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The events of the last ten years have shaken the “permissive consensus” that kept the European integration process going for many years. 'Output democracy', as based on decisions presumably meeting the needs of the citizens, is no longer enough to obtain public support. Never before has a process-oriented approach to European democracy been more urgent. This book aims to address this urgency, by providing an account of the European legislative process that is less conventional and does justice to the democratic potential inherent in trilogues. In particular, this book provides: a comprehensive reconstruction of the workings of trilogues, relying on internal documents collected through a series of access to documents requests; gives meaning to the legal notion of informality, understood as one of the most defining, although elusive, features of trilogues; squares the practice of trilogues with the European democratic order of the Treaties, showing that such a practice is compatible with a model of 'negotiation democracy'.
This study examines the intra-party mechanism that links right-wing populist parties' electoral performance in European elections and their persistence on the national political stage. Nationally marginalized right-wing populist parties have benefited from the second-order character of European elections since the introduction of the direct election in 1979. However, not every right-wing populist party has been able to turn its European victory into a national success. The most similar system comparison of right-wing populist parties in France and the UK shows that only parties that have strategically utilized the resources provided by the European Parliament have persisted in the national political arena.
This paper makes the case for a discursive understanding of ontological security and demonstrates the utility of such an approach in an analysis of European Parliament (EP) debates between 1990 and 2020. We argue that articulations of ontological (in)security operate through the (re)inscription of a set of metanarratives in what we call ‘discursive nodal points’. Building on an extensive analysis of EP debates over 30 years, we demonstrate that in contrast to the prevailing view of the European Union (EU) as an ‘anxious community’, at least on the political level, EU actors remain surprisingly confident in the European project. While they do invoke challenges to the EU, they see these as incentives to strengthen the integration project and often consider operating in crisis mode as an essential EU characteristic. In doing so, they draw on modernist metanarratives of progress, control, and power to construct an ontologically secure EU. We argue that the future ontological security of the EU will partly depend on allowing for more ambiguity in this modernist narrative without accepting a nationalist counter-narrative that undermines the idea of European integration.
The article examines the key factors influencing women’s electoral success in European Parliament (EP) elections. We present a new conceptual approach and a novel model that simultaneously incorporates trends in party characteristics, institutional and socio-economic factors and cross-country trends in women’s representation. The model provides a comprehensive analysis of the relationships between party-level and Member State-level factors and the election of women to the EP. The study is based on an original dataset of 450 observations on national political parties from all Member States, spanning four European elections from 2004 to 2019.
Our results show that party characteristics such as incumbency rates, party size and ideological orientations (i.e. the party’s position on the GAL-TAN scale or its attitude towards European integration) play a key role in shaping women’s representation. This article provides novel insights into the unique features of Central and Eastern Europe, elucidating divergent patterns of women’s electoral prospects in conservative and progressive parties in Western democracies and Central and Eastern European post-communist EU Member States.
The article explores the discursive representations of Syrian and Ukrainian refugees in the European Parliament (EP). The theoretical framework draws on Critical Securitisation Theory, pointing out the implicit hierarchies that affect the European Union (EU) reception policies in terms of race and gender. The main hypothesis is that a stigmatisation process based on race and gender affects the representation of refugees in the EU. Against this backdrop, the manuscript delves into how speech acts can either cast refugees as urgent threats or even facilitate the de-construction of the refugee as a threat. These are investigated through Computational Text-Analysis tools, such as Word- and Bigram-Frequency Analysis, Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency test and Structural Topic Modelling. On the one hand, contrary to expectations of a securitisation of Syrian refugees primarily based on race, what emerges is also a process of de-personalisation that helps justify the anti-migration stand of some members of the EP (MEPs). On the other hand, the assumption that deconstruction of the refugee as a threat would mainly occur through an emphasis on cultural proximity between Ukrainian people and the EU is challenged. Instead, our analysis shows a gender-based victimisation of Ukrainian refugees, which contributes leading to protective measures being enacted by the EU.
The chapter considers the powers of the central administrative and legislative institutions. The Commission comprises a college of twenty-seven Commissioners appointed for five years. It has four central types of power. It can adopt quasi-legislation. It proposes laws, policies and the budget. It administers EU policies. Finally, it has powers to police the observance of EU law. The Council of Ministers, comprised of national ministers, has the final power of decision over almost all fields of EU law. It votes either by unanimity or by Qualified Majority, where fifteen States representing 65 per cent of the Union population must vote for a measure. The European Council comprises the Heads of Government. Its central role is to provide political direction for the other EU Institutions. The European Parliament comprises 705 directly elected representatives. Depending upon the field, it has the power of veto over legislation, has to assent to it or must be consulted over it. The Parliament also has significant powers to hold the other EU Institutions to account. This chapter concludes by examining the circumstances when individuals can seek disclosure of documents from the EU Institutions.
The Eurogroup has played a central role in decision-making in the area of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its very inception. Nevertheless, it is one of those EU bodies that are least understood. This chapter focuses on the political and legal accountability of the Eurogroup, key aspects of which remained ill-defined for a considerable period of time. The discussion begins with the foundations and tasks of the Eurogroup (Section 2). The focus then shifts to the political accountability of the Eurogroup, the emphasis being on its relationship with the European Council and the Economic Dialogues with the European Parliament (Section 3.1). The chapter further looks at its legal accountability, in light of the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) (Section 3.2). The penultimate section of the chapter provides an assessment of the Eurogroup’s accountability in light of the framework laid down in the introductory chapter to this volume, namely in terms of procedural and substantive ways of delivering the normative goods of accountability (Section 4). Section 5 concludes by outlining the key features of the accountability arrangements and practices pertaining to the Eurogroup.
The European Banking Union (EBU) launched in 2012 relies on a complex institutional architecture; that is, a series of EU institutions and bodies as well as national institutions are involved in its functioning. At the EU level, these include the European Central Bank (ECB) – which acts as the authority in charge of monetary and as banking supervisor, two EU agencies (the Single Resolution Board and the European Banking Authority), as well as the European Commission. This chapter examines the existing accountability mechanisms vis-à-vis each of these institutions and bodies with a view to determining whether any accountability gaps exist. To this end, it first maps these mechanisms and analyses how they have been used to date. It finds that the mechanisms have been used indeed, but that some shortcomings exist in the existing institutional framework. It therefore proposes some reforms to improve the existing situation.
This chapter provides the volumes general conceptual framework. It begins by addressing why new approaches to accountability are needed, arguing that accountability literature has reached a stalemate as a result of an impasse between deductive and inductive approaches to accountability in the EU. It then argues that overcoming the stalemate requires developing a generalised framework of what accountability is for, deriving four accountability goods to be used in subsequent chapters. The chapter argues that each of the goods can be delivered in procedural or substantive ways, focusing either on the process by which decisions are made or the substantive worth of decisions themselves. The chapter concludes by discussing the strengths and weaknesses of both varieties of accountability before mapping out how the concepts will be applied across policy fields and institutions in subsequent chapters.
As the most powerful executive actor in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Eurogroup has faced continuous demands to improve its accountability record since the euro crisis. One reform introduced to meet these demands were the Economic Dialogue – a regular exchange of views between the European Parliament and the President of the Eurogroup designed to ‘ensure greater transparency and accountability’ in the EMU. This chapter investigates the practical functioning of the Economic Dialogues with the Eurogroup between 2013 and the 2019 European Parliament elections. Applying the theoretical framework of the introduction, the purpose is to examine the extent to which the Parliament focuses on procedural or substantive accountability when questioning the Eurogroup President. Moreover, the chapter investigates the reasoning of parliamentary questions in line with the four accountability goods identified at the outset (openness, non-arbitrariness, effectiveness, and publicness). The findings show that Members of the European Parliament are eager to question the extent to which Eurogroup decisions are substantively open and effective, and to a lesser extent whether they are arbitrary or protect EU interests more generally. The analysis is based on fourteen transcripts of Economic Dialogues with the Eurogroup President, which took place between 2013 and 2019.
The EU has become an increasingly powerful economic actor but we lack research on how EU economic decision-makers can be held to account. This book argues that the EU suffers from important substantive accountability deficits I.e. while numerous procedures exist to hold institutions like the Commission and ECB to account, there are few mechanisms to contest the merit and impact of economic decisions. The book combines detailed empirical research on how accountability practices are evolving across different fields of EU economic governance with a novel conceptual framework to assess where accountability deficits lie and how they might be addressed. Combining leading research in law and political science, this book will be of interest to scholars with an interest in the questions of accountability and economic governance arising from the budgets, central banks and financial institutions of the European Union. This title is Open Access.
Since the Treaty of Lisbon, trade policy has become an explicit part of, and integrated into, the general framework of the EU’s external policy but must also be in conformity with internal policies. Thus, trade policy is subject to a requirement of multiple coherence. Beyond constitutional obligations, other drivers work for the inclusion of non-genuine commercial policy objectives in trade policy, such as the orientation of contemporary trade politics towards the behind-the-border issues of national regulation, so that trade policy became closely intertwined with domestic regulatory policy. Therefore the actors primarily responsible for legislation, i.e. parliaments, advocate for their extended participation in determining trade policy, and rightly so for reasons of transparency, control and political inclusiveness. Parliaments thus become actors of respect for and positive consideration of non-commercial policy objectives in trade policy, which also applies to the European Parliament (EP). Hence, an institutional design of policy formulation cycles and decision-making in EU trade policy that strives for better coherence of trade concerns with non-trade policy objectives (NTPOs) must focus on strengthening the influence of the EP and improving its participatory rights in decision-making and its control and monitoring mechanisms. Consequently, this chapter derives proposals for improving EP´s monitoring mechanisms for the benefit of NTPOs in trade policy from an analysis of weaknesses in the negotiation and implementation stage of trade policy.
This chapter discusses the roles of and relations between political parties, political groups and members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Domestic political parties play an important role because they are responsible for selecting the candidates for the European Parliament elections. Once elected, most of these political parties and their MEPs work together in political groups. In these political groups MEPs from like-minded parties organize their work and tend to vote as cohesive blocks. Political groups thus help to make the EP work in a much more effective manner than would be possible if the more than 200 parties that are represented there did not build coalitions. These political groups are organized along two main cleavages: a classic left–right cleavage as well as a more recent cleavage between groups that are more supportive and groups that are more critical of European integration. Finally, in addition to domestic parties, there are also European political parties. They have more limited tasks and mostly provide a platform for like-minded parties from the different member states.
This chapter outlines the EU’s seven official main institutions (the European Council, Council of the European Union, European Parliament, Commission, Court of Justice, Court of Auditors and European Central Bank) and the different executive, legislative and judicial powers that are allocated to them. It describes their tasks and the way they have organized their work. The EU’s combination of institutions is unique and can be characterized as ‘mixed government’ or as ‘a polity with many principals’. It is nevertheless based upon a common model for organizing democratic systems, namely that of consensualism, and aims to disperse power and constrain the use of it.
This chapter aims to examine a topic that up to now has received scant, if any, attention: the use of customary international law (CIL) by the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission. To that effect, the actions resulting from the exercise of different powers of those three institutions (such as proposals, acts of secondary law, parliamentary questions, statements before the CJEU and other courts) have been taken in consideration. The examination of the practice of the political institutions of the EU does not reveal significant differences between them. References to rules of CIL from their side are relatively rare and mostly included in instruments with an international dimension. They all tend to invoke precise rules of CIL when doing so is essential for substantiating their legal position. They also seem to be aware of the fundamentals of this source of international law. By contrast, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission fail to demonstrate (here is another common feature) that the rules of CIL they invoke are well established or that practice and opinio juris, as constitutive elements of CIL, concur. It must be highlighted as well that no pattern has been identified in this empirical analysis on the use of CIL by the political institutions of the EU.
In EU policy-making, questions concerning legal limits and EU competence are routinely treated as a domain reserved for lawyers, as if they were indeed objective in nature, and as such somehow separate from policy-making. Yet such legal advice is often decisive in settling the scope or intensity of EU legislative intervention. The European Parliament is a free market of legal advice where law seldom counts as absolute truth and legal determinations are formally allocated to a political body, the Legal Affairs Committee. Building on over 50 interviews with legal advisers and policy makers (including in particular MEPs), this chapter provides an empirical study of what legal advisors in the European Parliament do and what remains of their power in a policy-making environment where only compromises count, and the main function of the lawyer is to assist in identifying the compromise. Their main institutional agenda is geared at defending the clients’ interest: the prerogatives of the Parliament as an institution. Yet objectivity is vital when navigating among the agendas of eight political groups from 28 Member States and hundreds of political parties.
Once an emergency has passed, general attention typically returns to dealing with day-to-day system management, and the opportunity to learn from the crisis and improve is missed. Lessons from the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) crisis must be learned, and the necessary changes made at all levels, both in terms of improving collaboration and strengthening health systems. This special report provides the conclusion of a workshop held in the European Parliament (EP) in Brussels, Belgium. The event explored the modalities of response and preparation to the COVID-19 pandemic, and to health crises in general. The workshop considered actions at different levels: international organizations (global level), European Union (EU) Member States ([MS] national level), and health services (local level). It provided an opportunity to look back at several initiatives taken during the pandemic, and to draw inspiration from them.
The fourth chapter deals with the ECJ’s present role in the EU’s political system and how its procedural and organisational law might need to be adapted to better reflect it. The chapter first explains how in recent years, notably through the Treaty of Lisbon, the ECJ’s mandate has been modified. It argues that the Court is no longer only concerned with ensuring the autonomy and effectiveness of EU law, but that it is also a democratic organ of the EU polity, whose decisions need to be responsive to EU citizens. To ensure democratic responsiveness, the chapter argues, the ECJ’s procedural and organisational law needs to be further developed. The chapter makes concrete proposals by applying the Treaty on European Union’s democratic principles to the ECJ’s procedural and organisational law. It discusses, among other things, the role of the European Parliament in selecting ECJ members the place of NGOs and civil society in ECJ proceedings, the interaction between the Advocate General and the judges, the composition of the ECJ’s chambers and the mechanism for case assignment and make suggestions how to better reflect the concern for the ECJ’s democratic responsiveness.
This chapter explores the key policy and law-making institutions in the EU – the European Parliament (the EP), the European Council (the EC), the Council of Ministers (the Council) and the European Commission (the Commission). The elements of the exploration will be taken from Article 13(2) TEU, where each institution is mandated to act ‘within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them’. The chapter will outline the powers: what authority does each institution have, for what functions and how is it exercised? It will discuss their composition and identify supervisory relationships between the institutions.
Law-making is perhaps the most important function in a democracy. Laws regulate the content of products as well as behaviour and relationships of both the state and individuals. However, as important as the rules themselves is that they are followed. It is not just the rules themselves that are important but how they are made, for this secures their credibility. Laws need to be fair, clear and comprehensible and in addition made according to procedures that are seen to be legitimate. Legitimate procedures must underpin rule-making if laws are to be considered credible by the populace who must follow them. This chapter will explore the typology of laws made in the EU and the procedures by which they are made. The chapter begins with an exploration of the law-making procedures themselves, looking at the different procedures for legislative and non-legislative measures. It then sets these within the regulatory environment of the EU to discuss the democratic deficit and a potential alternative. Finally, it analyses the EU law-making environment from the perspective of Lani Guinier’s concept of an ‘electocracy’ – when viewed through this lens, does the EU look more legitimate?