In a recent article (this Review, 63 [June, 1969]), Bruce Russett attempts to answer the title question by using two-variable regression analysis to estimate the “trade-off” relationships between the defense spending proportion of Gross National Product (GNP) and the other nondefense expenditure proportions of GNP for the 1939–68 period. This paper contends that Russett's method of analysis is misleading because it does not permit the detection of possible subperiod shifts in the trade-off relationships. The results of a multiple regression, dummy variable analysis indicate that significant shifts in both the sign and the numerical values of the trade-off relationships occurred between the three war periods and the peacetime period. Two attempts to identify the reasons for the shifts produced mixed results, but our tentative conclusion is that the shifts are related to subperiod differences in the unemployment rate and the methods of financing defense expenditures.

Inspired by impossibility theorems of social choice theory, many democratic theorists have argued that aggregative forms of democracy cannot lend full democratic justification for the collective decisions reached. Hence, democratic theorists have turned their attention to deliberative democracy, according to which “outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals” (Cohen 1997a, 73). However, relatively little work has been done to offer a formal theory of democratic deliberation. This article helps fill that gap by offering a formal theory of three different modes of democratic deliberation: myopic discussion, constructive discussion, and debate. We show that myopic discussion suffers from indeterminacy of long run outcomes, while constructive discussion and debate are conclusive. Finally, unlike the other two modes of deliberation, debate is path independent and converges to a unique compromise position, irrespective of the initial status quo.

This article considers the social and political factors that influence the stability/instability of the political system and attempts to measure some of these factors in the political systems of Latin America.

Max Weber's work has long been considered the property of sociologists. This paper attempts to restore an understanding of the fundamental political nature of his thought and action. Through an examination of Weber's political writings and involvements, beginning with the Freiburg Inaugural Address of 1895, it is demonstrated that Weber developed a political theory which was both critical and empirical, and attempted (unsuccessfully) to put it into practice. The two sides of this attempt are discussed: the critique of Bismarckian and Wilhelmian politics and Weber's own “positive” construction of a new political order. “Bureaucratization” and “democratization” are understood as the key themes of this analysis. Identification with the middle class is stressed as a major determinant of action, transcended only by a profound commitment to political education of the nation. Political education is judged to be the supreme task of theory; it supplies the source of Weber's political and scientific commitments, and the explanation for his ultimate political failure.

This article argues that the differences in the findings of the incrementalist budgetary theory of Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky and the “competition” theory of Natchez and Bupp have been wrongly attributed to the different units of analysis—program or organization—used in these studies. “Competition” as measured by Natchez and Bupp and incremental change as defined by Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky can both be found among either programs or organizations. The differences in the findings of these theorists depend instead on the particular theoretical construction of budgetary behavior and the budget measures chosen. The same data will support either theory of budgeting if one adopts the theoretical constructs and budget measures peculiar to each theory. Thus the theories are not really in competition with each other.

Mainstream feminist discourse typically defines rape culture as the normalization of aggressive male sexual violence against women, a definition that emerged out of radical feminist analysis of patriarchy in the 1970s but that does not reflect the intersectionality of sexual violence. I argue that conceptual analysis of rape culture must explore other dimensions of power in addition to patriarchy, such as white supremacy, heteronormativity, and capitalist exploitation. An intersectional analysis reveals how myths, discourses, and practices of rape culture sustain white male control over all subordinates of white heteropatriarchy by evolving and expanding to apply to any group that threatens white heteropatriarchal control. This essay traces the emergence of the idea of rape culture in the United States, offers an alternative intersectional account of rape culture, and uses this alternative account to analyze a 2013–14 news story involving Florida State University student and football player Jameis Winston and Florida State University student Erica Kinsman.

Central to the recent argument from the “unitary executive” is the claim that the unitary executive is consistent with the text and history of the Constitution. But because this veracity and importance of this claim is contested, unitarians also argue that the unitary executive is consistent with democratic theory. This article examines that argument by addressing a question in the political thought of Alexander Hamilton. Although Hamilton was an important defender of an energetic executive, and is associated with an expansive interpretation of executive power, he wrote in The Federalist that the president and Senate would share the removal power. In contrast with existing scholarship, which either overlooks Hamilton's statement on removals or dismisses it as a careless error, this article argues that Hamilton's statement limiting presidential removals illuminates his larger argument about executive energy. By showing how “duration” would check “unity,” this article clarifies Hamilton's political thought and offers an important critique of the modern argument from the unitary executive.

The purpose of this paper is to examine several specific kinds of nonrandom measurement errors and to note their implications for causal model construction. In doing so, my secondary purpose is to sensitize the reader to the crucial importance of making one's assumptions fully explicit and to the advantages of a causal models approach to measurement errors. It is well known that the presence of even random measurement errors can produce serious distortions in our estimates, particularly whenever one is attempting to assess the relative contributions of intercorrelated independent variables. Nevertheless, common practice is to utilize what Duncan refers to as the naive approach to the presence of measurement errors: that of acknowledging the existence of measurement errors, and even discussing possible sources of such errors, while completely ignoring them in the analysis stage of the research process. That is, measured values are inserted directly into causal models as though they adequately reflect the true values. It can easily be shown that such a practice, while leading to important simplifications, can readily lead one astray. In particular, it may blind the analyst to searching for alternative plausible explanations that allow for measurement error.

There have been a number of very recent papers in the sociological literature, some of which will be briefly summarized since they may not be familiar to the reader. For the most part, these papers have dealt rather systematically with ways to handle random measurement errors, whereas nonrandom errors have been dealt with only incidentally and much less carefully.

In most states it is permitted to write in the names on the ballot, and these write-in candidates can win if they assemble enough votes. Thus, in all elections in which I might conceivably participate, there are at least three candidates: the Republicans, the Democrats, and my own favorite candidate for president—Gordon Tullock. Indeed, using the notation of the Ferejohn and Fiorina article, assuming that we are talking about 1972, I would find k having a value of about .001. Under the circumstances, if I understand the article correctly, I should always vote, and the vote should always take the form of writing in my own name. Further, as far as I can see, this advice can be generalized. Everyone who would really like to be president should vote and write in his own name, because the minimum regret that they produce for three-candidate elections is also correct for the elections in which there are 30 million candidates. The only problem here is that it would, of course, amount to participating in a lottery, and my possible gain from writing in my own name might turn out to be less than the cost of writing it in. Granted that people are willing to buy lottery tickets, even when the various states offering them take very substantial rakeoffs, I do not imagine this would be much of a disadvantage.

This same conclusion could have been deduced from the Casstevens article, which Ferejohn and Fiorina quite properly criticize as being mathematically incorrect.

The years 1964 and 1967 stand as two crucial landmarks in the democratic development of India's political systems both at the center and in the several states. In the three years since Nehru's death in May, 1964, Indian politics entered fully into a major test of legitimacy. Since 1964, the national leadership of the Indian National Congress has three times demonstrated its ability to handle smoothly the first stage of India's process of legitimizing democratic political authority—that of transferring power from a charismatic leader to his successors within the dominant party. After the 1967 General Elections, Indian politics moved to a second stage to confront the problems of transferring power from the previously dominant Congress to diverse parties and party coalitions in more than half the Indian states.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications for party development in India of the ways in which power has been transferred from the Congress to multi-group coalitions in the three north Indian states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Punjab. Specifically, I am concerned with the structural characteristics of the developing party systems in the three states; with the roles played in the systems by parties, factions, and individuals; and with the impact of the ways in which the systems function upon government formation and stability. I will argue that north Indian political parties operate in systems in which inter-party ideological divisions are less decisive in the formation and breakup of governments than intra-party divisions.

This article examines the dynamics of military promotion and explores its consequences both for individual officers and for military organization. The central argument is that performance, while a necessary standard for acceptability into a rather large pool of officers from which the elite will emerge, is nonetheless a minor influence on promotion and becomes even less discriminating as an officer's career progresses, whereas visibility–the extent to which an individual has developed contacts with peers and superiors who can influence his movement in the organization–begins moderately and eventually becomes the dominant influence. To present this argument, the article first examines the prevailing concepts of performance and seniority and outlines an expanded model of the promotion process. The component variables of that model are applied to three separate military career levels–junior, middle-grade and senior officers–and are traced longitudinally through the entire officer career pattern. Finally, the impact of contextual factors on the model, particularly the differences between wartime and peacetime, is discussed and illustrated with data from general officer promotion in the army. The implications of this theory are significant for civil control of the military. Through the control of access to the elite nucleus represented by the promotion system, especially with the emphasis on visibility, the military is able to sustain a high degree of autonomy. By the time Congress or other civilian actors are able to exercise selection of the military elite, the promotion system has already preselected those individuals who most highly represent military values held by preceding leaders.

Whether or no it be true, as someone has said, that with words we govern men, it is at least certain that when a name has once passed into common speech it becomes a fact and a power. The term Political Science seems now generally accepted and your Association has by its very title expressed the opinion that Politics is a science. Nevertheless, to prevent misconception, we may properly ask “What sort of a science is it?” The mathematical sciences are described as exact sciences: and so too are such departments of knowledge as mechanics and physics. The laws and conclusions of these sciences can be expressed in precise terms. They can be stated in numbers. As the facts which these sciences deal with are the same everywhere and at all times, so the relations of those facts which we call Laws are of universal application. That being so we can predict their action and rely upon them to be the same in the future as they have been in the past.

In their 1993 article in this Review, Paul Teske, Mark Schneider, Michael Mintrom, and Samuel Best sought to establish the microfoundations for a model of a competitive market for public services between local governments in polycentric regions. An important part of their model focused on subgroups of informed citizens, especially recent movers. Theoretical analysis was supplemented by an empirical study of the factors shaping accuracy of Long Island homeowners' information about relative expenditures and tax rates of their school districts. David Lowery, W. E. Lyons and Ruth Hoogland DeHoog criticize the relevance of this empirical evidence, suggesting the atypical nature of education as a service (especially in this site) and challenging the sufficiency of the demonstrated levels of information for generating a competitive market. Teske and his colleagues reply by pointing out the general importance of education throughout American local policymaking and by defending the relevance of their measures and conclusions for their market model.

The collapse of the League of Nations as an instrument of collective security has called forth a series of politico-legal reactions, of which perhaps the most symptomatic of the crisis in the international order is the new neutrality policy of the small European states. This new policy was prompted by the collapse of the League of Nations sanctions against Italy. After withdrawal from the League had been seriously discussed in some of the small European states, and just before the lifting of the sanctions against Italy by the League, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland published a joint declaration, on July 1, 1936, containing in a veiled form a cancellation of the obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant of the League.

Roughly two decades after the first issue of the American Political Science Review, sampling theory emerged to encourage learning about the many from the few. Once social scientists had worked out the selection procedures to deal with large and far-flung human populations, the stage was set for the scientific study of citizen behavior in national elections, as initially demonstrated by George Gallup in predicting the 1936 presidential race. This development unleashed a growing torrent of literature, which by now is simply overwhelming. The many high points in this literature could scarcely be listed, much less abstracted, in the brief compass allowed this essay. So I must invoke some severe selection principles in order to proceed.

Is local attention a substitute for policy representation? Fenno (1978) famously described how legislators develop personal ties with their constituents through periodic visits to their districts and carefully crafted communications. Existing work suggests that such interactions insulate incumbents electorally, creating less need to represent constituents’ policy preferences. Surprisingly, this important argument has never been tested systematically. In this paper, I use data on senator travel and staffing behavior along with survey data from the 2011–2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study to investigate this claim. In addition to showing that areas with important campaign donors are significantly more likely to receive resources, I find that local visits may decrease approval among ideologically opposed constituents. Furthermore, I find inconsistent evidence regarding the effectiveness of local staff. These results suggest that local attention does not always cultivate goodwill in the district. Under polarized politics, home style does not effectively substitute for policy representation.

The paper attempts, through an examination of Thucydides' treatment of a significant problem, to illustrate the character of an older approach to the understanding of politics and to argue, implicitly, for the validity of that approach. The approach in question is shaped by the thoughts that the barriers standing in the way of a “scientific” approach to politics are much greater than today is sometimes assumed and that there is no more direct path to the removal of those barriers than the painstaking elaboration and subsequent refinement of the assumptions which shape and frame our view of the issues of politics. Thucydides' “history” is seen as intended to facilitate such an elaboration and refinement; his treatment of Athenian imperialism is accordingly presented in various stages, which first appeal to the prejudices with which the reader is likely to approach the work and then lead him gradually, through an examination of these, to Thucydides' own understanding, which is much more heterodox than is ordinarily supposed.

One way of acquiring insight into the processes of political development in Latin America is to compare the countries of the area systematically in terms of the “degree of development” which each can be said to have attained. Ideally, such an enterprise can lead to the understanding of the past history of the “more developed” countries by reference to the present problems of the “less developed” while an understanding of the problems confronting the more developed countries can make possible a glimpse into the future of those now less developed. Isolation of the factors responsible for a state's being more or less developed can moreover prove instructive for the understanding of the relations between political and socioeconomic phenomena.

Perhaps most important, such comparisons provide the means for holding constant effects attributable to characteristics shared by all, or nearly all, of the Latin American countries. Thus it can be argued with much plausibility that military intervention in politics, say, derives from elements in the Hispanic tradition. Yet it is clear that the frequency of military intervention varies from country to country, even where they share equally in that tradidition. Thus one is forced to go beyond the “Hispanic tradition” thesis with which the investigation might otherwise have come to rest.

In the present article I will be concerned with the problem of the relation of political development to socioeconomic development in the Latin American context. For reasons that will become apparent below, I will not at this point attempt a rigorous analysis of the concept of political development, which has already been the subject of a large and rapidly growing literature.

The proof of Riker's size principle is inadequate for the general class of zero-sum bargaining games (whether symmetric or asymmetric), and the principle is valid only for a very restricted class of games—the supersymmetric games and their asymmetric counterparts. Butterworth's modification of the size principle (the maximum number of positive gainers principle) can be extended to cover games which are only approximately symmetric. Roll-call voting in the United States House of Representatives overwhelmingly violates the size principle; hence, the House does not generally play a supersymmetric zero-sum bargaining game. More generally, both Butterworth's and Riker's principles seem inapplicable to large bodies.