Taking a pause from direct focus on the Jhaveris, Chapter 4 is an interlude that outlines major shifts across the Mughal Empire between the 1680 and 1720s. I suggest that military campaigns in the Deccan region impinged the Mughal treasury and undermined administration to an extent never seen before. Officials in Gujarat started to engage in behavior that undermined Mughal sovereignty. Yet, they also had little choice as monetary resources were becoming scarce. Financial limitations impacted the quality of state machinery including the upkeep of buildings, delay in salary payments, and even the ability of officials to legitimately demand taxes. Despite this, local Gujarati poems suggest that residents preferred Mughal rule to ruthless attacks from the Maratha marauders, whose periodic raids were increasing in frequency and intensity. After Aurangzeb’s death in 1707, successive Mughal emperors were poorly equipped to revive the grandeur of their ancestors. Their short stints as emperors, sometimes as brief as a few months, led to the further breakdown of Mughal authority. This manifest most clearly in the form of rivalries between Mughal governors sent to control and profit from Gujarat. Insecure in their positions and strapped for cash, these governors turned to assaulting key members of the business fraternity in the city of Ahmedabad.

This chapter examines how the digital financial infrastructure that emerged in the wake of the 2008 GFC assisted to address the financial, economic, and health challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic. While the 2008 Crisis was a financial crisis that impacted the real economy, COVID-19 was a health and geopolitical crisis that impacted the real economy. In fact, during COVID-19 the financial system turned from problem child to crisis manager, having provided effective tools to support the crisis response. Notwithstanding the former, digital finance has also created new forms of risk (TechRisk).

The South Sea Bubble of 1720 was Britain’s first modern financial crisis. This chapter uses digital tools to study the development, during the early eighteenth century, of a conceptual framework describing bubbles in the financial market. It traces the emergence of the phrase ‘South Sea Bubble’ in the months and years after the crisis, alongside the more complicated patterns of evolution in what that phrase describes, ultimately arguing that there is little resemblance between the ‘South Sea Bubble’ of the 1720s and that of the present-day historical imagination. The chapter’s final claim is that the conceptual framework underpinning how we understand present-day financial crises has its origins in the latency of the words used, at the time, to describe the emerging and interlinked crises of 1720.

This chapter analyses the evolution of finance and technology. In the modern era, we mark this in four major periods. The first focused on electrification and lasted for a century until the mid-to-late 1960s. It was dominated by analogue processes and traditional banks. The second period of digitisation was marked by digitisation, including across securities markets (NASDAQ), payments (ATMs, SWIFT), mass computerisation (financial calculators, PCs), communications (Internet, mobile), and lasted 40 years. From around 2007–2008 onwards, a new trend emerged as a result of the application of a range of new technologies to finance, combined with the impact of the 2008 GFC on finance and regulation. These three driving forces– the 2008 Crisis, the application of a range of new and transformative technologies to finance, and a massive increase in regulation globally in response to 2008 and a range of financial scandals– underpinned the emergence of FinTech, short for ‘financial technology’. This third period lasted just over 10 years and saw the rise of data, and its algorithmic analysis in a process called datafication which has transformed finance. The most recent era, driven by the COVID pandemic, commenced in 2020 and is characterised by the emergence of scale, in the form of large digital platforms.

In 1995 Italy’s labor productivity was above that of the USA. In the following quarter-century Italian productivity almost stagnated. This long relative decline of an advanced country has no parallel in modern economic history. The slow adaptation to the second globalization and digital technology is ascribed to financial and political uncertainty. The chapter identifies the areas in which adaptation to the new global environment was too slow (education, R&D, reliance on SME, inefficient bureaucracy, and judiciary). We also emphasize social and political weaknesses resulting in the large public debt. Uncertainty held back domestic and foreign investments. A brief window of opportunity in the early 2000s showed Italy’s potential resilience, when economic decline could have been reversed.

The chapter is devoted to the economic, political, and social crisis of the early 1990s: a shock with long-lasting consequences. The crisis catalyzed the weaknesses of the previous political, social and economic fabric. The economic crisis had several components: a public finance crisis, an exchange rate collapse, and a fall in private investment. But the longer-lasting impact of the crisis came from the corruption scandals leading the judiciary to decapitate the main political parties that had run the country since 1945, as well as most of the industrial powerhouses. At a time when bold decisions were swiftly needed to adjust to the new economic and geopolitical landscape, the early 1990s left a legacy of political fragmentation and financial uncertainty.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is the most important international standard setting body in the field of financial regulation. Its remit concerns banking regulation, and particularly prudential requirements of internationally active banks. The fundamental question addressed by this chapter is what explains the resilience of the BCBS and its standards, particularly in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. The chapter is organised as follows: first, there is an introduction to the BCBS and the standards its members develop. Second, the failures of the Basel regime leading to the financial crisis are highlighted, as well as some possible explanations thereof. Thereafter follows a discussion about the reasons why the fundamental features of the regime are still in place even after its evident inadequacies and why the reforms adopted in the wake of the crisis are a way to safeguard the resilience of such features.

The twenty-four accessible and thought-provoking essays in this volume present innovative new scholarship on Japan’s modern history, including its imperial past and transregional entanglements. Drawing on the latest Japanese and English-language scholarship, it highlights Japan’s distinctiveness as an extraordinarily fast-changing place. Indeed, Japan provides a ringside seat to all the big trends of modern history. Japan was the first non-Western society to become a modern nation and empire, to industrialize, to wage modern war on a vast scale, and to deliver a high standard of living to virtually all its citizens. Because the Japanese so determinedly acted to reshape global hierarchies, their modern history was incredibly destabilizing for the world. This intense dynamism has powered a variety of debates and conflicts, both at home and with people and places beyond Japan’s shores. Put simply, Japan has packed a lot of history into less than two centuries.

The framework for the legal regulation of cross-border capital flows is critically important yet remains vastly unexplored and undeveloped. The preface introduces the background on the issue and explains how the book aims to fill the void and contribute detailed legal analysis to the ongoing discussion and debate. In contrast with existing literature, this book does not focus on the utility of capital flow management measures (CFMs) but on legal issues of fragmentation and associated problems. Much of the existing literature starts with the premise that members should have an absolute right to maintain CFMs – as a result, over-reading and misinterpreting of provisions is rife. This book has no pre-conceived ideological viewpoint but instead seeks to provide solid analysis on the consistency of CFMs with the trade and investment regimes and to develop a framework to manage and avoid regime conflict in existing and future treaties.

Cross-border capital flows have long played an important role in the world economy. Yet foreign capital brings both benefits and risks to host countries. On the one hand, the expansion of global trade and the related increase in financial transactions have permitted market expansions and created wealth in both industrialized and emerging economies. On the other hand, cross-border capital flows can worsen economic conditions and deepen monetary instability. As a result, while capital account liberalisation and the free flow of capital were once almost universally praised as the solution to foster global economic growth, they have now come under serious scrutiny. In effect, there is an emerging consensus that a more careful and balanced approach to the management of cross-border capital flows is warranted. Before exploring these restraints and the legal and policy framework in which they have evolved, it is necessary to first provide a general overview of the current global financial landscape. This chapter does so by introducing the key pillars of the system – capital flows, the IMF and financial liberalisation – before elaborating on why this traditional approach to free capital flows has slowly but consistently shifted over time.

Populism is unlikely to be effective where the masses are already incorporated into well-established programmatic parties. However, this chapter shows that deep socioeconomic crises can disrupt those political linkages, providing an opening for populism. The sudden rise of Hitler’s Nazi Party in the early 1930s provides the main narrative for this chapter. Long frustrated in both his armed and electoral attempts to gain power, the fallout of the Great Depression in 1929 and Germany’s own banking crisis of 1931 shocked many Germans, especially on the right, out of their existing political affiliations. Hitler, the master demagogue, was ready to take advantage through a sophisticated propaganda machine. In most other cases across interwar Europe, the populist strategy was ineffective. Less severe crises left most the populace embedded in their existing ties to bureaucratic and patronage-based parties.

The introduction sets out the parameters of this book, which brings together contributions from experts from a range of academic disciplines, with legal scholarship at the core of the volume. It presents the context for the book’s focus upon sustainable value creation and explores how this might be developed inside the EU and through the EU’s institutions. The volume is positioned within a research-based concept of sustainability, defined as securing social foundations for humanity now and for the future within planetary boundaries. This provides the basis for the analyses of the potential for sustainable value creation in the EU. The introduction goes on to identify a number of mileposts that have shaped the progress of the EU and its relevance for value creation, including the EU’s ambitions, the financial and debt crises, Brexit and the urgent challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic and the broader environmental, social and economic aspects of sustainability. The contributions of the volume are briefly introduced, before the chapter concludes with hope and optimism, setting the tone for the critical and constructive analysis to follow.

This chapter proposes to trace a map following the economic and literary route of money in Latin America between 1890 and 1930, in tune with what was happening in Western Europe and the United States. Money, with all its ubiquity between real and virtual financial capital, had an expansive and global power that altered local imagination: In Latin America, due to both literary and economic forces, we see the proliferation of what this chapter dubs “fictions of money.” Furthermore, it focuses on the Argentine, Brazilian, and Guatemalan cases, given the striking publication of financial novels immediately after the economic crises provoked by fluctuations in the stock market and unbridled speculation, which served to process the actual circulation of money and to negotiate the social experience related to it.