Fueled in part by the wealth created from digital currencies, major art dealers such as Christie’s and Sotheby’s have embraced the sale of non-fungible tokens (NFTs) attached to unique digital works of art. NFTs, how they are related to the blockchain, and the evolution of the market for digital art is the subject of this chapter. Despite recent decreases in value, it appears that digital art can be added to the growing list of uses for blockchain technology, which is now becoming a part of modern life. This chapter proceeds in five sections. First, the overview of the evolutionary progression of blockchain technology in the form of NFTs. Second, a description of the emergence of the market for digital art. Third, an explanation and historical account of digital art and related recent issues. Fourth, a coverage of the abrupt decline in the market price for many NFTs. And last, a conclusion, which focuses on how the dramatic extension of blockchain and other digital technology to the world of art represents a new and exciting platform for creative expression. This chapter offers a valuable addition to the literature by providing a readable introduction and overview of what is now known about the likely impact of blockchain technology and NFTs to art. Additionally, this important development should have a significant impact on the future of innovation and property law.

Donald Trump was not the first president to favor smaller government, but they understood and respected the need for government even as they favored an adjustment in the mix. Instead of a conversation about the mix, Trump made politics about the distrust and animosity of Americans toward other Americans. His efforts to retain the presidency even though he lost the election based on the “big lie” poisoned trust in elections that continues, and his plan to stop the election of Joe Biden discarded democracy altogether. These tactics made it more difficult to have a national conversation about a change in the mix of government and markets that could renew economic opportunity for those left behind by economic developments and previous decisions of government by both political parties. The government helped to unbuild the middle class when it borrowed money to fight the Vietnam War, ignored how globalization harmed many Americans even as it benefited others, and cut taxes in ways that mostly benefited the wealthy and robbed the government of needed resources.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) seeks to end impunity for the world’s worst crimes to contribute to their prevention. But what is its impact to date? This book takes an in-depth look at four countries under scrutiny of the ICC: Afghanistan, Colombia, Libya, and Uganda. It puts forward an analytical framework to assess the impact of the ICC on four levels: on domestic legal systems (systemic effect); on peace negotiations and agreements (transformative effect); on victims (reparative effect); and on the perceptions of affected populations (demonstration effect). It concludes that the ICC is having a normative impact on domestic legal systems and peace agreements, but it has brought little reparative justice for victims, and it does not necessarily correspond with how affected populations view justice priorities. The book concludes that justice for the world’s worst crimes has no “universal formula” that can easily be captured in the law of the ICC.

This chapter puts Donald Trump’s populism in comparative perspective by applying the theory developed in chapter 2 and substantiated in chapters 3 to 5 to the US case. My analysis highlights the great institutional strength of US democracy and the unlikelihood of acute and severe crises and of huge windfalls, given the complexity and prosperity of US economy and society. As a result, populism is exceedingly unlikely to suffocate US democracy -- contrary to recent observers’ fears. The chapter substantiates these arguments through an in-depth examination of the Trump experience, which establishes intense partisan and affective polarization as another obstacle to the American populist’s ability to boost his mass support. Trump’s haphazard agency and very mixed governing performance created further limiations. Therefore, despite Trump’s relentless challenges to liberal norms and long-established institutions, US democracy held firm, even during the unprecedented post-electoral crisis of 2020/21. Indeed, the US’s vibrant civil society spearheaded a pro-democratic backlash that brought the electoral defeat of a populist leader who never managed to garner majority support in a highly polarized polity.

The Dwight David Eisenhower administration launched a security reassessment known as Project Solarium. This produced a new grand strategy known as the New Look. Eisenhower wanted to cut the cost of defense and famously warned about the dangers of the “military-industrial complex.” A solution was a reliance on atomic and then nuclear weapons. These were cheaper than standing forces. Eisenhower also stressed economic support abroad, alliance relationships, information operations, and subversion of Communist-leaning states abroad such as Guatemala and Iran. Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave us “brinksmanship” and “massive retaliation.” John F. Kennedy succeeded Eisenhower and criticized him for a supposed “missile gap” with the Soviet Union. Kennedy promulgated no official national security strategy but developed a grand strategy known as Flexible Response. His administration abandoned Eisenhower’s near-total dependence on nuclear weapons for a broader defense strategy. He faced crises in Berlin and particularly in Cuba. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara gave us MAD – mutually assured destruction. Kennedy moved America from an advising to a combat role in South Vietnam.

Trump and Trumpism were more than mere personality politics. He hijacked the system of minority rule and the alternative media reality created by Republicans since the 1990s while adding innovations of his own to create the Big Lie of #StopTheSteal, which is now the tail that wags the Republican party dog. Control of this machine will determine who wins the Republican nomination in 2024.

Describes the early career and political advent of Donald Trump through his election to the presidency in 2016. Explores the weaknesses in system of presidential nomination and election, and of his opponent Hillary Clinton, that made his victory possible. Explores the investigations integral to story of 2016 election: the Clinton email investigation and Crossfire Hurricane, the investigation into Russian election interference and possible Trump campaign collusion with the Russians.

An interlude exploring Donald Trump’s monetization of the presidency and possible violations of the foreign and domestic emoluments clauses. The chapter addresses whether this conduct is impeachable and why Trump was not impeached on this ground.

Describes the facts of Donald Trump’s effort to extort Ukraine into announcing investigations of his presidential rival Joseph Biden and how exposure of that effort led to a renewed effort to impeach him.

A second interlude introducing the 25th Amendment mechanism for removing a president who is incapable of performing his duties, and explaining unsuccessful initiatives to apply the 25th Amendment to Donald Trump.

The “Afterward” reminds us, via George Orwell, that, like us, democracies in the past have also endured eras when long-standing principles and practices have been severely challenged. Donald Trump is the epitome of that challenge today, and his figurative presence haunted the writing of this book. Moreover, Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels, in their Democracy for Realists, demonstrate that rejecting the national Story today (which they call “the folk theory”), on the basis of empirical research but without providing a replacement, is something that we might decide not to do within the guidelines of choosing, refraining, and dissembling.

The COVID-19 pandemic altered people’s lifestyle and caused them to have newfound free time with less ability to socialize. This ample time, and the polarizing influence of Trump’s presidency, likely facilitated the popularization of the conspiracy group QAnon. QAnon’s popularity partly can be attributed to the shift toward Conservative values, explained by Parasite Stress Theory, Moral Foundations Theory, and Terror Management Theory. As QAnon grew in prevalence, which subsequently increased social and aggressive acts from these groups, supporters justified the group’s actions using moral disengagement mechanisms. These acts include physical acts of violence, verbal threats of violence, and the spread of harmful misinformation. The purpose of this chapter is to apply the above-mentioned theories to understand the growth of QAnon, which can be used to garner a broader understanding of the cognitive processes of other conspiracy groups in general.

The epigraph focuses on answering the volume’s question, posed in the Introduction, regarding the degree to which the concept of fascism can be deemed essential or peripheral to the American historical experience, and how serious the threat actually is. The reader comes away from this book with a clear sense of the fascist origins and affiliations of the extremist forces that continue to threaten American democracy. In Fascist Italy, having participated in the March on Rome gave you a special status. The same is true for January 6 and all who conspired in the attempt to overturn the 2020 election and assault the Capitol, which is why many Republicans who attended the rally and breached the Capitol are now running for office, many with Trump’s endorsement. The epigraph examines the way in which this volume relates the history of fascism to America and abroad: every iteration of fascism is different, but the removal of rights and the advent of a climate of fear and violence is the constant. That is the lesson of this timely and invaluable book.

This chapter explores the political themes in Cavell’s philosophy of cinema by reading the film Gaslight in the context of contemporary American politics. This reading will serve two purposes. First, by focusing on a single film, the chapter demonstrates the political dimension of Cavell’s writing on film. Second in the last few years some critics of Trump have argued that he deploys gaslighting (a term developed from this film) to manipulate the American public. Therefore a reading of Gaslight can provide resources This chapter explores the political themes in Cavell’s philosophy of cinema by reading the film Gaslight in the context of contemporary American politics. This reading will serve two purposes. First, by focusing on a single film, the chapter demonstrates the political dimension of Cavell’s writing on film. Second, in the past few years, some critics of Trump have argued that he deploys “gaslighting” (a term developed from this film) to manipulate the American public. Therefore, a reading of Gaslight can provide resources for contemporary political theorists to think through political deception in contemporary American life. Gaslighting is one of the most powerful forms of political manipulation in the post-truth-politics era because it tricks its targets into doubting what they know. This chapter offers an theoretical analysis of gaslighting. It considers how Cavell’s interpretation of gaslighting as a gendered practice relates to Cavell’s understanding of the gendered nature of skepticism. Cavell suggests that to resist gaslighting one must cultivate modes of response to one’s intuition in order to reclaim one’s voice. The chapter concludes by analyzing how this way of responding to gaslighting can help us to make sense of Trump’s gaslighting of America and similar forms of populist propaganda.

Platform governance matters. The failure of platform companies to govern their users has led to disasters ranging from the unwitting culpability of Facebook in the 2017 genocide of the Rohingya people, to the spread of fraud and disinformation exacerbating the COVID-19 crisis, and to the subversion of free and fair elections across the world. The Introduction to The Networked Leviathan frames the problem of platform governance and its similarity to some of the problems confronted for centuries by political states and recommends that policymakers and scholars of the internet turn to older forms of political organization for inspiration.

Having taken the reader through the rapidly evolving political and religious landscape of three major Western democracies, in its two concluding chapters this book returns to the key questions raised in the Introduction. Thus, Chapter 16 moves from the specifics to the general and seeks to assess the insights from each case study from a comparative perspective, discussing common and distinct patterns. As it goes through each of the research questions it distils four conclusions that can serve as cornerstones for a more general theory of the dynamics between religion, populism and right-wing identity politics. The first is that right-wing populists’ success has often been a response to a democratic lack of representation of the new identity cleavage in the cases studied. The second is that right-wing populists’ references to Christianity is part of a new white identity politics, in which Christianity serves as a civilisational marker of belonging, rather than a source of religious believing. The third is that there is often a potential for religious immunity against right-wing populist appeals. The fourth is that the existence or strength of this immunity is shaped by the behaviour of mainstream parties and faith leaders who can play an immense role in shaping national populists’ ability to redefine and re-politicise religion in German, French and US politics.

This chapter turns to the dynamics of democratic discontent when it seizes power, focusing on Trump but referencing other cases where relevant. It analyzes the influence of Trumpism on the left and finds a mirror image to the dynamics in Spain, where the rise of left-wing populism provoked a populist backlash among the radical right. In the United States, extreme disgust with Trump’s agenda drove many further to the left, increasing leftist Democratic discontent. The second section analyzes the final months of the Trump presidency, as its response to the Covid-19 crisis faltered and Trumpism degenerated into an arcane morass of conspiracy theories. Using experiments and observational data from the PSAS, the chapter argues that pro-Trump conspiracy theories served as a coping mechanism for his followers. As the Covid-19 crisis ravaged both the lives and livelihoods of America, and as it became increasingly clear that Trump would not be reelected, the anxiety his followers felt, regarding a situation that their loyalty to the populist prevented them from accepting, became intolerable. Conspiracy theories allowed the followers to escape anxiety and embrace resentment by giving them targets for their rage.