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The Hebrew Bible contains two quite different divine personae. One is quick to anger and to exact punishment while the other is a compassionate God slow to anger and quick to forgive. One God distant, the other close by. This severe contrast posed a theological challenge for Jewish thought for the ages. This Element follows selected views in rabbinic literature, medieval Jewish philosophy, Jewish mystical thought, the Hasidic movement, modern Jewish theology, response to the Holocaust, and Jewish feminist theology. In the history of Jewish thought there was often a tendency to identify closely with the God of compassion.
One of Isaiah’s most forceful messages concerns justice, and the sociopolitical conditions necessary to support it. In “The Ethical and Political Vision of Isaiah,” M. Daniel Carroll R. looks at the fundamental themes and vocabulary of the book’s moral vision and surveys approaches that seek to better understand the socioeconomic injustice and politics it condemns. These sins include the greed and malfeasance of governing elites in ancient Judahite society, systemic socioeconomic abuses of agricultural and trade systems, and decisions leading to catastrophic war. At the same time, this prophetic text looks forward to a messianic age of justice and peace under a Spirit-filled king/servant. In closing, Carroll R. looks at how Isaiah’s ethical messages have been received (and resisted) in the pursuit of justice, peace, and ecology.
It is a reasonable worry that God would not truly love us and want our salvation if He fixed a definite point after which He will no longer offer us the graces to repent of our sins. I propose that Thomas Aquinas succeeds in showing us that God would not be cruel or arbitrary in setting up a world where embodied agents end up after death in a state where they will inevitably fail to repent of their sins. Aquinas proposes that being disembodied is to be in a state where a person cannot be mistaken about what they want, given that they know themselves perfectly. If the disembodied state were like this, it would not be surprising that being in that state makes repentance impossible, since a soul would become fully integrated around whatever one desired, without any conflicting desires that could prompt repentance. Thus, humans would persist in whatever desires they had at the moment of death and disembodiment. I conclude by arguing that, while this scenario stands in need of fuller theodicy, Aquinas’s scenario is helpful in defending a view that God is not cruel or arbitrary for creating a world in which post-mortem repentance is impossible.
It is uncontroversial that something goes wrong with the blaming practices of hypocrites. However, it is more difficult to pinpoint exactly what is objectionable about their blaming practices. I contend that, just as epistemologists have recently done with blame, we can constructively treat hypocrisy as admitting of an epistemic species. This paper has two objectives: first, to identify the epistemic fault in epistemically hypocritical blame, and second, to explain why epistemically hypocritical blamers lose their standing to epistemically blame. I tackle the first problem by appealing to an epistemic norm of consistency. I address the second by arguing that the epistemically hypocritical blamer commits to an opting-out of the set of shared epistemic standards that importantly underlies our standing to epistemically blame. I argue further that being epistemically hypocritical undermines a blamer's standing even to judge epistemically blameworthy.
Diplomacy skills matter, and the widespread perception that anyone with common sense can be trusted with a diplomatic position, even without proper qualifications, is misguided and dangerous. Diplomacy is a serious business. The matters that diplomats deal with are too important to be left to amateurs. There are careers that do not require a new hire to possess any special skills on day one; diplomacy is not such a profession. Diplomats must have most basic skills so that they can hit the ground running. In fact, they are expected to have them before joining a diplomatic service, because most governments do not provide much substantive training to new officers. Although different career tracks–political, economic, consular, management and public diplomacy–require some specialized knowledge and abilities, most diplomatic skill sets are universal. This chapter covers the key aspects of diplomatic tradecraft, on which the rest of the book will elaborate and expound.
Truth and content are theoretically prior in Frege to the act of judgment. Wittgenstein takes the opposite view, maintaining that truth is fundamentally correctness in judgment and that a content is fundamentally something to be judged. At Tractatus 4.063, Wittgenstein gives an argument against the Fregean position. Judgment can aim internally at truth, Wittgenstein holds, only if it is internal to truth that it is correctness in judgment.
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus deploys modal vocabulary, especially “possibility.” Some readers take this to signal commitment to substantive modal theories. For others, it is metaphysical nonsense to be thrown away. We steer a middle path. We uncover the central role of possibility in Wittgenstein’s philosophical development from criticism of Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment to the conception of propositions as pictures in the Tractatus. In this conception, modality is not the subject matter of theorizing but an ineluctable aspect of picturing of reality whose showing forth Wittgenstein aims to help us see by operationalizing the construction of propositions.
The Coda sketches how the distinctive tradition of uncertainty in nineteenth-century literature and culture changes with the rise of literary modernism. Uncertainty remains of vital interest to writers like Henry James, D. H. Lawrence, James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, and E. M. Forster. Yet a more self-conscious embrace of chance, contingency, and randomness, alongside a more thoroughgoing skepticism, disengages this writing from the earlier literature’s concerns. Further valences acquired by the concept of uncertainty in the early twentieth century – as radical indeterminacy in physics and contrast class to risk in economics – both intensify cultural interest in the topic and disarticulate its nineteenth-century framework. In a reading of Joseph Conrad’s novel Chance (1914), I argue that his emphasis on the value of momentary judgments, on knowledge as mercurial and provisional, and on the role of accident in literary plots all reprise Victorian tactics.
The Introduction provides an overview of the book’s argument about how novels in nineteenth-century Britain (by George Eliot, Wilkie Collins, William Thackeray, and Thomas Hardy) represented modes of thinking, judging, and acting in the face of uncertainty. It also offers a synopsis of key intellectual contexts: (1) the history of probability in logic and mathematics into the Victorian era, the parallel rise of statistics, and the novelistic importance of probability as a dual concept, geared to both the aleatory and the epistemic, to objective frequencies and subjective degrees of belief; (2) the school of thought known as associationism, which was related to mathematical probability and remained influential in the nineteenth century, underwriting the embodied account of mental function and volition in physiological psychology, and representations of deliberation and action in novels; (3) the place of uncertainty in treatises of rhetoric, law, and grammar, where considerations of evidence were inflected by probability’s epistemological transformation; and (4) the resultant shifts in literary probability (and related concepts like mimesis and verisimilitude) from Victorian novel theory to structuralist narratology, where understandings of probability as a dual concept were tacitly incorporated.
Responding to Russell is a constant throughout Wittgenstein's philosophizing. This Element focuses on Wittgenstein's criticisms of Russell's theories of judgment in the summer of 1913. Wittgenstein's response to these criticisms is of first-rate importance for his early philosophical development, setting the path to the conceptions of proposition and of logic in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. This Element also touches on further aspects of Wittgenstein's responses to Russell: the rejection of Russell's and Frege's logicisms in the Tractatus, the critique of Russell's causal-behavioristic philosophy of mind in Wittgenstein's 'middle' period, the Russellian origins of notions of privacy dialectically treated in Philosophical Investigations, and the discussion of 'surveyability' of mathematical proof in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, which is, again, a response to Russellian logicism.
This chapter argues that the indictment of idolatry and immorality in Romans 1:18–32 is not limited to gentile sins but instead, building on biblical prophetic declarations that Israel has effectively “gentilized,” systematically includes Israel as having broken the two great commands by engaging in the behaviors condemned throughout the passage, effectively breaking down any distinction between Israel and the nations. The first chapter of Romans thereby sets up the rhetorical shift in Rom 2, which argues that Jews and gentiles alike are subject to God’s impartial judgment.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the validity of the standard approach in expert judgment for evaluating precision medicines, in which experts are required to estimate outcomes as if they did not have access to diagnostic information, whereas in fact, they do.
Methods
Fourteen clinicians participated in an expert judgment task to estimate the cost and medical outcomes of the use of exome sequencing in pediatric patients with intractable epilepsy in Thailand. Experts were randomly assigned to either an “unblind” or “blind” group; the former was provided with the exome sequencing results for each patient case prior to the judgment task, whereas the latter was not provided with the exome sequencing results. Both groups were asked to estimate the outcomes for the counterfactual scenario, in which patients had not been tested by exome sequencing.
Results
Our study did not show significant results, possibly due to the small sample size of both participants and case studies.
Conclusions
A comparison of the unblind and blind approach did not show conclusive evidence that there is a difference in outcomes. However, until further evidence suggests otherwise, we recommend the blind approach as preferable when using expert judgment to evaluate precision medicines because this approach is more representative of the counterfactual scenario than the unblind approach.
Will existing forms of artificial intelligence (AI) lead to genuine intelligence? How is AI changing our society and politics? This essay examines the answers to these questions in Brian Cantwell Smith's The Promise of Artificial Intelligence and Mark Coeckelbergh's The Political Philosophy of AI with a focus on their central concern with judgment—whether AI can possess judgment and how developments in AI are affecting human judgment. First, I argue that the existentialist conception of judgment that Smith defends is highly idealized. While it may be an appropriate standard for intelligence, its implications for when and how AI should be deployed are not as clear as Smith suggests. Second, I point out that the concern with the displacement of judgment in favor of “reckoning” (or calculation) predates the rise of AI. The meaning and implications of this trend will become clearer if we move beyond ontology and metaphysics and into political philosophy, situating technological changes in their social context. Finally, I suggest that Coeckelbergh's distinctly political conception of judgment might offer a solution to the important boundary-drawing problem between tasks requiring judgment and those requiring reckoning, thus filling a gap in Smith's argument and clarifying its political stakes.
The Introduction draws attention to the many pictures and metaphors employed in the text. Literary study of the text reveals three sections: Chapters 1–3, 4–11, 12–14. Redaction-critical study indicates that the text developed from an earliest eighth-century text into the final form produced in the post-exilic period. Chapters 1–3 contain narrative material and prophetic sayings concerning Hosea’s marriage. Chapters 4–11 and 12–14 contain prophetic words of judgment and restoration. Key themes include Israel’s unfaithfulness to YHWH, of which the people’s worship of Baal and the nation’s propensity to seek alliances with Assyria and Egypt (rather than seeking YHWH) are indicative. There are Closer Look sections (A Wife of Prostitution; Baalism, Canaanite Religion and Ancient Ugarit; Knowledge of and by YHWH; Hosea and the Ten Commandments; Ephraim in Hosea; The Covenant in Scholarly Research; Jacob in Hosea 12). There are also Bridging the Horizons sections (The Metaphor of the Unfaithful Wife; Priestly Responsibility; Israel’s Alliances with Foreign Nations; The Judgment and Mercy of YHWH).
The book of Amos has often been seen as a key text promoting social justice, through its condemnation of social injustice. Literary study of the text reveals five sections: chapters 1–2, 3–4, 5–6, 7:1–9:6, 9:7–15. Redaction-critical study indicates that the text developed from an earliest eighth-century text into the final form produced in the post-exilic period. Chapters 1–2 contain a series of Oracles Against the Nations, while 7:1–9:4 contains a series of visions. Between them are prophetic words of judgment. The final 9:7–15 contains words of promised future blessing. Key themes include YHWH’s announcing of judgment of the people because of the exploitation of the poor and weak by the rich and powerful, and calls to seek YHWH and live. There are Closer Look sections (Zion; Oracles Against the Nations; The Nazirites; Justice in the Gate; Justice and Righteousness; Woe Oracles; The Prophets, the Cult, and Sacrifice; The Prophets as Intercessors; Seers and Prophets). There are also Bridging the Horizons sections (Atrocities and War Crimes, and on Martin Luther King Jr.)
The subcategory of modal verbs is introduced in this chapter, including an overview of how modal verbs differ in meaning and usage from typical verbs. The chapter also outlines their grammatical features and explains how to differentiate similar ones.
Abstract: This chapter addresses the tension between truth and social cohesion. Since all stories are interpretation of some event or behavior, the examined life is always an interpretation of an interpretation. But the interpretation of one’s own national history is not of some distant object: It is of the self, and it has a purpose – to open up and explore the possibilities that the past offers in the present for the future. This chapter examines the qualities of a good interpretation and role of the humanities in shaping it. I show how progress in interpretation is possible and argue for a dialogical view of interpretation where meanings evolve as contexts change, as new knowledge becomes available, and as the implications of different possible interpretations become clearer.
In deception research, little consideration is given to how the framing of the question might impact the decision-making process used to reach a veracity judgment. People use terms such as “sure” to describe their uncertainty about an event (i.e., aleatory) and terms such as “chance” to describe their uncertainty about the world (i.e., epistemic). Presently, the effect of such uncertainty framing on veracity judgments was considered. By manipulating the veracity question wording the effect of uncertainty framing on deception detection was measured. The data show no difference in veracity judgments between the two uncertainty framing conditions, suggesting that these may operate on a robust and invariant cognitive process.
This chapter addresses the Court’s jurisdiction in contentious cases and its jurisdiction in advisory opinions, using specific examples from the Court’s judgments and opinions. It considers whether a novel approach is needed to confer on the Court compulsory jurisdiction across a wider range of disputes.