In 1908 the second volume of the American Journal of International Law featured a piece by Lassa Oppenheim entitled The Science of International Law: Its Tasks and Method. Oppenheim began his article by noting, apparently with some approval, that the first volume of AJIL, stacked with articles only by Americans, had “shown to the world that America is able to foster the science of international law without being dependent upon the assistance of foreign contributors.” Concerned, however, that students were “at first frequently quite helpless for want of method [and] mostly plunge into their work without a proper knowledge of the task of our science, without knowing how to make use of the assertions of authorities, and without the proper views for the valuation and appreciation of the material at hand,” Oppenheim sought to bring “the task and the method of this our science into discussion in this Journal.” What followed was a comprehensive exposition of his views on the purposes of international law and the methods available to lawyers and scholars for approaching the problems they face.

One of the most important issues in the law of the World Trade Organization is the right of WTO members to adopt measures for nontrade purposes. In the WTO’s General Agreement. on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) and General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), this right is secured in general exceptions provisions, which permit WTO members to adopt measures to achieve certain objectives, notwithstanding any other provisions of these agreements and also, in some cases, other WTO agreements. These objectives include, most importantly, the protection of public morals, the maintenance of public order, the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health, the enforcement of certain domestic laws, and the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.

Central to the World Court’s mission is the determination of international custom “as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” Students of the Court’s jurisprudence have long been aware that the Court has been better at applying customary law than defining it. Yet until Nicaragua v. United States, little harm was done. For in the sharply contested cases prior to Nicaragua, the Court managed to elicit commonalities in argumentative structure that gravitated its rulings toward the customary norms implicit in state practice. The Court’s lack of theoretical explicitness simply meant that a career opportunity arose for some observers like me to attempt to supply the missing theory of custom.

The continuous stream of resolutions of the UN General Assembly and much academic writing on the subject notwithstanding, the present state of customary international law regarding expropriation of alien property has remained obscure in its basic aspects; this is true in particular for expropriations in the context of North-South (still better described as “West-South”) relations, to which this article is primarily, but not exclusively, addressed. International courts have had no occasion to rule on fundamental issues of expropriation law in the past decades, even though these issues have been relevant to various disputes settled out of court. Eventually, however, the courts will be confronted with cases involving expropriation of alien property: given the continuing and rising importance of foreign investment, the parties involved probably will not invariably prefer negotiated settlements. It must also be recalled here that customary law has occasionally served as a reference standard in treaties and contracts. If an expropriation case were brought before an international tribunal, it could not simply rule that the law governing expropriation of alien property is in dispute and therefore no law at all is applicable. The very notion of international law precludes an argument that acknowledges the existence of “gray areas” in that law: a court could not rule that some law exists, but that it cannot be identified by judicial means.

In October 2003, the Israeli permanent representative addressed the United Nations General Assembly on why Israel felt compelled to build a lengthy barrier spanning hundreds of kilometers across certain areas of the occupied West Bank of the Jordan River. Among other things, Ambassador Dan Gillernian stated:

Most international organizations lack law-enforcing sanctions or, having them in legal theory, are reluctant to invoke them in practice. Instead, they increasingly resort to fact-finding.

The entry of Latin America into the community of nations is one of the most important facts in the history of civilization. It resulted not only in widening the field occupied by International Law but also in radically modifying its character. Although the Latin States of America inherited the civilization of the peoples of Europe, they developed along different lines. In number, and in the fact of their common origin they were like the members of one large family who had been suddenly and almost simultaneously called into independent life.

This combination of circumstances caused these nations, upon their appearance in the general society of states, to exclude from their constitutions the principles of European public law which did not harmonize with the special character of their organization; and to reject, in their foreign relations, those principles and practices that were incompatible with their independent position or that did not favor their special conditions of development.

In January and February 1998, various United States officials, including the President, asserted that unless Iraq permitted unconditional access to international weapons inspections, it would face a military attack. The attack was not to be, in Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s words, “a pinprick,” but a “significant” military campaign. U.S. officials, citing United Nations Security Council resolutions, insisted that the United States had the authority for the contemplated attack. Representatives of other permanent members of the Security Council believed otherwise; that no resolution of the Council authorized U.S. armed action without its approval. In late February, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan traveled to Baghdad and returned with a memorandum of understanding regarding inspections signed by himself and the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister. On March 2, 1998, the Security Council, in Resolution 1154, unanimously endorsed this memorandum of understanding.

Liquid mineral deposits that extend across a national frontier on land territory or a dividing line on the continental shelf between adjacent or opposite states have increasingly attracted attention in international law during the last two decades. Several common deposits of petroleum or natural gas have recently been discovered, and since the early sixties a considerable number of international agreements have been concluded to deal with the problems of those deposits. This development gives rise to certain considerations regarding an emerging legal concept of cooperation between neighboring states, as has already occurred with water resources shared by two or more states.

In the last decade, many political scientists, economists and lawyers have suggested that national economic and regulatory systems may be converging globally. Economic, ideological and sociological factors, as well as action by the world’s great powers, may be facilitating cross-national convergence of economic systems and the globalization of some sectors. Globalization of the telecommunications industry and cross-national convergence of related national laws may serve as one of the stronger examples of this phenomenon.

The provisions relating to the Security Council in the United Nations Charter of 1995 do not look much different from those in the Charter of 1945. Articles 23 and 27 were amended in 1965 to increase the membership of the Security Council from its original eleven to its present fifteen, with a corresponding change from seven to nine votes for the adoption of resolutions. No change was made in the five permanent members’ veto power over substantive matters. Article 109 was amended in 1968 to increase from seven to nine the number of votes in the Security Council needed to complement a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly for the convening of a Charter review conference. Otherwise, c’est la même chose.

Since September 11, 2001, legal experts have focused significant attention on the lethal targeting of individuals by both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations. An equally significant legacy of the post-9/11 administrations, however, may be the decisions to target specific kinds of objects. Those decisions greatly affect the success of U.S. efforts to win ongoing conflicts, such as the conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). These decisions may also become precedents for military attacks that states consider lawful, whether carried out by cyber or kinetic means, in future armed conflicts.

To achieve the goal of destroying ISIL, President Obama embraced what many in the international law community long regarded as off-limits: targeting war-sustaining capabilities, such as the economic infrastructure used to generate revenue for an enemy's armed forces. Although the weight of scholarly opinion has for years maintained that such objects are not legitimate military targets, the existing literature on this topic is highly deficient. Academic discussion has yet to grapple with some of the strongest and clearest evidence in support of the U.S. view on the legality of such targeting decisions. Indeed, intellectual resources may be better spent not on the question of whether such objects are legitimate military targets under the law of armed conflict, but on second-order questions, such as how to apply proportionality analysis and how to identify limiting principles to guard against unintentional slippery slopes. In this article, I discuss the legal pedigree for war-sustaining targeting. I then turn to identify some of the most significant second-order questions and how we might begin to address them.

Human rights in general and the international human rights system in particular have come under increasing attack in recent years. Quite apart from the domestic and global political events since 2016, including an apparent retreat from international institutions, the human rights system has in recent times come in for severe criticism from academic scholars. Amongst the various criticisms levelled have been: (1) the ineffectiveness and lack of impact of international human rights regimes, (2) the ambiguity and lack of specificity of human rights standards, (3) the weakness of international human rights enforcement mechanisms, and (4) the claim to universalism of human rights standards coupled with the hegemonic imposition of these standards on diverse parts of the world. This article responds to several of those criticisms by introducing the idea of experimentalist governance, interpreting key aspects of the functioning of certain international human rights treaties from the perspective of experimentalist governance theory, and surveying a body of recent scholarship on the effectiveness of such treaties. Contrary to the depiction of international human rights regimes as both ineffective and top-down, the article argues that they function at their best as dynamic, participatory, and iterative systems. Experimentalist governance offers a theory of the causal effectiveness of human rights treaties, brings to light a set of features and interactions that are routinely overlooked in many accounts, and suggests possible avenues for reform of other human rights treaty regimes with a view to making them more effective in practice.

In recent years, scholarly attention has increasingly focused on the lawmaking effect of General Assembly resolutions. The citation of previous resolutions in later resolutions of the General Assembly is one potentially significant aspect of this question, yet there has been no examination of it in legal literature. Anyone familiar with the Assembly’s work knows that the phenomenon is pervasive. 1,149 resolutions, just over half of the 2,247 passed in the first twenty-one sessions of the General Assembly, refer to previous resolutions, and the cited resolutions have been invoked an average of 2.68 times. More important from a legal standpoint is the fact that a very few resolutions have been cited much more often than the average. Resolution 1514 (XV) was cited in 95 subsequent resolutions in the first six sessions following its passage, and Resolution 217(111) was cited 75 times in its first nineteen years. Seven resolutions have been referred to on more than sixteen occasions since their approval by the General Assembly, and seven have been cited more than twice in each session since passage. A consideration of the legal relevance of this phenomenon seems worth pursuing, and any such inquiry must begin first of all with an over-all theoretical analysis of General Assembly resolutions as a source of international law.

The concept of “soft law” in international law has been familiar for some years, although its precise meaning is still debated. A distinguished international lawyer, Professor Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, delivered a series of lectures on International Economic “Soft Law” at the Hague Academy of International Law in 1979. The concept as applied to economic affairs is of particular interest in relation to the subject matter of this article.

March 29, 1919

The Preliminary Peace Conference at the plenary session on the 25th January, 1919 (Minute No. 2), decided to create, for the purpose of inquiring into the responsibilties relating to the war, a commission composed of fifteen members, two to be named by each of the Great Powers (United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy and Japan) and five elected from among the Powers with special interests.

The Commission was charged to inquire into and report upon the following points:

1. 1. The responsibility of the authors of the war.

2. 2. The facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their Allies, on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war.

3. 3. The degree of responsibility for these offences attaching, to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staffs, and other individuals, however highly placed.

4. 4. The constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these offences.

5. 5. Any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above which may arise in the course of the enquiry, and which the Commission finds it useful and relevant to take into consideration.

If, as Lao-tse said, nature is not anthropomorphic, some fellow creatures nonetheless seem to share the better angels of our character; among these animals, none is grander than the African elephant. Elephants live in close-knit “families” of about ten members that seem to do just about everything synchronously—feeding, walking, resting, drinking or mud wallowing. Each unit has a matriarchal structure: it is headed by the oldest female and consists of younger females and their calves, as male calves tend to leave the family and strike out on their own when they reach sexual maturity between the ages of 10 and 15. Fighting is rare.