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How does ‘Europe’ cope with its dark past and how does it handle its internal conflicts and contradictions? This is the question at the heart of Christian Joerges’s 600-page opus magnum Conflict and Transformation – Essays on European Law and Policy where he advances his reconceptualization of EU law as a particular form of conflicts law as his answer. But the problem constellation the EU is faced with in today’s world is well-beyond what can be encapsulated by a conflicts law perspective. As an alternative the idea of transformative law is introduced and its potential for acting as a basis for the reconceptualization of the EU legal order discussed. Joerges’s oeuvre moreover has a blind angle, as it is internalistic in nature. But rather than internal forces driving the integration project forward the structural trigger and driver of European integration should rather be found in the reconfiguration of Europe’s relations with the wider world. From (de-)colonialisation to todays ‘fragmented globalisation’ it is the structural reconfigurations of Europe’s relationships to the rest of the world which is the central driver of the integration process.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has had profound effects on the stability and security of Europe. This study examines the attitudes of Europeans toward the European Union (EU) in the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine. Using Special Eurobarometer data collected between February and April 2022 with a representative sample of the EU (N = 26,502), it leverages the quasi-experimental setting with the coincidence between the timing of the invasion and the fieldwork period of the Eurobarometer. Our findings indicate a general increase in support for the EU in the aftermath of the invasion by 4 percentage-points (11 percent of a SD). While the amplitude of the effect remains similar, we see larger treatment effects as more days passed after the invasion. We also observe significant variation at the individual level in treatment effects, particularly by ideology, with left-leaning individuals being more critical of the EU following the invasion. In general, our research demonstrates the significant impact of regional conflicts on public attitudes toward supranational organizations such as the EU and highlights the role of the EU as a provider of security and stability in the face of such conflicts.
Community detection is a set of algorithms developed in network science to find meaningful sub-groups within larger groups. This article (1) outlines and evaluates the method and (2) shows how it can enrich ongoing debates about European integration. To this end, it uses the example of the approximation of laws, an enduring topic in European legal studies.
Since the 1950s, the history of European integration unfolds as a unique social experiment, witnessing the transformation of a non-existent entity into an increasingly institutionalized force. This article delves into the consequences of this ongoing institutionalization on public attitudes towards the institution itself: the European Union (EU). We argue that as European institutional integration advanced, a divide in EU support between more and less educated individuals emerged, with the latter becoming progressively less supportive. Drawing on data from eighty-five waves of the Eurobarometer survey across fifteen countries and over 820,000 individuals from 1976 to 2014, a Bayesian mixed-effects analysis reveals that the gap in support between the more and less educated significantly widened with a country's level of institutional integration. This study emphasizes the necessity of distinguishing institutional effects from temporal patterns in order to enhance our understanding of EU-related public opinion dynamics.
This paper makes the case for a discursive understanding of ontological security and demonstrates the utility of such an approach in an analysis of European Parliament (EP) debates between 1990 and 2020. We argue that articulations of ontological (in)security operate through the (re)inscription of a set of metanarratives in what we call ‘discursive nodal points’. Building on an extensive analysis of EP debates over 30 years, we demonstrate that in contrast to the prevailing view of the European Union (EU) as an ‘anxious community’, at least on the political level, EU actors remain surprisingly confident in the European project. While they do invoke challenges to the EU, they see these as incentives to strengthen the integration project and often consider operating in crisis mode as an essential EU characteristic. In doing so, they draw on modernist metanarratives of progress, control, and power to construct an ontologically secure EU. We argue that the future ontological security of the EU will partly depend on allowing for more ambiguity in this modernist narrative without accepting a nationalist counter-narrative that undermines the idea of European integration.
This book examines the new economic governance (NEG) regime that the EU adopted after 2008. Its novel research design captures the supranational formulation of NEG prescriptions and their uneven deployment across countries (Germany, Italy, Ireland, Romania), policy areas (employment relations, public services), and sectors (transport, water, healthcare). NEG led to a much more vertical mode of EU integration, and its commodification agenda unleashed a plethora of union and social-movement protests, including transnationally. The book presents findings that are crucial for the prospects of European democracy, as labour politics is essential in framing the struggles about the direction of NEG along a commodification–decommodification axis rather than a national–EU axis. To shed light on corresponding processes at EU level, it upscales insights on the historical role that labour movements have played in the development of democracy and welfare states. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This chapter puts the developed theory to the test. First, after outlining the most important case law of the CJEU on the relationship between EU and Member State law, which has introduced primacy of EU law (also over Member State constitutional law) and the doctrine of direct effect, this chapter also displays the most important judgments by Member State constitutional courts generally holding that there are limits to the primacy of EU law. After analyzing the most important theoretical conceptions and doctrines in literature addressing the difference between the CJEU and the Constitutional Courts of some Member States, this chapter shows how consent-based monism can provide for relief. According to consent-based monism, the EU is the larger circle with regard to its Member States. All EU Member States in turn are independent smaller circles which are also part of the EU circle. The EU competence regime is decisive in this regard. It is vital to pinpoint exactly which competences have been shifted to the European level. According to consent-based monism, an “integration resistant core” must not violate any consensus that has been obtained at the level of the larger EU circle. The larger circle must not autonomously add competences without authorization by all of the smaller circles.
This chapter holds that the CJEU follows two diametrically diverging doctrines regarding the relationship between international and EU, as well as EU and Member State law. From a theoretical perspective this is inconceivable. One and the same organization cannot follow two different approaches. However, from a pragmatic perspective, this chapter acknowledges that this Janus face of the CJEU is quite understandable. Autonomy understood as monism, on the one hand, is an expression of legal unity, which is absolutely necessary for the EU to safeguard its integration process. On the other hand, autonomy expressed as dualism helps to secure the stability of this integration process by separating the EU legal order from far-reaching international influences. However, at the same time, autonomy cannot provide for an adequate replacement of monism and dualism.
At first glance, social justice seems to be absent in the history of European integration, which ultimately led to the European Union of our own times. This chapter arrives at a different conclusion. It focuses on the period from the 1950s until the Maastricht Treaty and argues that European integration was not simply the neoliberal project it is often described as. Already the Schuman Declaration of 1950 called for a ‘solidarité de fait’. While social justice never became a key concept defining the policies of the European Community, the EC started to develop a distinct approach to social issues since the 1950s. It primarily sought social progress through economic cooperation, not through redistributive social policy. Moreover, the EC served as a platform for the exchange of experts, complementing the role of national actors, transnational forums, and other international organizations such as the International Labour Organization. But it also started developing a highly diverse set of policy instruments with deep implications for social justice. These policies remained patchy. They gained importance only incrementally and never seemed to be driven by an overall logic. Even if the EC was a hidden actor on questions of social justice, it clearly mattered.
To say that good institutions are a fundamental condition to foster economic growth is close to platitude. However, it is important to explain how it happens, and therefore the main aim of this chapter is to present and discuss the role played by both private and public institutions in decision making processes related to the implementation of economic policies encouraging economic growth. By discussing the lessons from the Iberian experience throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the chapter tries to disclose the similarities and differences between both countries, with a main focus on the way how the institutional environment helps to explain the circumstances that favour or hinder economic performance. This comparative approach begins with the age of the liberal revolutions in the early years of the nineteenth century and closes with the processes of democracy building and European integration in the two last decades of the twentieth century. The study of institutional changes and continuities in Spain and Portugal during this long period offers multiple opportunities to better understand the articulation between the economic and business environment, the dynamics of the markets and the economic policies designed or implemented by the state, in fulfilment of its regulatory role.
This paper aims at discussing the historical trajectory of European money and the way it can be illuminated through a dialogue with Stefan Eich’s The Currency of Politics. Fleshing out the different theories, visions, and conceptualisations of money in Eich’s book, this paper utilises this exposition to evaluate the development and operationalisation of European money. With an eye to contemporary debates about the re-politicisation or democratisation of money, the paper will critically assess the way in which Eich’s account can be used as a framework to explain European money.
The epilogue to this book zooms in on a telling and difficult conversation between two highly influential friends at the transatlantic Anglo-Saxon epicentre of the extraordinary period in the history of the West, Europe, and European integration which this book is about (George Kennan and Isaiah Berlin). In doing so, the epilogue, in a more essayistic way, reconnects to the prologue and reflects upon the conclusion of this book and its deeper meaning for present-day Europe.
The concluding chapter of the book summarises the main findings of the present study and puts these in the conceptual and historiographical framework of the introduction of the book. This chapter reconnects to the central question of the present study and shows how and why the developments in the transatlantic management of economic and monetary affairs created decisive political momentum for bold Franco-German (supranational) initiatives in European integration, but also which transatlantic and European ideational and emotional undercurrents co-steered this development. Furthermore, this chapter highlights the increasingly central role of Western Germany in this history.
The prologue to this book zooms in on the inherent tensions and harmonies in the transatlantic relations that evolved in the first half of the twentieth century and laid the practical, ideational, and emotional foundations for the take-off of European integration as of 1950. In doing so, the prologue, in a more essayistic way, critically reflects upon the reconstruction of the history of the origins of European integration as presented in this book and the history of European integration in general, and the deeper meaning of both for our understanding of present-day Europe and the unique phenomenon of European integration. The prologue also introduces some key concepts and figures in the historical reconstruction that follows in the chapters, such as the the policies and politics of planning, the functionalism of David Mitrany, and the analysis of the vicissitudes of transatlantic relations by Isaiah Berlin.
Scholars of European integration are primarily interested in explaining change and variation over time. Indeed, given that integration has progressed over 50 years and competences have been transferred to the European level in policy fields, including energy, fast and coordinated action in the face of a major external threat might have been anticipated. Yet, as this article documents, member states struggled to establish a cohesive and solidary European response to the 2022 gas crisis, just as they had failed to cooperate effectively during the 1973 oil crisis. Building on recent literature on European polity development and integration through crises, this article argues that differences in national crisis affectedness and energy structures hampered cooperation. Such asymmetries became particularly visible on the part of France and Germany, the Union’s two largest member states, who could have provided regional political leadership. Consequently, both the 1973 and 2022 energy crises led to very limited steps in European integration and collectively suboptimal policy outcomes, such as high energy prices and uneven access to energy resources.
By the early twentieth century, democracy was in the ascendant. Not all observers and practitioners were enthusiastic about this development. But, whether favourable towards it or not, they came to accept the predominance of the concept that the people were the ultimate source of political authority.1 An example of a grudging acknowledgement that confirms the strength of the conceptual transition that had occurred came from the constitutional historian, William Sharp McKechnie. He observed in his 1912 work of contemporary analysis The New Democracy and the Constitution that the public pronouncements of politicians suggested ‘the triumph of Democracy in Great Britain is now assured’ McKechnie noted a tendency as common to ‘Conservatives and Liberals as’ as it was among ‘Socialists and Labour leaders’ to display ‘[a] fervent and almost servile eagerness to interpret and to execute “the people’s will”’.2
In the late twentieth century, the European Union (EU) emerged as a global leader in setting environmental protections, including vehicle emissions standards. But member state consensus around environmental rules did not come easily, and the regional norms eventually set by the EU and its predecessor, the European Economic Community, had complex origins. This article argues that common emissions standards were ultimately achieved through a public-private process during the program to create the Single European Market in the 1980s and 1990s. For regional policymakers, standards were key to achieving an internal car market and strengthening the auto industry's global competitiveness; for many European carmakers and their transnational business associations, common norms could facilitate economies of scale and level the playing field. The “liberal environmentalism” born out of this convergence of interests produced common standards that fell pragmatically between the greenest member states and those most invested in protecting their national champion firms.
This chapter provides a historical overview of the evolution of European cooperation. It first sketches the historical background to several initiatives for international cooperation after the Second World War. It then discusses the way the EU evolved from the initial founding of the European Coal and Steel Community into what is now the European Union. In doing so it looks at the evolution of its policies, institutions and membership over the decades and highlights major international events and crises that affected developments. The chapter shows that the process of bringing the European countries together was long and winding with many fits and starts. Periods of rapid change and innovation have alternated with long stretches of gridlock and stalemate. The process was often erratic because of fundamentally different views on the nature, pace and scope of integration. While the term ‘European Union’ suggests that the organization was swiftly put in place on the basis of a solid design, the EU in essence is a patchwork that has been stitched together in a step-by-step fashion over the course of seven decades.
Stefan Eich’s The Currency of Politics reconstructs and contextualises the monetary understanding of some of the most renowned political thinkers in history. By contextualising each author’s conceptualisation (subjective perception) against their respective contemporary monetary frameworks (objective institutional dimension), Eich elaborates a narrative composed of cumulative layers leading to a double conclusion: that money is political at its core, and that current policies are actively de-politicizing money. These relevant findings are the point of departure of a reflection on the role that law, and constitutional theory in particular, must play in the configuration of Europe’s common currency to overcome some of the most acute difficulties the process of integration is currently experiencing. If the triad law, money and public discourse is supposed to articulate social life in the polity, European monetary integration has neutralised them by neglecting the relevance of one of their key features: civic reciprocity. Reactivating the three mechanisms of social integration requires an exercise of constitutional imagination able to integrate interdisciplinary knowledge about money within an institutional framework able to prevent the concentration of unlimited power in unaccountable institutions and to promote and fully exploit the democratic potential of money.
This chapter focuses on the origins of the institutions that would evolve into the European Union. Norman argues that a focus on perceptions of fragility provides a fruitful but underexplored perspective on the creation of the early institutions of European postwar political cooperation. The design of these institutions were informed by perceptions of fragility associated with democratic governance. The conventional functionalist story of the EU, where cooperative institutions were set up to prevent new conflicts between the formerly warring countries, while not inaccurate, obscures how the reconstruction of the European political order was also an answer to the breakdown of European democracy before the war. Notions of democracy’s fragility informed the functionalist perspective on politics as well as the perceived for a ‘militant’ protection of democratic institutions. Apart from shaping the origins of the European political order, the chapter argues that perceptions of fragility have continued to inform the institutional development of the EU and even ongoing efforts to strengthen its democratic aspects.