The development of multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) has allowed scholars to more accurately estimate subnational public opinion using national polls. However, MRP generally recovers less accurate estimates from polls whose respondents are selected using cluster sampling – also called area-probability sampling. This is in part because cluster-sampled polls rely on a complex form of random sampling focused on national representativeness that may result in small or unrepresentative subsamples in subnational geographies. This has limited MRP’s usefulness in subnational opinion estimation in several contexts, including historical polls in the US, where cluster-sampling was common into the 1980s, and large academic studies in many countries today. In this paper, I propose two approaches to improve estimation from MRP with cluster-sampled polls. The first is pooling data from multiple surveys to produce a larger sample of clusters. The second is clustered MRP (CMRP), which extends MRP by modeling opinion using the geographic information included in a survey’s cluster-sampling procedure. Using simulations, I show that both methods improve upon traditional MRP, and I validate them using historical polls in the US

During the COVID-19 pandemic, governors preempted local governments at unprecedented levels. A rich literature examines state preemption of local governments, but gubernatorial preemption – and the strategies governors use to do so – remain understudied. This paper examines what institutional and political factors influenced governors’ preemption style during the pandemic by analyzing a dataset of over 1,200 COVID-19 executive orders, classified by their style of preemption: ceiling, floor, or vacuum. Governors in states with high local autonomy rely on ceiling and floor preemptions. Republican governors are likelier to issue ceiling preemptions that bind local governments’ hands. Governors in states with ideologically dissimilar local governments tend to issue vacuum preemptions. When non-preempting previsions are dropped from the analysis, local autonomy does not significantly affect issuing one type of preemption over another. On the other hand, Republican governors are more likely to issue both ceiling and floor preemptions over vacuum preemptions. Governors in states with high ideological asymmetry are less likely to issue ceiling and floor preemptions over vacuum preemptions. These findings provide insight into gubernatorial behavior, interactions between state and local governments, and how theories of federalism can teach us more about how governments respond to crises.

Legislative staffers are an invisible force in legislative bodies that provide every imaginable service. It is doubtful that modern legislatures could operate without them. Prior studies of Congressional staffers have found evidence that staffers not only aid but also exert an independent influence on the policy-making process through network effects. In this article, I test if this extends to state legislative staffers using novel data from shared staffer networks in Arizona, Indiana, and New Mexico. I argue that, compared to their Congressional counterparts, state legislative staffers are more akin to ‘clerks’ than ‘political professionals’ and this limits their ability to independently influence policymaking at the state level.

Are workers effective lawmakers? Throughout American history, some politicians and elites have argued that white-collar Americans are more qualified than working-class Americans to govern. To date, however, we know relatively little about the legislative effectiveness of working-class lawmakers. I develop a theory of class-based electoral selection that links class-based discrimination in elections to legislators’ performance in office. I argue that working-class candidates face class-based biases in elections that make it more difficult to emerge and successfully win elective office. As a result, I expect the working-class candidates who do become lawmakers to be equally or more effective than their white-collar colleagues. To test these expectations, I create a data set merging the occupational background of more than 14,000 individual state legislators with their state legislative effectiveness score (SLES). The resulting data set includes more than 50,000 state legislator-term specific observations. Consistent with my expectations, I find that working-class lawmakers do not underperform white-collar lawmakers. Further, I provide evidence that, across various models and specifications, the gap between working-class and white-collar legislators’ effectiveness is negligible.

Between 1930 and 1980, the U.S. census bureau moved from using a Mexican as a racial category to Hispanic as an ethnicity. In between, the census bureau tried multiple ways to count Mexican Americans, Spanish Americans, or Latinos. Each measure the bureau tried ran headlong into differing subnational understandings of ethnicity, race, and Americanness. To understand Latino racial formation in this critical period, then, requires looking to the states. This paper explores the census counts in the southwest states between 1930 and 1970. Contextualizing these numbers with a history of differing state policies on language, marriage, and political inclusion reveals the importance of state-specific understandings of race and identity to understanding United States racial formation.

In the aftermath of the United States’ 2020 presidential election, state legislatures have introduced and passed an unprecedented number of restrictive voting bills. While past research has looked at the state-level drivers of restrictive voting legislation, this project explores what factors predict which legislators within states push for these laws. Specifically, I ask whether district-level characteristics predict when lawmakers use bill sponsorship to send messages about their positions beyond those sent by simple roll-call votes. I use theories of geographical threat and racial resentment to predict where sponsorship of these bills is most likely. My results tie these theoretical expectations to observed legislative activity: the whitest state legislative districts in the least-white states were the most likely to be represented by lawmakers who sponsored restrictive bills, as were districts with the most racially resentful white residents. I conclude that, despite lawmakers justifying these restrictive laws by claiming that fraud is a major problem, race and racism are inherently tied to the introduction and passage of these bills. This raises important questions about commitments to multiracial democracy.

Common examples of governance policies include regulations of lobbying, campaign-finance restrictions, and term limitations. Although the public generally favors these good-government reforms, the laws often restrict the autonomy of political elites. The histories of lobby reform in New York, Georgia, and Michigan illustrate how governance policies might be adopted despite elite opposition. In the states, initial reform efforts came about due to agenda-setting events or policy entrepreneurs. Although legislators adopted lobby reforms, they preferred transparency to other lobby reforms given its limited effect on mutualistic relationships. Initial lobby laws required only disclosure and did not restrict legislator–lobbyist interactions much. Only with the advent of additional events and entrepreneurs were the initial laws strengthened to limit interactions. The histories of reform imply that narratives of policy innovation or diffusion may be complicated somewhat by elite interests and that governance policies, once adopted, may have a unique immunity from repeal.

We examine the historical effects of ethnic and racial diversification among legislators on identity group mobilization and the hiring of nonwhite lobbyists. We propose that diversification among legislators encouraged identity groups to lobby, that these groups hired lobbyists who reflected their members’ identities, and that all interests also hired lobbyists who reflected the identities of new legislative targets. We apply a Bayesian estimation approach to infer the identities of lobbyists who were active in the American states over several decades. We find that the election of African Americans to state legislatures encouraged black identity groups to lobby, that all identity groups, including those representing Hispanics or Latinos, generally hired lobbyists who reflected their members’ identities, and that the election of Asian Americans to state legislatures encouraged interests generally to hire Asian-American lobbyists. Hispanic or Latino lobbyists gained clients in response to diversification in more Democratic legislatures.

We examine how institutional selection procedures affect the ideology of state supreme court chief justices. We argue that institutional selection methods empower those charged with choosing chief justices to select court leaders who reflect their own preferences, and we test this theory using data from all 50 American states from 1970 to 2017. Our results show that states that use popular elections to select chief justices tend to produce court leaders whose preferences reflect the electorate, and states that use commission-assisted elite appointment tend to produce chief justices whose preferences mirror those of political elites. While we find that peer election systems produce leaders with preferences similar to median court preferences, court preferences are also associated with other methods of chief justice selection.

Do reserved seats yield substantive representation for traditionally marginalized groups? To answer that question, we turn to a remarkable and little-studied institution: reserved seats for Native American tribes in the Maine House of Representatives. Tribal representatives, who can participate in debate but lack a vote, have represented tribes in Maine’s House of Representatives since statehood in 1820. We take advantage of a 1995 rule change that allowed tribal representatives to initiate legislation, and an original dataset of pro-tribal bills, to estimate the effect of reserved seats on the production of pro-tribal bills. We find that once tribal representatives were allowed to write bills, they produced over half of all tribal-related legislation during a 36-year period. Legislators with tribal constituents sponsored fewer relevant bills after the reform but continued to cosponsor pro-tribal legislation. Although our results show tribal representatives contribute to the legislative process, we caution that reserved seats are not a panacea for improving Indigenous representation.

We evaluate the politics of interim judicial appointments at the state level. Although nominating commissions have been established to promote merit-based selection, we argue that governor-applicant ideological concordance and financial support for a governor’s campaigns increase one’s odds of being appointed. We focus on the impact of political factors, as well as the qualifications of prospective judges. We analyze over 4,000 applications to fill interim judicial vacancies in Georgia from 1991 to 2014. Our findings indicate that ideological proximity and campaign donations to the governor increased the likelihood of appointment to the bench with their influence overpowering some indicators of competence.

How representative are conference delegations in state legislative chambers? I argue that differing conference rules across state legislative chambers influence majority party control over conference delegations. With an original data set encompassing all state-level conference committees from 2005 to 2016, I compare the observed policy preferences between conference delegation and majority party medians when the majority party unilaterally appoints and when the minority party has influence over conferee selection. My results show that in state legislative chambers where the minority can influence conference appointments, delegations are ideologically biased away from the majority party. These findings underscore how majority parties are limited when minorities have procedural rights.