In the past seventy years, lasting reorientations of the national electorate have taken place in two periods, centering about the presidential elections of 1896 and 1918. Most other presidential elections have involved relatively uniform swings of states or counties toward one party or the other; Louis Bean summarized this phenomenon in his chapter title, “As Your State Goes, So Goes the Nation.” But the occasions when this uniform swing does not occur are of special interest, because if the reorientations persist they can mark the injection of new issues into national and state politics for a generation. Lubell noted the importance of the “Al Smith revolution” which preceded the “Roosevelt revolution”; and Key, naming these phenomena “critical elections,” went on to show that Bryan's candidacy in 1896 marked an earlier major reorientation of the electorate. He defined a critical election as one in which “the depth and intensity of electoral involvement are high, in which more or less profound readjustments occur in the relations of power within the community, and in which new and durable electoral groupings are formed.”

In the process of agenda setting, the U.S. Supreme Court is limited to selecting from among only those cases brought before it. Despite this limitation, the justices possess considerable discretion and can reshape the issues in a case as a means of advancing their policy preferences. With data drawn from the Court's opinions, we find that, over the past twenty-five years, the justices have evinced a frequent willingness to expand the issues on their plenary docket and resolve questions not formally presented by the parties. We conclude that, notwithstanding informal norms that disapprove of this practice, issue fluidity is an important component in a continuous program of agenda building.

Recent studies question whether declining response rates in survey data overstate the level of polarization of Americans. At issue are the sources of declining response rates—declining contact rates, associated mostly with random polling mechanisms, or declining cooperation rates, associated with personal preferences, knowledge, and interest in politics—and their differing effects on measures of polarization. Assessing 158 surveys (2004–2018), we show that declining cooperation is the primary source of declining response rates and that it leads to survey overrepresentation of people who are more engaged in politics. Analyzing individual responses to 1,223 policy questions in those surveys, we further show that, conditional on the policy area, this survey bias overestimates or underestimates the partisan divide among Americans. Our findings question the perceived strength of mass polarization and move forward the discussion about the effect of declining survey response on generalizations from survey data.

Do primary elections cause candidates to take extreme, polarized positions? Standard equilibrium analysis predicts full convergence to the median voter’s position with complete information, but behavioral game theory predicts divergence when players are policy-motivated and have out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Theoretically, I show that primary elections can cause greater extremism or moderation, depending on the beliefs candidates and voters have about their opponents. In a controlled incentivized experiment, I find that candidates diverge substantially and that primaries have little effect on average positions. Voters employ a strategy that weeds out candidates who are either too moderate or too extreme, which enhances ideological purity without increasing divergence. The analysis highlights the importance of behavioral assumptions in understanding the effects of electoral institutions.

According to the SRC-CPS surveys, the proportion of Americans identifying with a political party declined sharply between 1964 and 1976, from approximately 75 percent to 63 percent. In order to cast some light on the reasons for this dealignment, we examine the contributions made by the changing age composition of the electorate, the entry of new voters into the electorate, the party desertion among voters already in the electorate, and the suppression of age gains in partisanship. These four sources are shown to explain close to 100 percent of the aggregate decline from 1964 to 1976, with the single largest contribution made by entry of new voters. Nevertheless our findings indicate that the decline occurred throughout all age cohorts and suggest the potency of dealigning period forces. These forces simply had their strongest effect on those voters with predictably the least resistance, the youngest cohorts.

In spite of the enormous literature on propaganda recently surveyed by a committee of the Social Science Research Council, there has not as yet emerged a generally accepted definition of propaganda. Consequently, any discussion in this field requires at the outset some statement or general indication of what one is dealing with, in order to reduce misunderstanding. As political scientists, we are taking a strictly pragmatic view of propaganda, as completely removed as possible from the area of psychological controversies. We have, for the purposes of our studies, considered only such propaganda as is manifested in the organized activities involved in efforts to get people to take a particular step, such as to vote for Roosevelt, or to abstain from objecting to a particular step, such as the United States’ entry into the World War. These efforts, when promotional, may be denominated “a propaganda campaign.” Such a campaign proceeds by the organized dissemination of propaganda appeals. But these same appeals can, and do, operate without any organized promotion; and still they tend to influence those whom they reach. Many different kinds of individuals carry these appeals—teachers, writers, gossips, etc. From the viewpoint of propaganda analysis, they may be called “propagandizers.” In the course of a typical campaign, there appear propagandizers who indulge in various activities which are significant in spite of their unorganized nature. Different is the propagandist who participates in a propaganda campaign.

John Rawls's theory of justice tries to resolve the question of fair allocation: When, if ever, may some members of society claim rightful privilege over their fellows? Rawls's answer is maximin justice: inequalities are just if, by permitting them, society treats best those whom she treats worst. Rawls attempts to show that this rule binds us all under the terms of a social contract. The present paper tries to show that Rawls's theory will not stand scrutiny. The social contract, as he gives it, disfranchises all but a single social stratum: Why are others bound by it? The maximin principle, allegedly agreed to under this social contract, requires that we judge allocations by ignoring all but one of society's many strata. This leads in turn to arbitrary judgments including ones which at once increase inequality and decrease the total shared by society. An alternative argument is offered, beginning with a social contract requiring agreement on all inequalities among agents for a series of hypothetical social strata. This device is meant to bind all strata, and leads to a principle of general advantage: Inequalities are just if but only if they serve the advantage of some strata and the disadvantage of none. This seemingly paradoxical rule has a clear interpretation and avoids the main difficulties attributed to maximin justice. Like maximin, however, the new doctrine would evidently require a radical redistribution of income in a society like our own.

This article provides a partial test of the rational-technical model and of the patronage model of political mobility in the Soviet Communist Party. Two major hypotheses are examined: 1) the greater the number of patron client ties acquired by regional Party secretaries, the greater the probability of their upward mobility, and 2) the better the economic performance of the regions for which secretaries are responsible, the greater the probability of their upward mobility. Multiple regression analysis indicates only very weak support for these hypotheses for the 1955–1968 period in the RSFSR. Considerably greater support for the hypotheses is found when the following variables are controlled: level of economic development, political regime, and Party cohort. Changes in the level of policy conflict within the central elite are found to account for much of the variation over time in the explanatory power of the two models.

In the Internet era, people can encounter a vast array of political news outlets, many with which they are unfamiliar. These unknown media outlets are notable because they represent potential sources of misinformation and coverage with a distinctive slant. We use two large survey experiments to consider how source familiarity influences political communication. Although this demonstrates the public is averse to consuming news from unfamiliar media, we show that—conditional on exposure to them—unknown local and foreign media sources can influence public opinion to an extent similar to established mainstream news outlets on the same issues. This comparable effectiveness stems from the public’s charitable evaluations of the credibility of unfamiliar news sources and their relatively low trust in familiar mainstream media. We find avoidance of unknown news outlets, not resistance to their coverage, is the primary factor limiting their political influence.

How do parties protect themselves from electoral manipulation? To answer this question, we study the drivers of polling station party representatives’ presence and their impact on electoral outcomes in an environment where electoral irregularities are common. Using election data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, we find a robust positive correlation between the presence of party representatives and that party’s vote share. The evidence suggests that this correlation can be attributed to party representatives influencing the electoral results. We also formulate a game theoretic model of the levels of representation chosen by parties in a given precinct and structurally estimate its parameters. We find that parties send their representatives where they expect their opponents to send their own. The finding suggests representatives play a primarily protective role, even when they are often involved in irregularities themselves.

The production of economic surplus, or “prosperity,” was fundamental to financing the rise of pristine civilizations. Yet, prosperity attracts predation, which discourages the investments required for civilization. To the extent that the economic footing of civilization creates existential security threats, civilization is paradoxical. We claim that, in addition to surplus production, civilizations require surplus protection, or “security.” Drawing from archaeology and history, we model the trade-offs facing a society on its path to civilization. We emphasize preinstitutional forces, especially the geographical environment, that shape growth and defense capabilities and derive the conditions under which these capabilities help escape the civilizational paradox. We provide qualitative illustration of the model by analyzing the rise of the first two civilizations, Sumer and Egypt.

Bacon's New Atlantis presents a picture of human life governed by the new science to be produced by his reformation of the arts and sciences. Unlike his successor Hobbes, who forged a link between modern science and a certain, demonstrable doctrine of political rule, Bacon made no claim to found or present a political science. The reason for this is shown by an analysis of the political teaching of the New Atlantis. Bacon's political teaching is indirect, but it is the core of his comprehensive account of science and man. According to Bacon, the end of science is fully disclosed by political wisdom, and that wisdom shows the perfection of science to reverse the moral superiority of moderation over excess. The full meaning of Bacon's scientific utopia consists in a new stance toward the traditional problems of political philosophy.

We argue that state legislative politics is qualitatively different from national congressional politics in the extent to which it focuses on localized and geographically specific legislation salient to subconstituencies within a legislative district. Whereas congressional politics focuses on casework benefits for individual constituents, state legislative politics is more oriented to the delivery of localized benefits for groups of citizens in specific areas within a district, fostering a geographically specific group connection. A primary way to build such targeted geographical support is for members to introduce particularistic legislation designed to aid their specific targeted geographical area within the district. We argue that this is primarily a function of electoral rules. Using original sponsorship data from U.S. state houses, we demonstrate that greater district magnitude and more inclusive selection procedures such as open primaries are associated with more particularism. Our findings provide strong support for a voter-group alignment model of electoral politics distinct from the personal vote/electoral connection model that characterizes U.S. congressional politics and is more akin to patterns of geographically specific group-oriented electoral politics found in Europe and throughout the world.

Comparative political analysts seek empirical generalizations which will hold water across systems and over a period of time. Yet, modeling important political phenomena over more than a handful of countries is still rather unusual. One focus for substantial comparative research has been the coup d'état—an irregular change of governmental leadership by force—in African countries. Scholars who have engaged in this research find they have various conceptual and methodological differences of opinion. In this Controversy, Robert Jackman and Rosemary O'Kane raise the issues in dispute. Their contentions are answered by Thomas Johnson, Pat McGowan, and Robert Slater. The exchange highlights important research issues without necessarily resolving them.

This essay analyzes selected publications since 1974 on U.S. secret intelligence agencies. Published works divide into four categories: memoirs defending the intelligence system, whistle-blowing exposés, scholarly analyses, and reports from executive and congressional studies. What do these materials reveal about the variables determining intelligence system influence in foreign policy decisions? And what do they suggest about criteria for evaluating intelligence performance and product? The finding is that little conceptual progress has been made towards defining the functions of intelligence. But a substantial amount of new illustrative material is now at hand to explore hypotheses such as (1) that intelligence agencies report what they think leaders want to hear, (2) that leaders take decisions without regard to intelligence reports, and (3) that costs often exceed benefits in covert action overseas. We need to understand better the functions of intelligence and to develop theories about the interrelations of information, action, and power within the context of American democratic values. Towards these ends, the article urges the exploitation of the variety of evidence recently published.

The Committee on Research of the American Political Science Association was appointed by President William Anderson in 1942. A considerable number of sessions were held during 1942 and 1943 in Washington under the chairmanship of Ernest S. Griffith. Four different regions of research were assigned for more specific exploration through panels to four “conveners,” namely, International Relations (Walter R. Sharp, later Phillips Bradley); Political Theory (Benjamin Lippincott, later Francis G. Wilson); Public Law (Carl B. Swisher); Comparative Government (Karl Loewenstein).

In developing the panel on comparative government, the convener sent various circular letters and detailed questionnaires to some twenty-five members of the profession who, by their past performance, were believed to entertain active interest in the subject-matter. The original plan of having the group function as a round-table at the annual meeting of the Association in 1942 became a casualty of the war. But the sponsors were not easily discouraged, even though war duties limited their own and the participants' efforts. After an epistolary exchange of opinion extending over almost a year, a panel meeting was held in Washington on April 17 and 18, 1943, attended by twelve members coming from outside and six resident in Washington.

This article advances a novel theoretical account of what a “method” is and what makes one “rigorous,” and shows how it could advance contemporary debates in political theory and empirical methodology. Plato's Socrates invented the notion of method, and his characteristic practice of immanent refutation through questioning escapes key problems in more familiar views. Socratic method is (1) antifoundational, (2) non-algorithmic, and (3) indirect and relative to competing hypotheses, and it (4) develops its own standards of objectivity from the logic of asking questions. The article reconstructs Socrates’ method from the Platonic texts and shows how it provides reasonable criteria for judgment while remaining critical, sensitive to difference, and open to innovation. Socratic method avoids a forced choice between universalism and particularism in political theory, and it provides a common language for evaluating both quantitative and qualitative methods by drawing out a critical logic of empirical inquiry shared by both.

It is common for combatants to deliberately force civilians to flee their homes, resulting in incalculable loss for millions around the world. Existing accounts suggest combatants displace civilians whom they suspect are loyal to their opponents. And yet violence is also frequently motivated by local actors taking advantage of war to pursue private interests unrelated to wartime loyalties. However, little evidence exists of these dynamics with respect to displacement. Drawing on theories of opportunistic violence, I test an account in which surges in demand for land create incentives for elites to prey on peasants for their land. Combining new municipal and survey data from the Colombian armed conflict, I find evidence that the expansion of a land-intensive industry—African palm oil—precipitated opportunistic displacement by elites and paramilitary allies. The results demonstrate how elites can take advantage of war to engage in private accumulation and have implications for transitional justice policy.

Why do outside powers intervene in other countries’ elections? We distinguish between two types of electoral interventions: interventions in favor of the democratic process and interventions in favor of particular candidates and parties. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, outside powers often simultaneously pursue interventions of both types. Using a formal model of elections with bias, we argue that outside powers will always invest some resources in particular candidates, if they care about the differences in their proposed policies. Spending on the electoral process is driven by liberalism concerns and geopolitical interests. In some cases, liberal powers might decrease their amount of support for the electoral process if this engagement works against their favored candidate. We also consider the case of “election wars.” These occur when two outside powers simultaneously intervene on different sides of an election. Some of the observable implications of the model are briefly demonstrated using a new and original dataset.

Cue-taking is thought to be influential because legislators seek information from like-minded, trusted policy experts. Unfortunately for researchers, this self-selection process complicates efforts to separate the causal effects of cues from the tendency of legislators to communicate with similar peers. Prior causally-oriented research has estimated cues’ effects in exogenous networks, but not in the naturally-occurring communication networks that legislators themselves choose to form. This study examines cue-taking with two legislative field experiments, with over 2,000 observations in total, that model the diffusion of a randomly-assigned information treatment across an endogenous legislative network. Experimental results reinforce findings from classic interview-based studies of self-selected communication networks by Matthews and Stimson (1975) and Kingdon (1973): cue-taking influences a large percentage of policy positions and occurs late in the policymaking process. I also contribute to the literature by showing that on average cues complement, rather than substitute for, policy information from other sources of expertise within the legislature.