests that the MSC may relate to moral behavior, yet little is known about how MSC relates to moral behavior in preschoolers. One hundred six low-income children (Mage = 52.78 months, SD = 6.61 months) and their teachers participated in this study. In the fall, children completed a MSC puppet task measure. In the fall and spring, teachers reported via children’s survey prosocial behavior and aggressive behavior. We used a person-centered approach to identify profiles of MSC, which revealed two profiles of behavior: comforting prosocials and helpful aggressors. Comforting prosocials showed a moderate preference for comforting, a slight preference for helping, and a slight preference for avoiding aggression. Helpful aggressors had a moderate aversion to comforting, a strong preference for helping, and a slight preference for aggressive behavior. Subsequent analysis of covariance analysis revealed that MSC profiles did not differ in concurrent behavior but did differ in behavior 6 months later. The comforting prosocial group participated in more aggression than the helpful aggressors. Additionally, analysis of covariance analysis of change in aggression scores over time showed that comforting prosocials aggression increased, while helpful aggressors aggression decreased. Both groups over time decreased in prosocial behavior, but to different degrees. Overall, findings reveal that the MSC in preschoolers may relate to future not concurrent moral behavior.

Much discussion over Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine focuses on the inability to charge aggression. However, another approach might be available: charging this under the ICC crimes against humanity (CAH) residual clause. First proposed in 2010 by Benjamin Ferencz, who lamented the circumscribed reach of aggression under the ‘Kampala Compromise’, the proposal has met with scepticism, primarily given that textbook aggression targets military forces, not civilians. Yet, civilian populations disproportionately bear the brunt of the violence of modern aggression (often being its direct targets). Russia's 2022 invasion is but the most recent and compelling example. Thus, this article resuscitates Ferencz's proposal, arguing that Russian leaders could be charged with using illegal force as a CAH under the residual clause. This approach would have practical advantages: initiating aggression in the Kremlin links liability to Putin much more directly for killing Ukrainian civilians, and charging it as CAH opens human victims to ICC participation and reparations. There are theoretical advantages, too, with utilitarian/retributive objectives better satisfied. Moreover, Ferencz's approach is better than recently proposed alternatives: using aggression merely as a gravity/liability modes/sentencing enhancer or alleging breach of the right to self-determination as the residual clause gravamen (arguably creating problems with victim group identification).

Should theoretical discourse supporting state crimes be protected as free speech or prosecuted as atrocity speech? The relationship between Neo-Hobbesian Nazi collaborator Carl Schmitt and progressive Futurology founder Ossip Flechtheim provides a fascinating framework for exploring that question. In 1933, Schmitt rejected Flechtheim as a PhD student, on antisemitic grounds. Meanwhile, becoming Nazism’s “Crown Jurist,” he helped force Jewish lawyers, including Flechtheim, into exile. Post-war, Flechtheim, now on the US Nuremberg prosecution staff, arrested Schmitt. Through Flechtheim’s experience, this article explores how Schmitt’s prosecution, within a contemplated “Propaganda and Education Case” (PEC), might have determined how to treat atrocity-complicit academic propagandists. It chronicles how the PEC/Schmitt case collapsed when Flechtheim’s investigation was curtailed due to resource constraints, equivocal precedent, and prosecutor Robert Kempner’s botched interrogations. Nonetheless, Flechtheim contributed to the Ministries Trial conviction of propagandist Otto Dietrich. The article concludes by juxtaposing that case with Schmitt’s near-prosecution to contemplate norms for charging theorists laying needed groundwork for atrocity, via sufficiently proximate speech, even absent direct incitement. Such an international justice future would mirror immediate post-Cold War intellectual developments, which vindicated Flechtheim’s vision, not Schmitt’s. Exploring this topic is timely, as Russian academic discourse has enabled/fueled Ukraine’s invasion and related atrocities.

Previous studies show aggression-related structural alterations in frontal and limbic brain regions. Most studies have focused on overall aggression, instead of its subtypes, and on specific regions instead of networks. This study aims to identify both brain networks and regions that are associated with reactive and proactive subtypes of aggression. Structural MRI data were collected from 340 adolescents (125 F/215 M) with a mean age of 16.29 (SD = 1.20). Aggression symptomology was indexed via the Reactive Proactive Aggression Questionnaire (RPQ). Freesurfer was used to estimate Cortical Volume (CV) from seven networks and regions within specific networks associated with aggression. Two multivariate analyses of covariance (MANCOVAs) were conducted on groups for low versus higher reactive and proactive RPQ scores. Our reactive aggression MANCOVA showed a main effect in CV [F(14,321) = 1.935, p = 0.022,ηp2 = 0.078] across all the 7-Networks. Unpacking this main effect revealed significant volumetric differences in the right Limbic Network (LN) (p = 0.029) and the Temporal Pole (p = 0.011), where adolescents in the higher reactive aggression group showed higher cortical volumes. Such findings are consistent with region/voxel-specific analyses that have associated atypical structure within the LN and reactive aggression. Moreover, the temporal pole is highly interconnected with regions important in the regulation and initiation of reactive aggression.

The present study examined the longitudinal associations between three dimensions of temperament – activity, affect-extraversion, and task orientation – and childhood aggression. Using 131 monozygotic and 173 dizygotic (86 same-sex) twin pairs from the Louisville Twin Study, we elucidated the ages, from 6 to 36 months, at which each temperament dimension began to correlate with aggression at age 7. We employed latent growth modeling to show that developmental increases (i.e., slopes) in activity were positively associated with aggression, whereas increases in affect-extraversion and task orientation were negatively associated with aggression. Genetically informed models revealed that correlations between temperament and aggression were primarily explained by common genetic variance, with nonshared environmental variance accounting for a small proportion of each correlation by 36 months. Genetic variance explained the correlations of the slopes of activity and task orientation with aggression. Nonshared environmental variance accounted for almost half of the correlation between the slopes of affect-extraversion and aggression. Exploratory analyses revealed quantitative sex differences in each temperament-aggression association. By establishing which dimensions of temperament correlate with aggression, as well as when and how they do so, our work informs the development of future child and family interventions for children at highest risk of aggression.