How do traumatic experiences shape individuals’ political behavior? Political scientists have investigated the behavioral changes caused by natural disasters and terrorist attacks, but no work to date has investigated the political consequences of such events using the framework of psychological trauma. In this study, I develop a theory of posttraumatic political response that explains how traumatic events influence voter turnout. To test this theory, I identify the effects of three different types of traumatic events: Black church arson attacks, mass shootings, and natural disasters. I find that a traumatic event decreases turnout in the next presidential election by 0.5–3.7 percentage points, but Black social identity conditions this effect—church arsons and Hurricane Katrina mobilize Black voters. Finally, I find that closer temporal proximity to an election increases the likelihood of a mobilizing effect.

According to an increasingly more widely held view, Leninist regimes tend to pump up mass-oriented policies during succession crises. Yet, this empirically based theory contains significant conceptual and methodological flaws, suggesting the need to reexamine the evidence and rethink the thesis. Using the Soviet evidence, a retest of its hypotheses fails to support this thesis. An alternative, consolidation connection is proposed here which considers the impact of political processes upon a General Secretary's capacity to innovate as well as his incentive structure. Tests of these hypotheses show a significantly higher rate of confirmation than the retest of the original thesis.

What drove an entire region in the Global South to significantly expand refugee protection in the early twenty-first century? In this paper, we test and build on political refugee theory via a mixed-methods approach to explain the liberalization of refugee legislation across Latin America. First, we use data from the new APLA Database, which measures legislative liberalization over a 30-year period, and test both general and region-specific immigration and refugee policy determinants through a series of nested Tobit and linear spatial panel-data regressions. Our models do not support some consistent predictors of policy liberalization identified by the literature such as immigrant and refugee stocks, democratization, and the number of emigrants, but they offer statistical evidence for the importance of leftist government ideology and regional integration. We then shed light on the causal mechanisms behind these correlations for two extreme but diverse cases: Argentina and Mexico. Based on process tracing and elite interviews, we suggest that the reason that leftist political ideology rather than institutional democratization and number of emigrants matters for policy liberalization is that Latin American executives embarked on symbolic human and migrant’s rights discourses that ultimately enabled legislative change.

What is the significance of the welfare state and struggles over social and economic needs for democratic politics? This article turns to Hannah Arendt's thought to articulate new possibilities for relating democratic agency and the welfare state, possibilities neglected by currently dominant deliberative and radical democratic approaches. Against critics who claim that Arendt seeks to purify politics of economic and social problems, I argue that she presents a sophisticated account of the vital importance of economic matters for public life. For Arendt, the danger is not the invasion of politics by economics, but rather the loss of the worldly, mediating institutions that allow economic matters to appear as objects of public concern. Reconstructing her account of these mediating institutions, I show that Arendt's analysis opens up novel insights into the relationship between democratic action and welfare institutions, drawing attention to how such institutions transform material necessity into shared objects of attachment, judgment, and action.

The pattern of international relations has always been in flux. The further we are removed from a period, the easier it is to discern its most salient features. So the fifteenth century now emerges as the time of the birth of the nation-state which was to become the key factor in international relations. Yet the supra-national church was not successfully challenged until the next century. Today it is clear that the French revolution completed the conversion of dynastic states into national states. In retrospect the 18th and particularly the 19th centuries are seen as the high point of the world expansion of Europe and the extension of its system of international relations. Now we realize that the Japanese victory over Russia in 1904–1905 marked the beginning of the counter-offensive against Europe. But what emerges sharply now was obscured then by a welter of incident.

When are inequalities in political power undemocratic, and why? While some writers condemn any inequalities in political power as a deviation from the ideal of democracy, this view is vulnerable to the simple objection that representative democracies concentrate political power in the hands of elected officials rather than distributing it equally among citizens, but they are no less democratic for it. Building on recent literature that interprets democracy as part of a broader vision of social equality, I argue that concentrations of political power are incompatible with democracy, and with a commitment to social equality more generally, when they consist in some having greater arbitrary power to influence decisions according to their idiosyncratic preferences. A novel account of the relationship between power and social status clarifies the role of social equality in the justification of democracy, including a representative democracy in which public officials have more political power than ordinary citizens.

Political borders profoundly influence outcomes central to international politics. Accordingly, a growing literature shows that historical boundaries affect important macro-outcomes such as patterns of interstate disputes and trade. To explain these findings, existing theories posit that borders have persistent effects on individual-level behavior, but the literature lacks empirical evidence of such effects. Combining spatial data on centuries of border changes in Europe with a wide range of contemporary survey evidence, we show that historical border changes have persistent effects on two of the most politically significant aspects of behavior: individuals’ political and social trust. We demonstrate that in areas where borders frequently changed, individuals are, on average, less trusting of others as well as their governments. We argue that this occurs because border changes disrupt historical state-building processes and limit the formation of interpersonal social networks, which leads to lower levels of trust.

I present a modified version of the public choice interest group model that integrates concentrated and deconcentrated interests with successful lobbying. It is argued that effective free trade lobbying required the political fusion of the economic interests representing two fundamental changes in nineteenth-century Britain's economy: (1) geographic concentration of the core export industry (cotton textiles) and (2) deconcentration of the broader export sector both geographically and in terms of industrial structure. Empirical evidence from both national and individual levels firmly supports the contention that the timing and political success of Britain's nineteenth-century free trade lobby required the combined forces of core export interests and the more diverse and geographically more evenly distributed interests of the export sector as a whole.

This article proposes a new interpretation of Tocqueville's thought, one that focuses on his account of religious psychology. From his observations of America, Tocqueville concludes that human beings have a natural hope for immortality—a hope that is driven by a paradoxical but ineradicable desire to affirm and forget oneself simultaneously. Tocqueville formulates this insight as a critique of the Enlightenment thinkers who laid the foundations for liberal democracy; I argue that he crafts his “new political science” to provide healthy outlets for the religious hopes whose existence these thinkers largely denied and whose anomalous presence in the United States has accordingly led to unforeseen dangers. Tocqueville's analysis not only helps us understand and begin to remedy those dissatisfactions that characterize democracy today but it also reveals his theoretical depth, political moderation, and sober assessment of our moral psychology in a way not seen before.

This article recovers Martin Buber’s important but neglected critique of Carl Schmitt’s political theology. Because Buber is known primarily as an ethicist and scholar of Judaism, his attack on Schmitt has been largely overlooked. Yet as I reveal through a close reading of his Biblical commentaries, a concern about the dangers of political theology threads through decades of his work. Divine sovereignty, Buber argues, is absolute and inimitable; no human ruler can claim the legitimate power reserved to God. Buber’s response is to uncover what he sees as Judaism’s earliest political theory: a “theopolitics,” where human beings, mutually subject to divine kingship, practice non-domination. But Buber, I show, did not seek to directly revive this religious vision. Instead, he sought to incorporate the spirit of theopolitics, as embodied by Israel’s prophets, into modern society. The result is a new and significant perspective on liberal democracy and political theology.

Political trust and political efficacy are concepts currently undergoing considerable discussion and revision. The discussion of voting behavior in Campbell et al. (1954), Almond's and Verba's (1965) version of the participation hypothesis, Gamson's (1968) trust-efficacy hypothesis, and Verba's and Nie's (1972) standard socioeconomic model represent quite distinct and contrasting stages in the treatment of these concepts, but share some assumptions requiring additional discussion and clarification. One of these pertains to treatment of political criticism, measured with low scores of trust in government, as political cynicism. This is not so much an operational or methodological question as a theoretical framework that has never had much to say about the role of criticism in contemporary democratic societies. This essay proffers a case in which, high levels of interpersonal distrust and high levels of government criticism notwithstanding, it is possible to make this basic distinction. Path analyses of data from a national-sample survey show that criticism is triggered by predominantly political orientations, while cynicism is a rigidified form of criticism inseparable from the social circumstances of individuals. In addition, the evidence suggests that the sense of political efficacy does not play the pivotal role assigned to it in the literature.

Two theories of community conflict are examined in this paper with data from elections in 89 cities in the San Francisco Bay area. One theory is developed from the work on group conflict by Georg Simmel and Lewis Coser while the other is a rational choice theory based on assumptions about the costs and risks of conflict in different size cities. Both theories suggest that conflict, while more frequent in larger communities, is likely to become most severe in smaller communities. Both theories are confirmed by the pattern of findings in the analysis, but the rational choice theory proves to have the greater generality, i.e., that it can explain more of the findings in the paper.

Our interest in the effect of aggregate economic variables on election results began in 1970 following a conversation with an administration official that we have reported elsewhere. We doubted both the implicit theory of voting behavior and the ability of the administration to achieve rates of inflation and unemployment even close to the ranges mentioned. We take this opportunity to note that the unemployment rate was higher and the inflation rate substantially higher than the adviser's estimate, but President Nixon was reelected.

At the time, the principal econometric evidence of the effects of aggregate economic variables was a study by Kramer. Kramer found evidence of an effect of real income, but despite (or perhaps because of) the flaws in his procedure, he found no evidence of an effect of inflation or unemployment. Furthermore, then and now, most of the reported evidence pertains to congressional not presidential elections and to votes for congressmen, not seats in the Congress.

Government in the United States is in considerable part local government, and of all local governmental units the county is most widely prevalent. Every state has counties (they are called parishes in Louisiana); in all states but Rhode Island the county is organized for governmental purposes; and, not with standing the existence of some areas without county organization, county government may be said virtually to blanket the nation. A generation ago, in a sub-title to one of the earlier books on the subject, the county was characterized as the “Dark Continent” of American Politics. Now, at mid-point in the century, it seems appropriate to reëxamine the county with a view to determining the extent to which the backward institution of the early 1900's has since been modernized and the directions in which further improvement may reasonably be expected in the future.

Perhaps most striking, in a comparison of present-day counties with those of a half-century ago, is the fact that, in total number of organized units (now 3,051) and in geographic outline, the county setup remains practically unchanged. Most present-day counties were established well before the turn of the century and, by and large, subsequent boundary changes have been few and of minor nature. A map of the nation's counties as of today would be scarcely distinguishable from one portraying the counties as of 1900 or even earlier.

In the December 1988 issue of this Review, John Dryzek and Stephen Leonard argued the need for “context-sensitive” histories of the discipline of political science. In their view, disciplinary history must guide practical inquiry if it is to be most useful. The course of their argument draws the criticisms of three political scientists concerned about the history of political science—James Farr, John Gunnell, and Raymond Seidelman. Dryzek and Leonard respond to their critics and underscore their own rationale for enhanced interest in the history of the discipline.

Recent decades have seen a vast increase of research in international relations, as in all fields of political and social science. We have more facts and many more expressions of opinion, and we are facing increasingly serious problems of reorientation. We know that much in the world of relations among nations has changed and is still changing, but what is the nature of this change? Is the world becoming more international? Is it turning into one world in which even the United States and the Soviet Union are influencing each other ever more, or at least into two worlds of two rival and ever more tightty integrated Communist and non-Communist blocs? Is the nation-state being superseded by the rise of new continent-wide or ocean-wide treaty organizations or federations?

And what is happening within most of the old and new nation-states, as they enter upon these new arrangements? Are their governments becoming more stable or less? Are their political and administrative capabilities rising or declining? Are power and prestige within these states shifting toward the elites or toward the masses of their populations? Are political controls of economic life in the long run growing or receding? Are we moving toward a world of “garrison states” or toward a world of “open societies,” or is the world moving in uncharted directions for which not even images have yet been found?

Surely, these seem sweeping questions. Scholars and men of affairs might be tempted to put them aside, and to turn their attention to the immediate business at hand. They may prefer the study of some particular conflict between two countries, or of the interests of this or that state, or of the merits of this or that policy at some particular moment. All serious questions, it has been argued, are particular and perhaps unique, and any broader and more general answers might be neither warranted nor wanted.

Such a retreat into the exclusive study of small-scale and short-range problems is based upon a fallacy. We cannot think about particular problems without making assumptions about the general context of the world in which they occur. Usually these assumptions are intuitive and vague. We form some indefinite conception of how states of a particular size and type of government and culture are expected to behave at particular times and places, and we feel surprised when some particular country departs strikingly from these half-formed expectations.

Since the last decade has witnessed an unparalleled outlay of energy in discussing public opinion, and in inventing devices intended to add precision to the discussion, it is not untimely to take stock of our present position in the matter. If this paper can be said to support a single thesis, it is that the problem of measurement can be considered most profitably in relation to a set of nuclear concepts about public opinion. To measure is to render more precise; measuring efforts which undertake to render faulty concepts more precise are foreordained to be more precisely faulty. I shall begin by passing certain general conceptions in review, and we shall see whether the upshot warrants us in believing that we shall thereby achieve a sounder view of the measurement problem.

Political changes come to pass by unreflecting innovation, by private planning and adjustment, and by acts which involve the attention of many people at some stage of their elaboration. Much of the etiquette of public administration has come into being without anyone taking thought of it. Much has been devised by a single person, who quietly transmitted his innovation to a limited circle, and ensured its permanence. But some of the features of political life have a more extended history. Men have argued, and even bled, for national independence, for the extension of the franchise, for the devolution of authority, for the qualified independence of the judiciary.

The analyst of campaign strategy in American elections is usually confronted by the apparent impossibility of demonstrating that campaign behavior actually matters. Although candidates possess numerous options in strategy and tactics, it is clear that incumbent members of the majority party (commonly joint phenomena) usually win and opposition candidates of the minority party usually lose. Lewis Froman has even argued that “ … the behavior of the candidates during the campaign is one of the least influential factors in determining electoral outcomes.

The effects, if any, of campaign behavior are the residue to be examined after the partisan distribution of the electorate, the nature of the times, the power of incumbency and any number of variables beyond the ready control of the candidates themselves have been employed to explain or predict the popular vote distribution. The perceived general ineffectiveness of candidate strategy and tactics is usually explained by the low public saliency of the typical election contest, in which most voters are unlikely to be aware even of the names of the candidates, much less their policy positions or, presumably, any other of their behaviors.

But this circumstance may change when “ordinary” election contests are connected to contests of much higher saliency, especially that for the Presidency. It is at this time, at least, when the strategic decisions and behaviors of certain classes of candidates may attract the attention of voters otherwise preoccupied with that more dramatic battle for power.