The chapter discusses the position of victims in international criminal justice and the evolution of their status and modalities of their involvement in the administration of justice by international criminal jurisdictions, with a particular focus on the legal regime of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The chapter highlights the centrality of victims as the core constituency of international criminal law and the mismatch between this aspiration and the limited recognition of their agency and rights before the UN ad hoc tribunals. It then examines how the ICC’s architects have sought to bridge this gap in the Court’s Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The ICC’s legal framework is unprecedented in this respect. Over and above the protective measures necessary on account of their engagement in the proceedings, it granted victims extensive rights to participate and be legally represented at different stages the ICC proceedings as well as the autonomous right to obtain reparations. The chapter surveys the key challenges this ambitious scheme has raised, as far as the admission of victims to participate, the organisation of their legal representation, and the implementation of reparations are concerned, and solutions that have been developed in the Court’s practice to date.

This chapter deals with all manner of state-derived prohibitions. Ancient states prohibited a broad variety of behaviours, threatening punishment for those who would transgress boundaries. The logic of prohibition was wide-ranging: from the marking of spaces, objects and officials as somehow distinct from the rest of ‘society’, leading factions within ancient states sought to preserve and protect their individual prerogatives. They also sought to reinforce their claims to leadership by incentivizing subjects to settle their disputes in state-sanctioned venues. The evidence for such prohibitions is extensive, but did they add up to something that we might legitimately call ‘social control’? Did ancient states succeed at inducing subject populations to accept their claims to rule? If so, how? This chapter suggests that the logic of prohibition was a site of contestation for both statecraft and subject-craft.

One of the most important aspects of human rights law for children is the recognition that the state has positive obligations to protect them from harm, including harm suffered in the home. Child protection is one of the most important areas for protecting children’s rights, but also one of the most difficult. As well as the right to protection from harm, children and parents also have a right to protection of their family life together. This chapter considers the extent to which the law and process of child protection protect the rights of children at risk from harm. It considers the importance of supporting families and the difficulty of deciding when to intervene. It then considers child protection proceedings and the extent to which children’s rights are protected in the law concerning child protection orders. Finally, it considers children’s own perspectives and the extent to which they are heard in the process.

Health interventions are purposeful activities intended to improve health. They may involve treatment or care of the ill, or health promotion to prevent disease and illness. Complex health interventions have multiple components interacting with each other and with the context of delivery. Evaluation is important to ensure that complex health interventions are effective in achieving their intended outcomes, represent good value for money and cause minimal harm. Evaluation is also important to detect if interventions reduce or increase health inequalities. Intervention effects are not always obvious. They can easily be confused with other changes that occur. Hence, there is a need for evaluation to use rigorous methods to distinguish the ‘signal’ of intervention effects from the ‘noise’ of other effects in the absence of intervention. Evaluation should provide evidence to inform policy. If not based on evidence, there is a risk that policies may not achieve their intended effects or may create harms.

The harm principle sets a limit on the justified legal and social control of individuals. The principle also provides a widely accepted justification for such control. This chapter critically reviews John Stuart Mill’s understanding of the harm principle and the considerations he advanced in its support. It also draws on other discussions of the principle to assess its plausibility in general. Mill took the harm principle to be the sole ground for justified interference with the liberty of individuals, but less restrictive defenses of the principle are available. The content of the harm principle, on any of its formulations, is shaped by the characterization of harm that figures in it. A good characterization of harm should be both descriptively accurate and morally appealing, but these two desiderata can pull in opposing directions. This chapter argues that the characterization of harm that figures in the harm principle must advert to the grounds that justify the principle, but these grounds are multiple and can come into conflict. Mill presents both an autonomy argument and a social learning argument in support of the harm principle, but the ground of autonomy can speak in favor of interference in cases where the social learning argument speaks against it. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of harm, speech and offense.

Proponents of the harm principle often appeal to a notion of personal sovereignty in setting out their position. This notion helps to fix the application of the harm principle. Critics of the harm principle seize on this point and argue that, once a principle of sovereignty is introduced, it can do all the work that needs doing. Appeals to harm become otiose. Further, the critics contend, the harm principle cannot explain the impermissibility of certain “harmless” wrongs, such as those involved in harmless trespass. This chapter assesses this sovereignty-centered critique of the harm principle. It argues that neither the harm principle nor the sovereignty principle enjoys priority over the other. The two principles complement each other with neither meriting a privileged position. The chapter then discusses the content and stringency of the sovereignty principle, and its relation to the Volenti Maxim, which holds that a person is not harmed or wronged by that to which they consent. The critical discussion of the Volenti Maxim, in turn, reveals limits to the sovereignty principle.

This chapter introduces the central research agenda, methodology, and scope of the book, centring the concept of grievance formation. Discussing the legal foundations and modalities of remedies in international law, the chapter poses the question of state remedial responsibilities in relation to the passage of time. This is a central question in the globally emerging discussions on whether states ought to remedy sterilisation or castration practices in their past. Furthermore, the chapter lays down the theoretical framework for the book’s use of the concept of grievance formation. As employed in social movement theory, this concept describes the process of people starting to address harmful experiences as common grievances. In this chapter, the concept is initially introduced into legal research by linking it with rights mobilisation: how victims of rights violations redefine traumatic experiences as individual or common grievances, rights violations, and legal harm to be remedied. As such, the concept offers a theoretical framework to understand how and why some victims of rights violations begin to conceptualise themselves as such and demand state responsibility, while others might not; why victims are publicly and institutionally recognised and redressed to different extents.

The Laws makes clear its commitment to a form of Socratic paradox: no one who is unjust is so voluntarily. I show first how its protagonist – the Athenian Visitor – maintains this position, without resorting to the Socratic thesis that knowingly acting against one's beliefs about what is best is some sort of impossibility, and indeed recognizing the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance. My main concern, however, is with the Athenian's treatment – near the outset of the penology of Book 9 – of what is presented as a serious threat posed by the paradox to any viable theory of criminal behaviour and its punishment; or as he puts it, to the distinction drawn 'in every city and by every legialator there has ever been between two sorts of wrongdoing (adikêmata), voluntary and involuntary'. The Athenian's strategy for resisting the threat (as most commentators note) relies on distinguishing between volutarily harming someone, which requires compensation and often purification, and involuntary commission of injustice, which merits punishment, reconceptualized however as treatment for psychic disease. How far this distinction is successful in defusing the problem is then explored.

We briefly mentioned in Chapter 2 that the main source of contractual obligations under Qatari contract law arises from: (i) the contract itself; (ii) the intention of the parties at the time of forming the contract; and lastly; (iii) the relevant laws regulating contractual affairs. Here, we need to highlight the fact that obligations in general under the civil law are comprised of three tiers: (i) civil obligations; (ii) natural obligations; and (iii) moral duties. Understanding these is vital to one’s appreciation of contractual performance. Civil obligations include statutory and contractual undertakings, such as the sale of goods and services. Civil obligations also include civil-wrongdoings, which are governed by the law of delict under the CC. Civil-wrongdoings are concerned with personal injury, negligence, defamation, mental distress, etc. All civil obligations are enforceable.

The theory of obligation addresses the central ethical question of what we ought to do. The theory of moral creditworthiness concerns motivation appropriate to fulfilling obligation. The theory of manners of actions concerns how they are performed. The triple-barreled theory of moral conduct the book develops integrates these dimensions of behavior. The theory covers obligatory deeds – the types of things we ought to do – the vehicles of conduct: concrete doings that are right or wrong in virtue of their type, morally or non-morally motivated by intentions that explain them, and morally appropriate or inappropriate in manner in virtue of how they are performed. Among the central moral principles examined are those of justice and harm-avoidance, veracity and fidelity, beneficence and self-improvement, and reparation and gratitude. How are these to be understood? Are some reducible to others? This chapter clarifies these principles through both narrative examples and conceptual exploration.

We explore whether there is a plausible probabilistic version of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), and more generally pursue the question of how probabilistic outcomes affect the application of moral principles. Many think that the DDE helps explain why it is permissible to shunt a trolley onto a sidetrack to which one person is tied (thereby resulting in his death) in order to save the lives of five people tied to the main track, whereas it is impermissible to lead an unsuspecting person onto the main track in order to save the five. But we can ask: Does it make a difference if we have an option to lead a person onto the main track when there is only a small to moderate chance that he will be killed? Here we make a start toward an answer by investigating why it is generally wrong to risk harm to others, taking as a defeasible starting point a pluralistic deontological account of morality. In the process, we explore whether imposing risk is causing harm, how to sort permissible from impermissible risk impositions, and why we should not expect a linear function between degree of risk imposed and seriousness of wrong.