The main purpose of this chapter is to study gender inequality within the inventive activities in three emerging countries – Brazil, India, and Mexico – using the framework of knowledge economics. It aims to determine which factors that influence a growing propensity of women to be inventors help reduce gender inequality in knowledge economies. In addition, the chapter contributes policy proposals that aim at increasing female participation in inventive activities. The key questions for this research are as follows: What are the characteristics and dynamics of female inventive activities in emerging countries with different economic development paths? What factors influence women’s propensity to invent? Based on the results of the econometric model proposed in this chapter, the inventive variables, such as the stock of prior knowledge, the size of inventor teams, the type of patent holder, technological field, and the presence of foreign researchers – positively influence women’s propensity to become inventors in a differentiated manner in each country. These findings validate how some variables could influence the inclusion of a greater number of women in research teams and the deployment of their potential inventive activities. The chapter proposes policies aimed at reducing gender inequality in the knowledge economy.

This chapter provides an introduction to Intellectual Property, Innovation and Economic Inequality. It begins by discussing the problem of economic inequality, including the scale of that problem, types of economic inequality, and extant research on such inequality. The chapter then outlines the structure of this volume, which is divided into three parts: (1) theoretical, empirical, and policy issues; (2) intellectual property and national inequality; and (3) intellectual property and global inequality.

This chapter criticizes the oversimplification of the binary North–South debate on intellectual property, innovation, and global inequality and highlights the wide geographic, sectoral, and income inequalities within middle-income countries. It begins by explaining why the arrival of these countries has called into question the North–South debate. The chapter then moves from the widely studied subject of global inequality to the underexplored topic of national inequality. Focusing on the intellectual property context, the discussion highlights the considerable subnational variations in the economic and technological conditions of middle-income countries. To combat national inequality, this chapter concludes by recommending interventions in three areas: (1) international norm-setting, (2) national policymaking, and (3) academic and policy research.

Innovation is at the core of economic development, growth, and structural change. Yet, it does not spur in nor flow to all corners of the world. This chapter reviews and describes empirically the uneven geographical distribution of innovation and its dynamics, at both the national and subnational levels. It also compares such distribution in relation to other indicators of economic activity. The chapter then examines the potential consequences of such unequal distribution, particularly for its possible influence on inter-regional income inequality, and discusses how inevitable they might be. In light of available evidence, it explores what the role of policy could be.

Low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are confronted with a new world order in which the major economic powers that promoted multilateralism have moved toward nationalism, localization of production, and de-legalization of dispute settlement in favor of balance of power diplomacy. A counterpart to this trend is declining interest in developmental assistance. It remains to be determined how countries that are not part of the new great power dynamic will acclimate to this new world. LMICs have the opportunity to leapfrog in the current technological environment. A key challenge is securing adequate capital investment, including through the private sector. There is a trend among the capital-exporting countries to negotiate bilateral and plurilateral agreements with LMICs that preclude regulatory measures requiring technology transfer as a condition of foreign direct investment. Because individual private investors within LMICs may lack substantial bargaining power, these agreements diminish LMICs’ capacity to secure favorable terms for technology transfer. LMICs confront terms of trade that favor high-income countries and, more broadly, the ascendance of managed trade policy among economically powerful states. These factors portend the perpetuation of the marked disparity in the distribution of global income and wealth. There are no “magic bullet” solutions on the horizon.

This chapter examines distributive justice (DJ) within the realm of international intellectual property (IP) laws, focusing on the digital era. It highlights DJ as a critical lens for understanding global IP laws, particularly where technology significantly influences the processes of creation. It also emphasizes the importance of global equity in achieving access to IP rights, within a comprehensive understanding of their scope. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals focus on the context of peace, prosperity, and equality, though not explicitly centered on IP rights. Consequently, there is a need to redefine IP rights not only to address legal uncertainties but also to foster global equality. Moreover, the chapter delves into the roles of international entities like the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in managing challenges where global DJ and IP intersect. It highlights the importance of digital tools (e.g., blockchain) for authenticating original authors. The chapter asserts that proficient and reliable international organizations like WIPO are best suited to address these challenges. Furthermore, the chapter underscores the significance of an unbiased global investment system for promoting universal progress and equity. Ultimately, it explores how WIPO’s tools, such as WIPO Re:Search and WIPO Proof, exemplify DJ in the international IP framework.

This chapter reviews available economic theories and empirical evidence about the potential roles intellectual property (IP) rights play in generating or reducing economic inequality, emphasizing international data. Basic evidence demonstrates the simultaneous growth in internal income inequality across countries and increasing IP protection in the prior 25 years. It is tempting to assign causality from IP to inequality but doing so confidently is challenging and has not yet been accomplished systematically. Through encouraging technology diffusion, global IP reforms likely contribute to convergence in average incomes between advanced economies and select emerging and developing countries.

Women do not receive their fair share when it comes to patenting and are far less likely to own patents. This disparity is due in part to the inherent biases in science, technology, and the patent system and in part to the high costs of the patent application process. This chapter therefore proposes an unconventional new regime of unregistered patent rights to relieve women and other disadvantaged inventors of such costs and biases and thereby increase their access to patent protections. To explain the proposal, this chapter details the challenges facing women and other disadvantaged inventors in applying for patents as well as the fact that other intellectual property regimes, such as copyright and trademark, allow such unregistered rights. The chapter also addresses a number of objections that the proposal would inevitably raise. In particular, it shows that, because the proposed unregistered patent system would grant rights for only three years and protect only against direct and knowing copying, these rights would be unlikely to deter incremental or complementary innovation. Such rights would also be fully subject to invalidation under a preponderance of the evidence standard.

The needs of the global South are proving to be far more complex and challenging to ameliorate than anticipated when the World Trade Organization was established amid promises of enhancing social welfare. In particular, inequality among member states has persisted despite the optimistic projections made during the Uruguay Round negotiations. This issue concerns intellectual property scholars because economic theory suggests that technology policy is a key contributor. After discussing the roles that innovation and international intellectual property protection play within the theory of economic inequality, this chapter focuses on the impact of international patent law. It demonstrates how the demands of the North for ever-stronger patent and patent-like protection exacerbate the problem of technological inequality. The chapter ends with suggestions for ways in which the patent system could be restructured to better enable local inventors to avail themselves of the global knowledge base and enhance the incentives available to innovators who fulfill the needs of the South. In the authors’ view, reducing intellectual property-based inequality in the ways this chapter outlines is a key step toward mitigating the problem of income inequality.

In a prior study, one of the authors uncovered a striking degree of imbalance with respect to rates of copyright registrations between men and women. Although women made up roughly half of the population between 1978 and 2012, they authored only one third of all registered works. If the U.S. Copyright Office is to properly “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” then we must seek to understand what may be contributing to lower rates of creative authorship and copyright registration by women. This chapter discusses several factors that may contribute to the historic inequality in rates of copyright authorship by men and women. Far from exhaustive, the chapter provides a snapshot of some of the structural and economic factors that may discourage authorship by women. Specifically, the authors consider whether the gender disparity in rates of authorship is reflective of gender dynamics in other intellectual property holdings, property ownership more generally, and gender disparity within various creative professions.

This chapter explores the impact of intellectual property on increasing income and wealth inequality internationally and domestically, with a focus on law and legal methodology. It begins by setting the scene and background of international intellectual property protection. The chapter then examines the potential of taking into account considerations of income and wealth distribution in the process of interpreting intellectual property rules and explores the potential of the principle of equity. It turns to the overall balance of rights and obligations from an angle of fostering investment in innovation and proposes to recognize creative imitation in the overall equation. It also suggests recalibrating rules on the duration of patents, copyright, trademarks, and trade secret protection. The latter is not subject to limitation and time and may thus contribute to unjustified economic rents detrimental to human investment. This chapter suggests to introduce ceilings of protection and refer to the principle of unjust enrichment in conceptualizing these concerns.

Theoretically, all inventions are equal under the law: they receive the same scope of protection for the same period, backed by the same remedies. In reality, such equality has been strongly compromised. Patents are concentrated in the hands of big companies and privileged individuals. Women and minorities – as well as firms they own – are less likely to file for patents and have their patents granted. Small companies are also less likely to file and receive patents than strong incumbents. This chapter argues that some changes in the patent system can trigger better accessibility, affordability, and equality. It builds on the author’s earlier proposal to replace the patent record with a decentralized database that would include more information about inventions from more sources and additional functions. Under the proposal, inventors would submit patent applications to a shared patent record instead of a central patent office. During the examination process and throughout the duration of the patent, industry and state actors would be able to update the record. For example, third parties could submit prior art, scientists could weigh in on obviousness, patentees could offer licenses, and courts could list outstanding cases that pertain to the patent.

Without enhancing their innovation capabilities, latecomer countries will be subject to the middle-income trap, and global inequality will not be reduced. This chapter thus discusses the roles of diverse forms of intellectual property rights (IPR) in promoting innovation among latecomers. It argues, first, that utility model or petit patents can be a useful form of IPR for recognizing and encouraging innovation by latecomers in their earlier stage of development, and, secondly, that latecomer firms in sectors involving tacit knowledge can rely on trademarks, rather than regular patents, as the main forms of IPR in their innovation and growth pathways. This chapter further discusses the negative impacts of strong IPR protection in Northern economies on the exports by Southern or catch-up economies to Northern markets. As a means to overcome this barrier, the chapter discusses the role of leapfrogging strategy, where latecomers pursue different technological trajectories from those of incumbent countries.

The Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has threatened to impede access to genetic resources and related data for cross-border scientific research. In principle, every use of genetic resources would require a set of contracts under the CBD, in a “bilateral” regime. The related transaction costs could overwhelm many transnational research undertakings, affecting even public health responses to outbreaks and epidemics. However, the Nagoya Protocol also offers a unique opportunity to resolve this dilemma, despite struggles to define the meaning and coverage of “digital sequence information.” The coverage of genetic sequence data under the CBD remains controversial mainly because users do not know what the potential consequences of such coverage might ultimately entail. This chapter’s objective is to outline a type of coverage devised specifically for pathogens that would promote science, public health, and commercial applications while also protecting the interests of provider countries, supporting innovation, and addressing inequalities. The authors envision an agreed waiver for pathogen sequence data used for upstream scientific research purposes under the Nagoya Protocol, without compromising the duty of users to share benefits. This waiver should help alleviate the problems of definition and subject-matter coverage that have stymied multilateral action.

The process of constitutionalizing intellectual property rights highlights absurdities associated with unequal and asymmetrical power relations within the politics of intellectual property and exposes the inherent conflicts between international legal harmonization and unbalanced trade powers in intellectual property constitutionalism. This chapter begins by demonstrating the gap between the mere existence of a constitutional equality provision and its application on the ground. The chapter then examines how inequality is a defining concept in intellectual property that can be articulated in many forms. It discusses intellectual property constitutionalism and highlights the lack of scholarly attention to intellectual property in formal constitutions and the implications. This chapter further demonstrates the incorrect assumption that adding intellectual property rights to a constitution will provide better protection for these rights and discusses how this assumption is predominantly a result of global political inequality and asymmetrical power relations. The chapter evaluates the ideological motivations of countries to adopt intellectual property as a socio-economic right in their formal constitutions. It further introduces and empirically analyzes the results of the collected data. This chapter concludes by discussing the inequality-related consequences of unbalanced constitutional commitments in the intellectual property area.

As much as COVID-19 illustrates the shortcomings of our siloed medical and scientific professions, it also represents an opportunity to rethink and reorganize scientific research infrastructure. COVID-19 has become a scientific “nucleating event” of sorts: forcing researchers from many specialties into fragile but promising forms of collaboration around a shared – and pressing – problem, and giving rise to multiple infrastructures to facilitate such collaboration.This chapter argues that forging sustainable cross-cutting collaborations will require ongoing policy action along three axes: (1) building information-sharing infrastructure; (2) creating cross-disciplinary teams; and (3) countering anti-innovation norms.

Historically, the use of legal frameworks to claim proprietary rights in the products of agricultural science was limited to the private sector. Public institutions, including CGIAR, treated their creations as the common heritage of humankind. Scientific, economic, and legal changes unsettled this public–private balance in the 1980s, provoking a reimagination of the role of intellectual property in research and development. Three distinct theories about how CGIAR should respond to the global expansion of intellectual property in agriculture emerged. Maximalists embraced proprietary legal claims, adaptationists advocated for cautious accommodation, and rejectionists viewed intellectual property as ancillary to the CGIAR mission. This chapter traces the history of intellectual property debates within CGIAR from 1990 to 2020, arguing that over time, the adaptationist approach prevailed as institutional governance structures developed. Although current policies permit each CGIAR center to embrace rejectionism or maximalism to a certain extent, the rejectionist theory has been marginalized at the system level, while a global capitalist approach to agricultural science has taken root.

Australian courts may grant ‘reasonable fee’ awards where defendants have used certain property or infringed certain rights in a tortious manner. ‘Reasonable fee’ refers to a method of calculating a monetary award for a wrong; namely, where the court awards the objectively ascertained fee that the parties would have agreed upon for permitting the defendant’s conduct. Reasonable fee awards may be made in various forms, including through an award of compensation, in an action for money had and received through ‘waiver of tort’, as ‘restitutionary damages’, or under Lord Cairns’ Act in lieu of an injunction. They are generally awarded for common law causes of action. As discussed in this chapter, the rationale for reasonable fee damages is highly contested. In previous editions of this book, we conceptualised reasonable fee awards as being gain-based and discussed them in the chapter on gain-based relief. The latest cases from the apex courts of the United Kingdom and Singapore suggest that reasonable fee awards are an instance of ‘substitutive compensation’. It remains to be seen whether Australian courts will adopt this approach.