This paper examines how credit guarantees and government subsidies impact investment in a regime-switching model. We provide new explicit pricing formulas for a general standard asset. Almost all common corporate securities’ prices can be easily derived by the explicit formulas though project cash flows are driven by both a Brownian motion and a two-state Markov chain. We provide a method about how governments should specify a proper tax subsidy standard for a given tax rate to motivate a firm to invest in a project in the way they wish. If the tax subsidy is sufficiently high (low), an overinvestment (underinvestment) occurs. The higher the tax rate, the more significant the overinvestment (underinvestment). We pin down the subsidy amount required for motivating a firm to invest immediately and fix the optimal capital structure with government subsidies.

We shed light on assessing product quality in blind tastings and their potential (gender) biases. We study how phonetic traits of grape varieties suggest product attributes in the context of professional reviews. This study aims to close this research gap and analyze how product variety and phonetic name traits affect expert ratings. We obtained data on 18,609 wines and their ratings from Wine Enthusiast Magazine between 1997 and 2016, yielding a sample of 31,058 observations. We suppose that the gender of the taster needs to be considered to understand what affects tastings and ratings, as women and men might be attracted differently to masculine or feminine names. This study shows that masculine names receive higher evaluations than feminine ones. This phonetic gender gap is driven by lower ratings for white wines by female reviewers and lower ratings for red wines by male reviewers. In addition, white wines are rated lower overall by both men and women.

Cost-share contracts, offered through working lands programs, are instrumental in addressing environmental externalities from agriculture and generating ecosystem services. However, the persistent trend of noncompliance with cost-share contractual terms has become a problem for funding agencies and policymakers. This paper aims to study noncompliance issues within the US working lands programs using historical county-level panel data (1997–2019) from Louisiana. The results show that noncompliance is attributed more to cancellations than terminations due to flexible provisions within the cancellation option. The significant incentive effect of payment obligations reveals that revisiting payment rates could reduce contract noncompliance and mitigate moral hazard.

This paper uses data from the 2021 Swiss edition of the Gault&Millau food guide to analyze the probability with which restaurant owners decide to share their wine list with the public. This is an important question relating to the amount of information circulating in markets characterized by information asymmetry in the context of experience and credence goods. We find that restaurant owners are more willing to share wine lists with others if competition is limited or their wine list does not contain idiosyncratic information that competitors may use strategically. Interviews indicate the challenge for restaurants to balance the risk of sharing information with competitors and the opportunity to attract wine lovers by revealing an appealing wine list. We also show that this decision depends on cultural considerations.

Compared to other policy instruments that aim to change consumer behavior, information provision is perhaps the least controversial. An important question is how information in the form of carbon labels can contribute to direct food consumption toward reduced climate impact. From a policy guidance perspective, there is a need to identify how the labeling strategy affects consumers’ ability to identify lower emitting food products and the behavioral change due to carbon information. Key aspects of a carbon label are discussed, as well as the implications of different labeling schemes. Drawing on economic and behavioral theories, we propose that, to assist consumers in identifying changes in consumption that contribute to significant reductions in their climate impact, a carbon label must enable comparisons between product groups and not only within narrowly defined product groups. This suggests mandatory labeling, since producers of high-emission products are less likely to display such labels. However, it is important to consider both costs and benefits of labeling schemes and to consider complementing labeling with other policy instruments.

The philosophical debate concerning political exchange has largely been confined to debating the desirability of vote trading; where individuals can sell their votes or buy votes from others. However, I show that the vote credit systems prevalent in public choice theory entirely avoid the common objections to political exchange that afflict vote trading proposals. Namely, vote credit systems avoid equality concerns and inalienability concerns. I offer an alternative critique to formal mechanisms that encourage political exchange by drawing on the role that impartiality and impartial moral judgements play in democratic and electoral institutions.

This paper constructs a two-period general equilibrium model with the effective lower bound of nominal interest rates and describes price competition among monopolistically competitive firms as a coordination game. While the model has multiple equilibria with different levels of inflation (positive or zero), the equilibrium selection in line with global games implies that the economy with high expected productivity growth moves into the positive inflation equilibrium. The policy analyses indicate that monetary policy measures such as an increase in the target inflation can prevent the economy from moving into the zero inflation equilibrium even with low productivity growth.

An often overlooked strategy for fighting the COVID-19 pandemic is group testing. Its main advantage is that it can scale, enabling the regular testing of the whole population. We argue that another advantage is that it can induce social distancing. Using a simple model, we show that if a group tests positive and its members are in close social proximity, then they will rationally choose not to meet. The driving force is the uncertainty about who has the virus and the fact that the group cares about its collective welfare. We therefore propose identifying socially connected groups, such as colleagues, friends and neighbours, and testing them regularly.

Bonus-malus systems (BMSs) are widely used in actuarial sciences. These systems are applied by insurance companies to distinguish the policyholders by their risks. The most known application of BMS is in automobile third-party liability insurance. In BMS, there are several classes, and the premium of a policyholder depends on the class he/she is assigned to. The classification of policyholders over the periods of the insurance depends on the transition rules. In general, optimization of these systems involves the calculation of an appropriate premium scale considering the number of classes and transition rules as external parameters. Usually, the stationary distribution is used in the optimization process. In this article, we present a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) formulation for determining the premium scale and the transition rules. We present two versions of the model, one with the calculation of stationary probabilities and another with the consideration of multiple periods of the insurance. Furthermore, numerical examples will also be given to demonstrate that the MILP technique is suitable for handling existing BMSs.

This article offers a new interpretation of the Baring crisis, the most dramatic financial collapse of the nineteenth century, by focusing on how information brokerage allowed Barings to abandon its risk-averse practices in the mid 1880s. I argue that the mediators who bridged structural holes (gaps between social clusters) shaped actors’ access to information as well as their expectations regarding its quality. Information brokers who enjoyed philos ties with at least one of the parties connected by the bridging relationships could promote collaborative arrangements more likely to survive an environment of heightened uncertainty. The performance of such brokers in the 1880s enabled cooperation between Baring Brothers & Co. and the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas and supported the London house's growing association with the Anglo-Argentine firm of S. B. Hale & Co. in the second half of the 1880s. Cooperation gave Barings an illusion of security amid the costs of increasing competition and supported the house's growing engagement in South American affairs. Nevertheless, the strategy proved ineffective at barring the entry of new players. By the late 1880s, ties produced by brokerage connected Barings to the house's former competitors, producing a cohesive social cluster. Barings thereafter had access to redundant information, which hindered the house's ability to assess risk.

In this paper we review the benefit-cost analyses (BCAs) made to support applications for authorisations under the EU’s REACH Regulation on hazardous chemicals. Experiences from over 100 cases suggest that there are a number of informational and methodological challenges to overcome in these BCAs. In particular, we find that many REACH applicants have had problems explaining the societal relevance of the regulatory impacts expected to affect them and other market actors. Adapting the framework for regulatory impact assessment proposed by Dudley et al. [(2017). Consumer’s Guide to Regulatory Impact Analysis: Ten Tips for Being an Informed Policymaker. Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 8, 187–204], we discuss these impacts from a welfare economics perspective and make suggestions on how to improve current practices in BCA applied to chemicals risk management. From this discussion we then distill a number of topics that deserve more attention in applied BCAs under the REACH Regulation.

In England, teacher shortages have worsened in recent years and one contributor is the declining rates of retention among newly qualified teachers (NQTs). We employ a method developed in the health-statistics literature to identify schools that both recruit an unusually high level of NQTs and lose an unusually high level of NQTs from the profession. We show that this small group of schools, which are likely characterised by poor working conditions, are responsible for a disproportionately large amount of attrition from the teaching profession. This has a material effect on overall teacher shortages and comes at a high cost to taxpayers. Policy solutions, including improving the flow of information to NQTs to help them avoid such schools, are discussed

Regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) weigh the benefits of regulations against the burdens they impose and are invaluable tools for informing decision makers. We offer 10 tips for nonspecialist policymakers and interested stakeholders who will be reading RIAs as consumers.

1. 1. Core problem: Determine whether the RIA identifies the core problem (compelling public need) the regulation is intended to address.

2. 2. Alternatives: Look for an objective, policy-neutral evaluation of the relative merits of reasonable alternatives.

3. 3. Baseline: Check whether the RIA presents a reasonable “counterfactual” against which benefits and costs are measured.

4. 4. Increments: Evaluate whether totals and averages obscure relevant distinctions and trade-offs.

5. 5. Uncertainty: Recognize that all estimates involve uncertainty, and ask what effect key assumptions, data, and models have on those estimates.

6. 6. Transparency: Look for transparency and objectivity of analytical inputs.

7. 7. Benefits: Examine how projected benefits relate to stated objectives.

8. 8. Costs: Understand what costs are included.

9. 9. Distribution: Consider how benefits and costs are distributed.

10. 10. Symmetrical treatment: Ensure that benefits and costs are presented symmetrically.

This paper investigates the effect of recent regulatory changes to the compulsory annuitisation of tax-privileged pension savings, on the demand for annuities and other retirement products. We find that the demand for annuities has fallen by almost 75 per cent from its peak in 2012, and the demand for income drawdown products has increased. There is some evidence that people at younger ages and with smaller pension pots are choosing not to annuitise, and hence the average size of an annuity purchase has increased.

We propose a market-based approach to reducing the environmental risk posed by concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs). The dual problems of hidden information and hidden action faced by policymakers are considered alongside the competing incentives faced by the CAFO manager in a multiple principal-agent setting. A new approach that uses insurance-like contracts is introduced by use of the specific example of a swine operation with a lagoon-based manure management system. Index-based contingent claims contracts in tandem with third-party auditing and waste hauling options are introduced as a complement to regulatory frameworks designed to reduce negative externalities from production.

Cattle feeders want feeder cattle that have been weaned and preconditioned with a certified health program. Preconditioned calves perform more efficiently in the feedlot with lower morbidity and mortality. Health program claims, however, range from no claim to being USDA-certified. The value of health protocol certification may vary with certifying entity. Results from a choice experiment and survey of cattle feeders indicate preconditioning programs that include weaning, vaccinating against respiratory and clostridial/blackleg, and treating for parasites are worth on average $7.28/cwt to feedlots. Furthermore, a health program certified by USDA carries an additional value of $2.37/cwt on average.

In this article, we examine disclosure as a tool to mitigate the effects of asymmetric information in a Thoroughbred yearling market. If disclosures influence market price, information contained therein must be valuable to buyers and hence diminish asymmetric information. Using public auction data, we find that disclosures do not influence price in a segment of the auction in which an implicit quality certification is available. However, in the other segment, we find evidence that some disclosures may provide valuable information to buyers.

Nous considérons une prise de contrôle dans laquelle les motivations des repreneurs potentiels sont multiples et étudions I’impact du degré d’affiliation de leurs évaluations sur la stratégie optimale. Nous montrons que cet impact dépend du rapport des dotations initiales. Nous trouvons que lorsque les dotations initiales sont symétriques, la stratégie optimale des enchérisseurs est indépendante du degré d’affiliation de leurs évaluations. En revanche, lorsque les dotations initiales sont asymétriques, cet impact dépend du niveau du signal privé de l’enchérisseur. Si les acqueréurs potentiels surenchérissent en présence de dotations initiales, l’étendue de la surenchére décroît avec l’augmentation du degré d’affiliation lorsque le signal privé est inférieur un certain seuil. L’agressivité des enchérisseurs profite à la firme cible dont le revenu espéré augmente avec le degré d’affiliation des évaluations.

In an environment with asymmetric information and intragenerational externalities, the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke–Groves–Vickrey mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can be covered in every generation only if the initial allocation is not dynamically efficient. While introducing a pay-as-you-go scheme without addressing the externality already yields a Pareto improvement, further welfare gains can be captured by using the additional resources to achieve a perfect internalization.

Ce papier examine l'externalité verticale provenant de l'imposition d'une même base par des gouvernements aux territoires gigognes, phénomène récurrent observé dans la plupart des organiations étatiques et ayant fait l'objet d'un éclairage moins soutenu que celui de concurrence fiscale horizontale. Le modèle étudie un système comportant plusieurs niveaux de dèci-deurs et utilise la théorie des multiprincipaux pour analyser l'optimalité du degré de taxe lorsque plusieurs autorités exercent leur pouvoir fiscal sur une même assiette imposable. Cette théorie permet en effet d'appréhender et de décrire les mécanismes de concurrence entre différents décideurs poursuivant des objectifs propres. Il ressort que le comportement non coopératif de collectivités appartenant à différents niveaux administratifs et partageant une même base fiscale conduit à une hausse du taux de taxation auquel cette base est soumise. Chacun néglige en effet la perte de recettes fiscales qu'il inflige aux autres niveaux de gouvernement etdéfinit donc une taxe supérieure à celle qui correspondrait au coût marginal social. Le taux final d'imposition excède celui qui résulterait de l'exercice par un seul décideur public de la politique fiscale à mettre en oeuvre. Il apparaît en outre que la prise en compte d'une asymétrie d'information exerce un effet dépressif sur le niveau global d'imposition en conauisant chaque échelon à accorder une rente aux firmes, et donc à modérer sa pression fiscale, afin qu'elles révèlent leur information privéeet que puissent être mises en oeuvre les politiques les plus proches d'un optimum social.